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This dissertation is a study of a portion of the panorama of 
mid-twentieth century military manpower policy. Although there has not 
been much study of any of the aspects of military policy, manpower re­
search has been especially meager. Partially because of the shortage of 
information, the nation has yet to make any solid decisions on manpower 
policy. For lack of a policy, we continue selective service. Unknow­
ingly, we allow our administrators to bring us to the brink of universal 
military training. We still have only a vague idea of the desirability 
of a big Reserve program.
This study is an exploration into the policy-making structure of 
the Army Reserve Forces with particular emphasis on the role of the pres­
sure groups. After setting the stage of postwar Reserve activities, it 
describes the locale of pressure group efforts— in the administrative 
hierarchy, in Congress and in three special boards. Special attention 
is paid to the National Guard Association, composed of approximately
35,000 National Guard officers, and the Reserve Officers Association, 
composed of about 65,000 Reserve officers of the various military ser­
vices. The Regular Army, as a pressure group, is also considered. An 
inquiry is made into the nature of these interest groups, their goals, 
and the extent to which they have influenced Army Reserve Forces policy.
111
particularly in five agencies of the Department of the Army,
Reserve Forces policy has been made in a milieu dominated by 
intrinsic, technical factors such as the suitability of Reserve Forces 
in atomic warfare, the difficulties in keeping ready to fight, recruit­
ing troubles, problems of federalism, the deficient numbers of enlisted 
men, the over-supply of high-ranking officers, and the general function­
al problems growing out of the cold war. No attempt is made to analyze 
any of these basic problems, except as vehicles to show the influence of 
interest groups.
The author gratefully acknowledges the help of Dr. Joseph C. 
Pray, Department of Government, University of Oklahoma for valuable 
criticism of the manuscript throughout its preparation. Other important 
aid was received from my dissertation committee, from the staff of the 
University of Oklahoma Library, from a variety of public officers, and 
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CHAPTER I
THE ARI4Y RESERVE FORCES IN THE POSTWAR ERA
The Reserve Forces of the Army of the United States, which in­
cludes the National Guard, continue to have a controversial role. This 
is for a variety of reasons. There is a widespread conviction that 
"weekend warriors" can never be trained to the degree necessary to win 
a modern war where almost every job requires considerable technical 
ability. Numerous military authorities support this view. Air Brigadier 
General Dale 0. Smith's provocative volume, United States Military Doc­
trine,̂  stresses professionalism as one of the fundamental necessities
of mid-twentieth century defense. Samuel P. Huntington has put mili-
2tary professionalism at the crux of the civil-military relationship.
In a similar vein, the celebrated military analyst for the New York 
Times. Hanson Baldwin, has said that "any legislation which strengthens
3the reserves at the expense of the regulars is not worth the price."
iDale 0. Smith, United States Military Doctrine (New York: Duell, 
Sloan and Pierce, 1955)»
^Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State (Cambridge; 
Harvard University Press, 1957)> p. 7*
^New York Times, June 9, 1945, p. 6.
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Walter Millis, editorial writer for the New York Herald Tribune 
has severely criticized reliance on reserve forces:
While the British were disbanding their reserve divisions, 
the United States was adopting the National Reserve Act of 1955» 
which contemplated (among other things) a force of no less than 
thirty-seven National Guard and Reserve divisions— none, however, 
to be maintained at full strength or with full equipment, and 
the whole force requiring anywhere from three months to a year 
before it could be made combat ready.^
Several other authorities including Dr. Vannevar Bush, wartime 
chief of research and development, and presidential candidate Adlai E. 
Stevenson have expressed a doubt of the value of bulky reserves in an 
atomic-powered army.
Such observers emphasize the likelihood that nuclear weapons 
will dominate any future hostilities. They speak of the failure to 
build bigger bombs and bigger airplanes to carry them as tantamount to 
national suicide. They see victory as stemming almost entirely from the 
scientific laboratory. They discount the possibility of outlawing the 
strategic atomic bonib, and they claim the maintenance of a large ground 
army is not justified.
To the extent that a clear-cut policy was announced, this was 
the view of the Eisenhower administration. From 1953 to 1955, it came 
to be called the "new look" in military affairs. The policy emphasized 
atomic weapons— tactical as well as strategic— whereby United States 
power would be strengthened while manpower levels held steady. It recog­
nized the futility of competing with Russia for manpower superiority.
^Walter Millis, Arriis and Men, A Study of American Military History 
(New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1956), p. 354*
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The opposing view calls for readiness to fight "limited wars" 
in which, for some reason, nuclear weapons are not used or at least are 
used only in tactical situations. The Korean War, where 33,629 men died 
in a local war without the use of nuclear weapons, is cited as historical 
proof that "limited wars" can occur. Deterrence, the believers in this 
concept say, must involve more than deterrence against atomic bombs. It 
is not a case of total atomic war or total peace— there are gray areas. 
The United States must be ready with tremendous numbers of ground troops 
in case a "limited war" comes. The Reserve, it is claimed, can fulfill 
this need.
The dangers of a "no middle ground" policy between total atomic 
war and total peace were pointed out by Henry A. Kissinger, who in 1957 
achieved recognition as an authority on military-diplomatic cold war 
strategy after publication of his influential book. Nuclear Warfare and 
Foreign Policy. Here, and on other occasions, he asked for a "military 
and diplomatic framework which would cause war, if it does come, to take 
less absolute forms which might spare humanity at least the worst horrors 
of nuclear conflict."5
As of 1958, the technical military questions are as yet un­
answered. Little is known, for instance, of the need for massive numbers 
of infantry troops where only tactical nuclear weapons are used. It may 
be that even those most anxious about small local wars will find such 
wars fought as artillery duels— using atomic cannon— without even the 
need for infantry to hold ground taken by the cannon. With such
^Henry A. Kissinger, "Controls, Inspections and Limited War," 
Reporter. 16 (June 13, 1957), 14.
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questions unresolved by either military or political decision-makers, 
the tendency has been to steer a middle course. Many people, still 
seeking answers, compromised by supporting the "new look" while simul­
taneously speaking well of a large ground force composed mostly of Re­
serves.
Even the 1957 chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral 
Arthur W. Radford, generally considered the architect of the "new look," 
hesitates to fully de-emphasize the Reserves. On January 30, 1957, in 
testimony before the House Appropriations Committee, he spoke of the 
existence of a large Reserve as a "possible deterrent to an impending 
war."^ In answer to a question by Representative George H. Mahon, Demo­
crat of Texas, on whether Reserve Forces are still needed, Radford said, 
"New-type warfare, in which atomic weapons might be used, downgrade the 
importance of the inactive and standby Reserves, but makes the ready 
Reserve more valuable . . .  an even more important role for the Reserves 
would be the use to restore order in the event of a surprise attack."
A more comprehensive statement of the role of the Army Reserve 
Forces in current plans has been made by Army Chief of Staff Maxwell D, 
Taylor. Speaking before the 1957 National Convention of the Reserve 
Officers Association at Santa Barbara, California, he asked that the 
United States be ready for any eventuality— any type of war. Such a 
view gives the Reserves a formidable place in our defense, "The enemy 
must see clearly," General Taylor said, "that if he engages in any 
aggression, he will be met quickly and decisively by Army men on the
Ârmy Times (Reserve Edition), May 4, 1957, p. 1.
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ground, standing between him and the objective of his aggression." He 
described the over-all system of American defense as follows:
In the first line of national defense will be our Army forces 
abroad. . . .  If these forces become engaged, we must come to 
their aid promptly and effectively. This need for a ready re­
inforcement in the United States requires us to maintain a group 
of active Army divisions at home which we call the Strategic 
Army Force, . . .  At units, that because of their requirement 
for readiness there is no job for the reserves in the important 
strategic force. I take an opposite view— I believe we can and 
should use some reserves in this force.?
This concept of immediate use of the Reserve is relatively new. 
Although the National Guard boasts of three centuries of service to the 
states and nation, and although the Army Reserve organization has 
existed since 1916, neither organization has had much practical import­
ance in war plans, so far as immediate use is concerned. For most of 
our national history up to World War I, the Guard has been used primarily 
for state functions, and national mobilization was usually accompanied 
by legal and practical complications. Even in the World War II mobili­
zation, the Guard’s effectiveness was riddled by the discharge, on the 
eve of war, of many husbands and fathers.
The Army Reserve never amounted to much more than a list of offi­
cers who wanted, in case of war, to retain their officer status. The 
first mention of an Army Reserve occurred in 1908 when Congress provided 
for the appointment of doctors of medicine as Reserve officers in the 
Army Medical Corps. The Reserve, as an organization, was created in the 
National Defense Act of 1916. It was for the principal purpose of shep­
herding together the graduates of the new Reserve Officer Training Corps
"̂’’Objective: Readiness," Army Reservist, 3 (Sept., 1957), 4.
6
and! the Civilian Military Training Gamps. These two programs continued 
to produce officers who received almost no mere training after gradua­
tion and who were definitely not ready for immediate use in battle.
The Army Reserve and National Guard have always been small in 
size. In 1921, with nearly all World War I officers eligible, the Army 
Reserve amounted to only 66,000.® In 1929, it reached a peak pre-World 
War II strength of 110,000, and this included the Air Corps Reserve, 
then a part of the Army. The National Guard in 1939 numibered 175,000.
Planning for a post-World War II Army civilian component program 
began in 1944.' General of the Army George C. Marshall, wartime Chief of 
Staff, issued War Department Circular 347 on August 25, 1944, which was 
to be "the basis for all plans for a postwar peace establishment." He 
described the goal as follows:
The type of military institution through which the national 
manpower can be developed is based upon the conception of a pro­
fessional peace establishment (no larger than necessary to meet 
normal peacetime requirements) to be reenforced in time of emer­
gency by organized units drawn from a citizen reserve, effectively 
organized for this purpose in time of peace; with full oppor­
tunity for competent citizen soldiers to acquire practical ex­
perience through temporary active service and to rise by succes­
sive steps to any rank for which they can definitely qualify; 
and with specific facilities for such practical experience, 
qualification, and advancement definitely organized as essential 
and predominating characteristics of the peace establishment.
General Marshall's Circular 347 (1944) was the basis of more 
specific policies? issued late in 1945. These were compiled in the 
traditional staff methods and presented to Marshall, who in turn got them
ACol. Arthur Roth, "Development of the Army Reserve Forces," 
Military Affairs. XVII (Spring, 1953), 3.
^Approved War Department Policies of October 13, 1945 Affecting the 
National Guard and Organized Reserve.
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approved by Secretary of War Robert P. Patterson.10 However, according 
to Section 5 of the National Defense Act of 1920,H  all policies affect­
ing the National Guard must be submitted for recommendations to the 
general staff committee on National Guard policy, composed of an equal 
number of National Guard officers and Army staff members. The 1945 pol­
icies were formulated through this process.
These policies were prepared at a time when military appropria­
tions were generous. Also, at the time, there was an assumption that a 
universal military training bill would be passed, thus removing all wor­
ries of an adequate source of manpower. Consequently, the planning 
eventually proved to be highly unrealistic. The troop basis for the 
National Guard was set at 475,000 men of whom 278,000 were to be organized 
into 27 divisions at either 75 per cent or 40 per cent strength. The 
Organized Reserve Corps was to have 579,000 men of whom 96,000 were to 
be organized into 25 divisions. These were to be maintained at 200 per 
cent officer strength and ten per cent enlisted strength.
The unrealistic and unattainable requirements of the 1945 poli­
cies eventually became apparent. Clarifying policies were published 
December 13, 1946, and a complete revision of the troop basis occurred 
in 1949. Under the new doctrine, the National Guard was to be the pri­
mary mobilization day force for the Reserve Forces. The Organized Re­
serve Corps was to organize only those combat units which the Regular
l^File 326.6 Organized Reserve Corps (1945), Departmental Records 
Branch, contains staff papers on this subject.
^Department of the Army, Act of June 1920 (4I Stat. 759).
^^New York Times. May 1, 1949, p. 41.
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Army or the National Guard could not organize, equip and train. Need­
less to say, sucn a plan remained controversial as long as it lasted.
As early as September, 1946, Brigadier General E. A. Evans, the execu­
tive director of the Reserve Officers Association, had traveled over 
the West declaring that "the War Department was not being absolutely 
on-the-level with Reserve officers."̂ 3
The program hit other snags. Although the law seemingly re­
quired World War II veterans to be transferred to the Reserve Forces, 
this was not accomplished. Section 3 (c) of the Selective Service Act 
of 1940 required each draftee upon his release from the service to be:
. . . transferred to a reserve component of the land or naval 
forces of the United States until he attains the age of forty- 
five or until the expiration of a period of ten years after 
such transfer. . . .
The Army chose to disregard this requirement and consequently was se­
verely criticized by Reserve enthusiasts. Colonel William H. Neblett, 
former president of the Reserve Officers Association, declared among 
other things that the Army’s disregard of the provision was "illegal."^ 
Even if Colonel Neblett’s wishes had been followed, the Army Re­
serve would have amounted to little more than a bulky, overflowing pool 
of veterans, many of whom wanted no more contact with military activities, 
At the end of the war, as before, the Organized Reserve Corps had
no organization, traditions, leaders or facilities. It is true that
mandatory transfer to the Reserves might have encouraged more men to
l^letter from Brig. Gen. Frank Merrill (6th Army) to Brig. Gen. E,
S. Bres (Executive for Reserve and ROTC Affairs), Sept. 18, 1946, Depart­
mental Records Branch, Department of the Army.
14william H. Neblett, Pentagon Politics (New York: Pageant Press, 
1953), p. 22.
9
participate in Reserve Forces training, but it would have helped only 
slightly. There was a general deep-seated antagonism for things of a 
military nature; too many Reservists had been mistreated. Memories were 
too fresh of inequities in their original appointments, mal-assignments, 
deprivation of "civilian" liberties and inadequate leadership. The few 
who did seek appointment in the Army Reserve Forces were frequently 
ridiculed by their former military associates.
Colonel Neblett’s plan would have made it possible, however, to 
maintain contact with the thousands of former officers and men who, at 
some later date, might have been persuaded to attend training as a citi- 
zen-soldier. As it happened, thousands"of veterans were lost to the 
Reserves.
In the first stages of the Russian-American cold war, the Army 
became alarmed that almost no information was available concerning the 
officers and men who had accepted Reserve commissions at the close of 
the war. Questionnaires were sent out by registered mail to determine 
which persons remained "available to the Organized Reserve Corps pro­
gram. "^5 This nationwide survey revealed that about seventy per cent 
of the officers currently on the Organized Reserve Corps rolls (but not 
National Guard) desired to remain there. The remainder desired discharge. 
At the time. Brigadier General Wendell Westover, Executive for Army Re­
serve and ROTC Affairs, said in a memorandum to Lieutenant General 
Willard S, Paul, Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel -nd Administration,
l^Fiie 326.2 Organized Reserve Corps (1948), Department Records 
Branch, Department of the Army.
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that the number who desired discharge was "lower than anticipated."Ï&
The Organized Reserve Corps had dropped, indeed, to a low ebb.
It is impossible to pin-point the cause of the troubles. The 
Regular Army has been accused of sabotaging the Reserve program. How­
ever, its force commitments around the world, even with the best of in­
tentions, might have made the construction of a big Reserve program 
almost beyond its reach, considering the resources and facilities avail­
able. At least, very little was done.
The Navy, on the other hand, started off the postwar period with 
a well developed Reserve plan. Money was requested from Congress for 
the erection of armories; equipment was supplied by the Navy department, 
and units were established throughout the United States. Even before 
the beginning of World War II, the Navy department had achieved the pas­
sage of a law providing for drill pay for each participant in the naval 
program.
The Navy’s enthusiasm did not spread to the Army. There was no 
drill pay, no retirement program, no accident or death benefits for 
training mishaps. There were no government-owned armories in existence 
for the Organized Reserve Corps, and none were being built. The National 
Guard had only those buildings financed exclusively by the state govern­
ments. Equipment in both components was inadequate, although millions 
of pieces of World War II production were being junked or sold as surplus.
The situation brought many complaints from enthusiastic reser-
% b id.. June 11, 1948.
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vists. The president of the Ohio Reserve Officers Association declared
publicly, as early as 1946, that the program was getting off to a bad
start in the Pentagon.1? Brigadier General Donald B. Adams, 1946-47
national president of the Reserve Officers Association, complained
strongly at a commanders* conference in the Pentagon on January 22,
1947, about the disgruntled and discouraged attitudes of Reservists.
Almost simultaneously, Hanson Baldwin attacked the Pentagon’s "unreal-
1 0-istic" Reserve policies. He spoke of the Oklahoma National Guard as 
the one exception which has "led the Army in the postwar reorganization 
of the Guard, due in considerable measure to the leadership of Lieuten­
ant General Raymond S. McLain, a native Oklahoman."
By 1948, the Pentagon staff agencies, especially the Office of 
the Executive for Reserve and ROTC Affairs, were being showered with 
complaints. The 1948 files for the office reveal many bitter letters 
from high-ranking reservists, and usually these reservists were not 
bashful about writing to their congressman about the situation. The 
office spent considerable time answering the polite inquiries and embar­
rassing questions sent over from Capitol Hill. In other Pentagon offices, 
there seemed to be little concern about the dilapidated Reserve.
The Office of the Executive for Reserve and ROTC Affairs was 
relatively incapable of doing much about the complaints or fostering im­
provements. The office was low in the Pentagon hierarchy and restricted
17pile 322 Org. (1946), Departmental Records Branch, Department of 
the Army.
^%ew York Times, March 17, 1947, p. 8.
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to the performance of staff functions under the leadership of several 
Regular Army assistant chiefs of staff and deputy chiefs of staff— all 
of whom were more interested in preparing against Communist aggression 
overseas.
When questioned on the lack of progress among the Reserve com­
ponents, the Army denied any lack of enthusiasm for a strong program; 
the problem was simply the lack of resources. With declining appropria­
tions, the Army declared that every available dollar was needed to main­
tain occupation troops abroad in addition to a minimum Regular Army 
"mobilization day" force at home. Regular officers could not be spared 
to serve as instructors in Reserve units, and there was no money for 
constructing armories or recruiting reservists.
Many compromises were suggested. At one point, there was a 
willingness to accept, as better than nothing at all, a system whereby 
Reserve officers would organize, with almost no surveillance by Army 
authorities, into informal discussion g r o u p s . 9̂ in big cities, such 
groups would be segregated according to branch of service. In less pop­
ulated areas, there would be only one big composite group. These organ­
izations would supposedly "be able to train themselves" and would "re­
quire only the use of a meeting place and the official sanction of the 
local reserve headquarters." The idea was never implemented.
The discouraging situation was further complicated by disagree-
^%emorandum to the Director of Organization and Training from the 
Office of the Executive for Reserve and ROTC Affairs, signed by Colonel 
Charles A. Miller, Sept. 25, 1%6, Departmental Records Branch, Depart­
ment of the Army,
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ment between the Organized Reserve Corps and the National Guard. In 
the approved policies of 1945 and 1946 the priority position of the 
Guard over the Organized Reserve Corps was emphasized, and it was a 
constant source of bitterness. The Guard had been allotted more combat 
divisions, where the greater part of the positions of high military rank 
are found. In addition, personnel priorities were given to the National 
Guard; the law provided for draft exemptions for its men, while Organ­
ized Reserve Corps men continued to be vulnerable to the draft.
The tended also to be some envy on the part of Organized Re­
serve Corps men for the Guard’s traditional place of prestige and power. 
The Organized Reserve was a postwar organization while the National 
Guard boasted of three centuries of service to state and nation. At 
almost any minute, the Guard and its friends could manufacture tremen­
dous pressure on Congress— usually enough to defeat any unfavorable leg­
islation. While it hesitated to engage the Pentagon in a power strug­
gle, the Guard had little fear of defeat in any bout with the youthful 
Organized Reserve.
Other complications, of great importance in explaining the post­
war troubles of the civilian components, stemmed from the "military fed­
eralism" contained in the militia clause of the United States Constitu­
tion. The founding fathers had sought a "well-regulated militia"^^ in 
each of the states. They gave to Congress the power to provide for 
organizing, arming, and training the militia, but reserved to the states, 
respectively, the appointment of all officers and the actual training
20u. S. Constitution. Art. 4> sec. 8, clause l6.
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of the troops.21 Under rules which were developed during the last cent­
ury, the Guard could be called into national service by the President 
of the United States. Naturally, the frictions resulting from the sys­
tem were tremendous. As will be later shown, it has appeared, on oc­
casion, that the National Guard and Regular Army have been more interested 
in fighting each other than in preparing to fight a common enemy.
The historical evolution of the antagonism was affected greatly 
by the increased willingness of the national government, after 1900, to 
subsidize National Guard operations. Since that time, the use of fin­
ancial subsidies has helped to bend the Guard to the national will.
Still, however, the National Guard has continued to be administered en­
tirely by state personnel largely for the performance of state functions. 
Particular criticism erupted sporadically over the use of National Guard 
troops by state authorities in activities distasteful to the nation as 
a whole. The most prominent examples concern their use to curtail labor 
strikes and to prevent integration of Negroes into Southern white
V -, 22schools.
The handicaps arising from the dual status of the National Guard, 
as well as other roadblocks to an effective Reserve program, caused the 
Secretary of Defense, James V. Forrestal, to appoint a board in November, 
1947 to study the entire Reserve Forces program. It was named the Com­
mittee on Civilian Components, but came to be popularly called the "Gray
^^National Guard Association, Our Nation*s National Guard (Washing­
ton; National Guard Association, 1954), p. 23.
M. Rich and P. H. Burch, Jr., "The Changing Role of the 
National Guard," American Political Science Review, 50 (Sept., 1956), 702.
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board,” after its chairman, Gordon Gray, Assistant Secretary of the 
Army and tobacco millionaire. The board’s duties, which included the 
determination of recommendations on all branches of the service, were 
carried out at sixty-five meetings in which eighty-nine witnesses were 
heard. The recommendations, issued June 30, 1948, were sufficiently 
drastic to produce news headlines for several days. The board suggested 
ending the dual status of the National Guard, It condemned the bicker­
ing, recriminations, factionalism and stalemate resulting from state con­
trol of the Guard,The Organized Reserve Corps and the National Guard 
should be merged to form the Army Reserve Forces, 4̂ the board said. The 
.states should be expected to organize home guard units for local emer­
gency purposes, as they did while the Guard was in national service dur­
ing World War II, under the militia clause of the United States Consti­
tution,
Active opposition to the Gray board report came from governors, 
the National Guard Association, and state military chiefs. The National 
Guard Association took the starring role in the controversy. It declared 
the denial of the Guard’s dual status was a violation of the spirit of 
the Constitution and was, militarily speaking, an unwise recommendation, 
"The Association eloquently reaffirmed the tradition of the citizen 
soldier, completely overlooking the fact that a national militia was no 
less composed of citizens than a state militia."̂ 5
^^Louis Smith, American Democracy and Military Power (Chicago; 
University of Chicago Press, I95I), p, 312,
^Committee on Civilian Components, Reserve Forces for National 
Security (Washington: Government Printing Office, I948), p, 9,
25louis Smith, 0£jj_ cit,, p, 312,
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A large percentage of the Gray board’s recommendations were 
eventually put into action, but the federalization of the National Guard 
was rapidly abandoned. It was a Presidential election year— not a pro­
pitious time to infuriate strong National Guard interests.
The ever-growing chaos in world affairs and the increasing dis­
satisfaction of the Reserve Officers Association and the National Guard 
Association produced a tense state in Reserve affairs in 1948 and 1949»
In a well calculated move, the Pentagon installed the first reservist to 
occupy the post into the office of the Executive of Reserve and ROTC 
Affairs. His persistent nudging for a stronger Reserve program started 
early in his tenure and matured into strong demands before the end of 
1948. On September 18, 1948, in a memorandum to the General Staff Com­
mittee on Reserve and National Guard Policy, he asked that the Army take 
notice of his April 15, 1948 recommendations. "More than fifty per cent 
of the officer personnel of the Organized Reserve Corps has been lost to 
the program,he told the committee’s chairman. "There must be an over­
haul of the Approved Policies of 1945 and 1946. The penalties accruing 
from the over-long adherence to these policies are now clearly defined." 
He asked for the rescission of all priorities giving preferential treat­
ment to the National Guard over that portion of the Organized Reserve 
Corps which is necessary for the mobilization base. "The conclusion is 
inescapable," Wendell Westover, the Executive for Reserve and ROTC
26Memorandum from the Executive, Reserve and ROTC Affairs, to the 
Chairman, General Staff Committee on Organized Reserve and National 
Guard Policy, dated Sept. 16, 1948. Files 326 (l6 Sept. 48), Depart­
mental Records Branch, Department of the Army.
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Affairs, said, "that the prolonged period of relative stagnation of the 
Reserve component while the National Guard has ridden a gravy train of 
priorities must end without delay."2?
The immediate effect of Westover’s efforts was the publication 
on October 29, 194&, of the Revised Clarification of Department of the 
Army Policies Pertaining to the National Guard and Organized Reserve 
Corps, but his other goals were not accomplished. Nevertheless, his 
demands spurred on some general attempts to improve the riddled Reserves. 
Among other bits of progress, the Republican 80th Congress in its last 
days investigated the situation without much effect except to spotlight 
the problem in the public mind. The passage of the Selective Service 
Act of 1948, however, was of major importance. It gave Reserve obliga­
tions to draftees being released from active s e r v i c e . 28
Of still more consequence was an order issued by President Harry 
S.Truman on October I5, 1948, to Secretary of Defense James V. Forrestal
2 7 j b i d . . p. 2 .
®̂The Selective Service Act of 1948, enacted June 24, 1948, pro­
vided that men from 19 to 26 years old, who were inducted for twenty-one 
months should serve in a Reserve component for five years, but they were 
not required to render active duty service or attend drills or classes.
By enlisting for three years in an organized unit, a man could cut down 
his five year obligation, or he could discharge it by remaining an extra 
year on active duty. The Reserve obligation was similar for those who 
volunteered in the Regular Army for twenty-one months. Eighteen year olds 
could enlist for one year up to a maximum of 160,000 men, but their Re­
serve obligation was six years during which time they could be recalled 
for one month each year for active duty training. These men were re­
quired to fill any vacancies which occurred in an organized Reserve unit, 
and in such a case their obligation was cut to four years. Failure to 
accept appointment in an Organized Reserve vacancy resulted in liability 
for recall to active duty for twelve months. Since enlistment in an or­
ganized unit of a Reserve component meant deferment from active duty, the 
law had the effect of increasing the voluntary enlistments, or at least 
this was the intended effect of the legislation.
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requiring a report within sixty days on the condition of the Reserves. 
Hanson Baldwin referred to the presidential command as "possibly an ab­
erration of Major General Harry Vaughan,"^9 the President’s military 
aide and a staunch reservist. There was other speculation at the time 
on the origin of the order. It was more likely a subtle and deft stroke 
by the Reserve Officers Association lobby, and, considering the impend­
ing presidential election, it probably was intended by the administration 
to pick up the political support of thousands of Reserve officers.
The executive order was couched in urgent tones, so much so that 
it was reportedly reworded at the last minute to avoid alarming the pop­
ulation.̂ 0 It said:
1. The Secretary of Defense and the head of each department 
in the National Military Establishment, shall proceed without 
delay utilizing every practicable resource of the regular com­
ponents of the armed forces, to organize all Reserve component 
units, and to train such additional individuals now or hereafter 
members of the Active Reserve, as may be required for the national 
security; and to establish vigorous and progressive programs of 
the Reserve components, including the National Guard.
2. The Secretary of Defense shall within sixty days after the
date of this order submit to the President a report showing action 
which has been taken by the National Military Establishment in re­
spect hereof, and any proposed legislation or other measures 
deemed necessary or appropriate in the interest of the maximum 
effectiveness of the reserve components of the Armed Forces.
3. Every citizen is urged to do his utmost in aiding the de­
velopment of effective Reserve components of our Armed Forces, 
and every person who is a member of a Reserve component of the
Armed Forces or viio is qualified to become one is urged to take
an active part in building up the strong and highly trained Re­
serve forces which are so vital to the defense of the United
^%ew York Times. Oct. 18, 1948, p. 9»




Accompanying the Order was a letter to Forrestal suggesting:
. . . (l) the assignment of an active, capable, high-ranking offi­
cer to head the Reserve program in each department. (2) the as­
signment of an adequate number of young vigorous officers as in­
structors and administrative officers in programs of Reserve 
training. (3) increased attention on the part of all General 
Staff divisions to planning and directing Reserve activities and 
reviewing accomplishments thereunder. (4) the development and 
institution of training programs . . . and (5) the provision of 
more adequate training facilities. . . .
Secretary Forrestal’s reply, dated December 14, 1948» was com­
piled from reports rendered by the various departments within the National 
Military Establishment after the interchange of comments among the sec­
retaries.32 John H. Ohley, Special Assistant to Secretary of the Army 
Kenneth Royal, prepared most of the Army report, which followed a basic 
outline laid down by Assistant Secretary of the Army Gordon Gray. The 
report told what had been done, what can be done by the Army, and what 
decisions must be made in Forrestal’s office.
Simultaneously feverish actions began in the Department of the 
Army. As directed by the President, the executive order itself was given 
wide distribution among Reservists scattered throughout the nation. Ap­
proval was given to the field by teletype on October 20th to initiate 
procedures to organize substantially all of the Organized Reserve Corps 
units of the current eighteen division Army plan, which had lain unimple-
3lExecutive Order 10007, Oct. 15, 1948.
^^File 326 (5 Nov 4Ô), Departmental Records Branch, Department of 
the Army.
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mented so long in Pentagon files. A survey of facilities suitable as 
locations for 1949 summer camps was begun '*with a view of expansion."
A program of mobilization assignments for reservists not in organized 
units was put into action in accordance with plans announced July 2, 
1948. Major Charles ¥. Ryder was appointed Special Assistant to the
Chief of Staff (Army) for Civilian Components, and weekly meetings were 
scheduled in Army officialdom to coordinate planning for the Reserve 
Forces,
The General Staff Committee on Reserve and National Guard Policy 
was convened from November 8th to the 13th, 1948, to consider the Presi­
dent’s order. As might be expected of an advisory board composed mostly 
of members of the civilian components, it recommended drastic actions to 
accomplish the President’s objectives. They asked for the appointment 
of a special troop basis board to reconsider the 1946 policies on the 
composition of the mobilization day force. Even more spectacular was 
their recommendation to place an officer in charge of the Reserves on 
the level of the deputy chiefs of staff within the Army organization, 
together with other organizational changes. The assignment of "2,500 
additional young and vigorous instructors and assistants" to the Reserve 
program was also recommended.
Almost all of these recommendations were received with a "we will 
do the best we can" attitude in Regular Army circles, but several were 
"deferred pending further study."
One General Staff committee recommendation that was carried
33Department of the Army Circular 199 (1948).
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through to completion was a reappraisal of the 1946 troop basis. By 
1949, discontent over the favoritism shown to the National Guard had 
brought the appointment of a special study board in the Department of 
the Army, It was a distinguished group of Americans, headed by former 
Secretary of State James F. Byrnes, and included the presidents of the 
Reserve Officers Association and the National Guard Association. When 
the report of the board was rendered, the committee had again given the 
Organized Reserve Corps a place in the third line of defense— after the 
Regular Army and the National Guard. As a result. Brigadier General 
Westover ’̂ bitterly opposed” the recommendations espoused by the group. 
Colonel Clarence E. Barnes, president of the Reserve Officers Associa­
tion, signed the report but simultaneously wrote a letter to the Secre­
tary of the Army which was a virtual disclaimer of his earlier approval. 
Colonel Barnes termed the report "a limited and restricted approach not 
meeting the requirements of national security.” Instead, he recited his 
approval of the efforts of General Westover.
There were rumors at the time that the Byrnes report would never 
be implemented. They proved to be true, for after the Korean War, the 
Organized Reserve Coî ps was allowed plans for expansion.
All the while, the Reserve Forces were climbing in actual 
strength, getting better organized and improving generally, but the pro­
cess was slow and tedious. Worst of all, the program seemed to be with­
out adept leadership. Pentagon responsibility was vague and nebulous, 
and there was no leadership at all to coordinate the Army Reserve activi-
^%ew York Times. June 12, 1949, p. 19.
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ties with those of the other services. The Navy, Air Force and Marines 
were all constructing armories, recruiting personnel, opening district 
offices— each without knowledge of the other’s activities. The situa­
tion stimulated the creation by Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson of 
the Civilian Components Policy Board on May 20, 1949. Its purpose was 
to develop over-all policies and coordinate and maintain surveillance 
over the plans, policies and programs of the civilian components. It 
was to have a civilian chairman, a military executive and eighteen mem­
bers, only six of whom were to be on active duty with the regular ser­
vices. The others were to be non-active duty Reservists. It was to have 
a staff of approximately eight officers and several clerks.
Due largely to the wide scope of authority originally allotted 
to the board, the military services complained, and a delay until Octo­
ber 3, 1949, occurred before the board’s first meeting. 5̂ Trouble was 
also experienced in finding a suitable civilian chairman. Finally, Wil­
liam T. Faricy, president of the Association of American Railroads, ac­
cepted the part-time, uncompensated job, and began the effort to work 
out a set of priorities to remedy the numerous ills of the Reserve.
Also in 1949, the military services commenced an expanded armory- 
building program, from which the Army Reserve Forces were to derive 
great benefit. Previously, the Organized Reserve Corps had no armories, 
except those leased from private owners. The National Guard armories, 
built mostly before the war, were becoming inadequate. Furthermore, the 
post-World War II troop basis was so large, few states could afford an
^%ew York Times, Sept. 21, 1949, p. 20.
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adequate building program. The states, realizing the size of the Guard 
was already well beyond their own needs, refused to take responsibility 
for the construction of armories. Until 1949, efforts to work out a 
system of financial cooperation between the national government and the 
state governments were unsuccessful. Consequently, armory construction 
was negligible.
In early 1949 a plan was formulated in the Department of Defense 
whereby the national government would pay the complete cost of all Or­
ganized Reserve Corps armories and seventy-five per cent of the costs of 
National Guard armories. The armed services committees began hearings 
on the plan in March, 1949*^^ The Secretary of Defense had called it a 
"priority measure" but in May, 1949, withdrew this classification from 
the bill. It was subsequently dropped from the legislative program.
When Congress opened in 1950, the defense secretary again restated the 
"critical importance"̂ '̂  of the armory program, and the bill was enacted 
into law.^^ It authorized the appropriation of $500,000,000 for armory 
construction for all the services, with the division of funds among the 
services to be accomplished by the Secretary of Defense.
Several other attempts were made in the years previous to the 
Korean conflict to enhance the Reserve Forces. In late December, 1949, 
Secretary of Defense Johnson decreed that all Regular Army, Navy, and
^̂ S. 960, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., 1949*
S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, National 
Defense Facilities Act of 1950, S. Rept. 1785, 81st Cong., 2d Sess.,
1950, accompany S. 960, p. 3»
L. 783, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., 1950.
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Air Force officers would be expected to serve at least two years during 
their career with the Reserve Forces if they expected to attain high 
military rank. The new policy, made on recommendation of the new Civil­
ian Components Policy Board, recognized the distaste which many regular 
officers held for civilian component duty. The jobs required tremendous 
psychological adjustment. Officers accustomed to "commanding" sometimes 
found it difficult to find the persuasion necessary to manage a Reserve 
unit well. If he were too demanding, some irate Reserve colonel would 
likely complain about the young officer to higher military authorities 
or even to a congressman. Such episodes might be the single entry on an 
officer»s personnel records which would prevent promotion to high mili­
tary command. Johnson’s new policy was intended to reverse this trend.
At this point in its development, the Reserve Forces were 
shocked by the outbreak of the Korean Conflict, It broke out in June,
1950 when the United States possessed a standing army of only 591,487 
39officers and men. Under existing law there seemed to be no legal 
authority whereby the President could mobilize the Army Reserve Forces 
(in the absence of a declaration of war or national emergencyj^^ except 
the Dick Act of I903 which allowed the National Guard to be mobilized in 
cases of invasion or rebellion. The Congress quickly placed a clause in 
the Selective Service Extension Act of 1950^^ allowing the recall of re-
S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Hearings, 
National Reserve Plan. 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 1952, on H. R. 5426, Appendix,
p. 337.
^̂ Ibid., p. 337.
^̂ P. L. 599, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., 1950.
25
servists for not to exceed twenty-one months. In 1952, the period was 
increased to twenty-four months.^2
In the one and one-half years after July 1, 1950, there were
334,000 members of the Organized Reserve Corps back in uniform, and by 
1952 eight National Guard divisions had been recalled to active national 
service. Two of the divisions eventually sailed to Europe, two went to 
Asia, and four remained in the United States.
There were great inequities involved in the recall procedures. 
Delays in reporting for duty were permitted many members, but others 
found themselves fighting in the Korean hills almost immediately. The 
process of closing businesses and leaving school was in many cases a 
great sacrifice. Even those reservists not called immediately were hurt 
by the denial of employment and loans. Numerous members of the Volunteer 
Reserve, who were not assigned to units and were not receiving pay, were 
among the first to be called. Previous Army policy had envisioned the 
recall of organized units first, to be followed by the individuals in the 
Volunteer Reserve. As it happened in the case of the Korean partial 
mobilization, the great need was for individual replacements. To avoid 
breaking up the organized units, a policy which might have endangered 
national security, the Volunteer Reserves were mobilized, although many 
of them had received no training since World War II.
The inequities appear even greater when it is remembered that 
draft deferred persons, mostly students and fathers, although they had
L. 51, 82d Cong., 1st Sess., 1949.
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never served in the military service, continued to be deferred while 
World War II veterans were returned to combat.
The Department of Defense, engulfed in criticism, announced in 
late October, 1950 that insofar as conditions would permit, "a reservist 
called to active duty would be allowed thirty days from the time he was 
called until the date he would report for active duty.”̂  ̂ In addition, 
the three military departments were told to determine their manpower re­
quirements six months in advance of recall, and that due notice would be 
sent to the reservists concerned.
There was considerable agitation to have a firm recall policy 
written into law, and during congressional hearings on the matter in 
1951, spokesmen for the Department of Defense promised to have a new 
comprehensive Reserve bill in the hands of Congress within six months. 
Actually work had been underway in the Reserve establishment on such a 
bill for well over a year, but had been cast aside in the wake of much 
bigger problems associated with the war in Korea.After the promise 
was made, the responsibility for making the final preparations for the 
legislation was handed to the Reserve Forces Policy Board, formerly 
called the Civilian Components Policy Board. After much deliberation, 
the board recommended to the Secretary of Defense a number of general 
policies affecting the Reserve. The policies were approved by Secretary
S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Armed 




George C. Marshall and published April 6, 1951.46 They were the basis 
of the proposed Armed Forces Reserve Act sent to the Congress by Secre­
tary Marshall on July 18, 1951.
House and Senate consideration of the bill was in the light of 
two important, recent occurrences— the Korean recall debacle and the 
failure of universal military training legislation in the Congress, It 
was largely because of these two factors that the bill, as originally 
submitted, was almost entirely rewritten by the Brooks subcommittee of 
the House Armed Services c o m m i t t e e . 47 The bill faced many other diffi­
culties, but the greatest occurred on May 28, 1952, when the National 
Guard Association unexpectedly denounced the bill during Senate hearings, 
The association feared the bill would endanger the Guardis dual state- 
national status. Despite the obstacle, it became law late in the 1952 
session. The National Guard Association could not overcome the great 
public discontent over recall policies.
The law divided the Reserves into ready, standby and retired 
categories, and by limiting the recall powers of the President, it 
abolished the system which was the source of so much criticism during 
the Korean mobilization. Standby Reserves could be ordered to active 
duty only after a declaration of war or emergency by Congress. Ready 
Reserves could be called by the President in the number authorized by
4&U. S. Department of Defense, Policies Relating to the Reserve 
Forces, Approved 6 April 1951 (Washington; Government Printing Office,
Î95ÎT7
47u, S, Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Armed 
Services, Hearings, Reserve Components. 82d Cong., 1st Sess., 1951, on 
H. R. 4860, p. l68.
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Congress. It was an attempt to assure that the persons who had done the 
most in earlier wars would not have to carry the major burdens in the 
future.
Only after 1952 did the Reserve program feel the full brunt of 
the ramifications of the Korean recall system. Officer strength dropped, 
and enlisted strength would have shown a similar decrease except for the 
requirements of the Selective Service Act of 1948 which forced men into 
the Reserve upon their release from the service. Therefore, instead of 
falling, enlisted strength rose by 50,000 during the 1952 fiscal year. 
Unfortunately, however, the increase was not of much value to national 
security because the men refused to take an active interest in Reserve 
training. The number of active training units and the assigned strength 
of these units showed an alarming decrease.At the end of June 1953 
there were five hundred fewer Reserve units than one year earlier. The 
assigned strength of the organized units had dropped more than 18,000.
Thus, the most crucial task faced by the Army was that of induc­
ing reservists who had statutory Reserve obligations to join units. The 
law permitted the mandatory assignment of reservists to organized units, 
but it was questionable whether, as a practical matter, actual partici­
pation in unit training could be enforced under existing statutes.49 
Mandatory participation was not tried, but instead considerable effort 
was made by the Army to induce men into training through use of the in-
4%, S. Department of Defense, Semi-Annual Report of the Secretary 




centives already provided in various pieces of legislation. Inactive 
duty training pay and generous retirement credits were offered, but all 
such efforts failed to produce satisfactory results.
In 1953> as the Korean Conflict was being terminated, the new 
Eisenhower administration applied its efforts to the reconstruction of 
the Reserve. All veteran reservists who were on active duty involun­
tarily were returned to civilian life, except a few trained in critical 
specialties.50 Implementation of the Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1952 
was begun. Categories of Ready and Standby Reservists were established 
in all the military departments. Indefinite term commissions replaced 
the five-year appointments still existing in the Army and Air Force, ex­
cept for a few officers still on active duty.
At the end of June, 1953, the statutory Reserve obligations of 
veterans had pushed the Reserve to over two million men in strength.
The program was bulky and unmanageable. Recent legislation^! made it 
possible for these veterans to reduce their eight-year military obliga­
tion by participating in part-time training in units near their homes, 
but the number who utilized this opportunity continued to be disappoint­
ingly small.52
The impending expiration of the selective service law and the 
need for reappraisal of the Reserve situation in the light of the results
5°Ibid.. p. 25.
^^Universal Military Training and Service Act of 1951 (65 Stat. 75).
S. Department of Defense, Semi-Annual Report of the Secretary 
of Defense, January 1-June 30. 1953 (Washington: Government Printing 
Office, 1953), p. 25.
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of the Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1952 caused the Eisenhower adminis­
tration to begin major studies of all manpower problems. On December 1, 
1953» the National Security Training Commission issued its Twentieth 
Century Minutemen Report which proposed an improved long-range Reserve 
program. Slightly over one month later the director of the Office of 
Defense Mobilization published a report of the relative availability of 
civilian and military manpower. Out of these studies came the adminis­
tration's recommendations for the National Reserve Plan.33 When intro­
duced in Congress in early 1955, it was destined to be rewritten five 
times before it was finally enacted into law on August 9» 1955*
The 1955 act amends both the Universal Military Training and 
Service Act of 1951 and the Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1952. Its pro­
visions fall into two categories, those remedying certain inadequacies 
in the structure and operations of the Reserve and those providing a new 
voluntary enlistment system whereby young men could avoid the draft by 
taking six months' active duty training followed by seven and one-half 
years of Reserve training.
In the first category, the act raised the statutory limit on the 
size of the Ready Reserve from 1,500,000 men to 2,900,000 men. Previous­
ly the limit had been ignored because other laws required the transfer 
to the Reserve of all veterans who were being released from the service. 
The act also made major changes in the recall system in periods of emer­
gency. The President was authorized to call up to one million men of 
the Ready Reserve without the specific number being approved by Congress.
53h. R. 2967, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., I953.
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Any call exceeding one million continued to require congressional ap­
proval. Standby reservists continued to be uncallable without congres­
sional approval, and furthermore could not be called until the selective 
service system decided whether each reservist was needed in the Army or 
in his civilian job.
A continuous screening process was established by the act for 
the purpose of transferring men from the Ready to the Standby Reserve.
It was intended that the Ready Reserve be truly ready to serve: all men 
who had critical jobs in industry, who were overage, or who were for 
other reasons not qualified to serve immediately would be transferred to 
the Standby Reserve,
Reserve training requirements were stiffened considerably by the 
new act. Persons who acquired a Reserve obligation after August 9, 1955, 
were required to take an active part in Reserve training. Men who failed 
to perform this requirement satisfactorily could be ordered to active 
duty for a period of forty-five days, and any one who refused such an 
order to active duty was subject to court-martial proceedings under the 
Uniform Code of Military Justice.
The most far-reaching portion of the 1955 act was the introduc­
tion of the six months’ training program whereby Reserve enlistees would 
be given Army% basic training and various types of advanced training on 
Army posts throughout the country. Afterwards they would be returned 
home, in a draft-free status, where they would participate in a minimum
5̂ The other services announced in advance that they would not make 
use of the six months’ provisions.
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of forty-eight paid drill periods yearly for seven and one-half years,55 
Because the other branches of the military service felt that the six 
months’ program interfered with their long-range regular recruiting pro­
gram and because many Americans would oppose the program if it became a 
form of universal military training, the law provided for a strict quota 
system for entry into the program. A maximum of 250,000 new entries 
annually was set by the law, but it was anticipated that budget limita­
tions would be an even greater limiting factor, as they were in later 
years.
As enacted by Congress, the act’s six-month enlistment privileges 
were intended to be available only to young men between the ages of 
seventeen and eighteen and one-half. The program was implemented in 
August, 1955, with this limitation, but enlistments came slowly. Men in 
this age group did not fear the draft. Selective service did not reach 
men so young. Few of these men foresaw that, by the time the draft drew 
near, they would be too old to join for only six months’ active duty. 
Consequently, as of December 1, 1955, only 5,500 men had joined the pro­
gram. On the verge of being declared a failure, the program was opened 
on April 1, 1957, to persons up to twenty-six years of age.57 Enlist­
ments increased rapidly. In June, 1957, the weekly enlistment rate 
reached over four thousand.^®
55By administrative regulations, the period was reduced to three 
years effective April 1, 1957.
5&National Security Training Commission, Final Report to Congress 
(Washington; Government Printing Office, 1957), p. 13.
57lbid.. p. 1. 58ibid., p. 13.
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The expanded program brought much criticism from the other ser­
vices which had to compete with it in recruiting men for tours of three, 
four, and five years. Other temporary criticism came from congressmen 
who felt that the Department of Defense had violated the spirit of the 
1955 law by opening the program to older men. These criticisms, as 
well as the lack of sufficient funds, forced the Army temporarily to 
suspend enlistments in the program on May 14, 1957. When reopened, new 
entries were severely limited by a regulation which required a vacancy 
before any new six-months’ trainees could be accepted. Late in 1957 
additional enlistments were permitted.
Thus, ten years after the first major agitation for an improved 
Reserve Forces program, there was still much to be accomplished. The 
improvements that had occurred were not based on a clear understanding 
of the role of the Reserve in modern warfare. There was considerable 
coordination needed among the Reserve programs of the various services. 
There was still great indecision over the use of compulsory recruitment 
methods, and the National Guard and Army Reserve disagreed greatly over 
several key policies.
On the other hand, the Reserve program had been greatly stabilized 
by the activities of the postwar era. There were more systematic pro­
cedures. The question of the proper role of the Reserve in the Armed 
Forces was, at least, being debated. The Reserve Forces were rapidly 
becoming institutionalized, with their own procedures, organization, and 
interests.
CHAPTER II
ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATION FOR POLICY-MAKING
The organizational structure of any administrative organization 
is highly influential in the decisions which flow from it. This is true 
for a variety of reasons. Organizations develop institutional qualities 
that lead policy in certain directions. They are the frames of refer­
ence— indeed, the boundary lines of interest— for the bureaucracy and 
the public generally. In addition, administrative organizations consti­
tute the machinery by lAich knowledge, efficiency, procedures and person­
alities are intermeshed to grind out decisions in a methodical fashion.
The administrative organization of the Reserve Forces is im­
portant for the above reasons, and also because it is the scaffolding 
from vrfiich the Regular Army, the National Guard Association and the Re­
serve Officers Association have frequently transmitted their desires into 
policy.
A birdseye view of the Reserve organization reveals a sprawling, 
disjointed establishment, without its own compact hierarchy. It falls 
into two major portions— the Department of Defense and the Department of 




Department of Defense 
With the creation of the National Military Establishment by the 
National Security Act of 1947, there came to be an increased amount of 
Army Reserve Forces policy made at levels higher than the Army Staff.
The dedication to a new, unified military policy required the Amy to 
relinquish some control over its Reserve program to the Secretary of 
Defense.
Earlier, small portions of policy may have been made by the se­
cretive State-Amy-Navy Coordinating Committee, or by the Bureau of the 
Budget, as well as by the President himself, but the amount was un­
doubtedly insignificant. After 1947, there was increased pressure for 
new Reserve legislation, and more attention was demanded from the Presi­
dent and his immediate staff. Yet there are no indications in published 
reports that the agencies above the Department of Defense exerted any 
great influence on Reserve policy. Problems tended to be resolved be­
fore they reached such high levels. This could possibly be in error, 
however. Little is known of the work of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and 
the National Security Council. Because of the high degree of secrecy 
surrounding them, there is no information as to the degree these agencies 
influenced policy. Nevertheless, it is widely assumed that almost all 
Reserve policy was made in the Department of Defense and the Department 
of the Amy.
The evolution toward an effective Department of Defense was a 
slow and painful process. The 1949 amendments to the National Security 
Act converted the National Military Establishment into an executive de-
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partaient and increased the Secretary's coordinating powers. In Febru­
ary, 1953, Secretary of Defense Charles E, Wilson appointed a committee 
headed by Nelson A. Rockefeller to make recommendations for overhauling 
the Department of Defense. From the committee*s report came President 
Eisenhower^s Reorganization Plan No. 6. which took effect on June 30, 
1953, and provided that the major functions of the Department be divided 
among nine assistant secretaries.
The Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1952 had required the Secretary 
of Defense to designate an assistant secretary as having principal re­
sponsibility for the Reserves.1 Chosen for this purpose was the Assist­
ant Secretary for Manpower and Personnel,2 one of three assistant secre­
taries in existence when the reorganization plan became effective. On 
September 2, 1955» Secretary Wilson added the Reserve function to the 
title of the office to make it the "Assistant Secretary of Defense (Man­
power, Personnel and Reserve)."3
In recent years, repeated proposals have been offered for the 
appointment of an additional assistant secretary to be exclusively re­
sponsible for Reserve affairs. Representative L. Mendel Rivers, of 
South Carolina, introduced bills into several post-Korean War sessions 
of the House of Representatives to accomplish this,^ and in the Senate, 
Burnet R. Maybank, of South Carolina, offered similar proposals.^
Ip. L. 476, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 1952, sec. 256 (a).
%. S. Department of Defense Directive 5120.9, Dec. 31, 1952.
3u. S. Department of Defense Directive 5120.7, Sept. 2, 1955.
%. R. 2302 , 83d Cong.; H. R. 2427 , 84th Cong.; H. R. 913, 85th
Cong.
%. 2926 , 83d Cong.
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Former Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower and Personnel, Mrs. 
Anna Rosenberg made the same recommendation in testimony before the 
House Armed Services Committee in 1951.^
President Eisenhower*s defense department, as of 1957» had not 
looked favorably on such legislation, and it had never reached the floor 
of either house. The department claimed that one of its "principal ad­
ministrative objectives" was the "achievement of maximum integration of 
the Reserve and Regular components." The Secretary, therefore, wanted 
the Assistant Secretary for Manpower, Personnel and Reserve to have full 
manpower controls over all components. Personnel policy relating to 
both active and Reserve Forces, the Department said, must "emanate from 
the same source."? The argument was sufficient to defeat any further 
moves in this direction.
The Department of Defense mushroomed into a mammoth organization, 
without concomitant reductions in the size of the lower departments.8 
This is true in practically all areas including the Reserve program. At 
first the Department of Defense was envisioned as a small policy-coordin­
ating agency only. Instead, there came to be several boards, committees 
and other agencies that cut squarely across the operating authority of 
the individual services. It occurred slowly, and practically every such 
move was accompanied by vehement complaints from the subordinate services.
Û. S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Armed 
Services, Hearings, Reserve Components. 82d Cong.. 1st Sess., on H. R.
4860, p. 201.
?Letter from Richard A. Buddeke to Hon. Carl Vinson, mimeographed, 
February 26, 1957» Report on H. R. 2427» 85th Congress for the Department 
of Defense.
%ew York Times, July 28, 1949» p. 40.
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This was the case with the Civilian Components Policy Board, 
created by Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson in 1949* The department 
needed a small advisory group to represent the viewpoints of all the 
services. When the activating directive was issued, the services 
claimed it was a surprise and that the new board had been given oper­
ating authority. The board would be sufficiently powerful, it was said, 
to destroy the responsibility of the several departmental secretaries. 
After several compromises— all reducing the board to a non-operating 
position— the members were appointed. In 1950, Secretary of Defense 
George C. Marshall reconstituted the board, renaming it the Reserve 
Forces Policy Board.
The Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1952 made the Reserve Forces 
Policy Board statutory and declared it to be the "principal policy ad- 
visor"9 to the Secretary of Defense on Reserve matters. The wisdom of 
writing the board into law was much debated at the time. The Reserve 
Officers Association, champion of the idea, finally won its point.
Later, clear-cut recommendations against such provisions were made by 
the Rockefeller Committee,10 possibly with the Reserve Forces Policy 
Board in mind.
The board, according to law,11 must have four civilians— a civil-
9p. L. 476, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 1952.
1%. S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Report of 
the Rockefeller Committee on Department of Defense Organization. 83d 
Cong., 1st Sess., April 11, 1953 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 
1953), p. 11.
lip. L. 476, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 1952.
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ian chairman and the assistant secretary responsible for Reserve matters 
in each of the Army, Navy, and Air Force Departments. Additional mem­
bers include one regular officer from each of the departments, two rep­
resentatives each from the Army Reserve, Amy National Guard, Naval Re­
serve, Marine Corps Reserve, Air Force Reserve, Air National Guard, and 
one officer of general or flag rank vdio serves as military adviser and 
executive officer of the board. When the Coast Guard is operating as a 
unit of the Navy, it has a non-voting representative on the board.
Seldom does the board meet more often than once every six weeks. 
The agenda for such meetings is laid out, with the approval of the chair­
man, by the board*s staff which takes care of all other routine adminis­
trative responsibilities.
The board operates as an adviser to the Secretary of Defense 
through the Assistant Secretary of Defense (M, P & R). In its formative 
days, this location was not considered suitable by several persons con­
nected with the board, but after a few months the demand for a loftier 
status was forgotten. It came to be, by 1957, one of approximately 
seven special advisory boards surrounding this particular assistant sec­
retary's office.
By 1957, with the assistant secretary’s office getting more 
firmly established the Reserve program constituted only a minor portion 
of its responsibilities. In addition to all personnel and manpower pol­
icy, the office controlled matters of personnel security, soldier voting, 
certain aspects of civil defense. Armed Forces information and education 
programs and several special projects.
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There were two offices of major importance under the assistant 
secretary— one for personnel policy, the other for manpower problems. 
Reserve matters fell in the domain of the Office of Personnel Policy 
which was divided into civilian, military and Reserve policy divisions.
The Reserve Affairs Policy Division was created in November,
1955> by Assistant Secretary Carter L. Burgess.It was first headed 
by Colonel James A. Norell, who was succeeded by Colonel Joseph L.
Chabot. In 1957 Colonel Chabot had two assistant directors and two sec­
retarial clerks in the Office. The parent Office of Personnel Policy 
was, at the time, even smaller with only four persons in all.
The functions of the Reserve Affairs Policy Division cover pol­
icy-making on all matters affecting reservists as individuals, including 
procurement, placement, career management, promotion, separation, re­
tirement and retainment standards. It has responsibility for all policy 
involved in the implementation of Reserve legislation, publicity require­
ments for the Reserve program and liaison on Reserve matters with the 
White House staff. Office of Defense Mobilization, National Security- 
Training Commission and various private interest groups.
The inter-working of the Department of Defense agencies with the 
Reserve agencies of the Department of the Army is a complicated, and 
usually highly informal matter. Pressures arise irregularly throughout 
the organization, as well as from higher and lower echelons, which cause 
policy changes to be initiated at any number of points in the hierarchy.
Generally speaking, the Department of Defense makes its power
^^Army Reservist, 1 (Nov., 1955), 15»
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felt most vividly as new legislation is being transmitted from one of 
the departments through the Department of Defense to Congress, or when 
budget estimates are being prepared. An excellent example of this was 
the inter-departmental coordination for the Armed Forces Reserve Act of 
1952. The act sprang from the Navy Department’s Roper Board, which pre­
pared a bill to revitalize the Naval Reserve. When the bill went for­
ward to the Department of Defense, Secretary James Forrestal "thought it 
ought to apply across the board" to all the departments, 3̂ even though 
the Army and Air Force seemed to be unenthusiastic. This was in Decem­
ber, 1948. Nothing happened until the Civilian Components Policy Board 
was created and its authority clarified between June and October, 1949» 
The job of redrawing the bill to fit all the departments was handed to 
the new board as its first important function. The following time-table 
of events reveals well the inter-working of the conglomeration of Re­
serve agencies within the military structure:
October 17, 1949 Ad hoc committee of the Civilian Components
Policy Board undertook rewriting the bill.
December 1, 1949 M  hoc committee submitted certain policy
questions for decision of the parent Board.
January 10, 1950 Tentative draft sent to the Services for comment.
January 19, 1950 Revised draft submitted to CCPB by ̂  hoc com­
mittee for decision on differences among the 
services.
March 1, 1950 Further revised draft sent to CCPB for approval.
March 21, 1950 CCPB formally submitted draft to military depart­
ments and the Secretary of Defense.
May 5> 1950 CCPB requested Secretary of Defense to resolve 
• controversies among military departments.
May 12, 1950 Further comments from military departments sub­
mitted to Secretary of Defense.
13u. S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Armed 
Services, Hearings, Reserve Components. 82d Cong., 1st Sess., 1951, on 
H. R. 4860, p. 119.
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July 5 , 1950 Secretary of Defense»s staff completed study of
the controversies and isolated twenty-two areas 
of disagreement,
July 21, 1950 Secretary of Defense made decision resolving
differences on bill.
August 1, 1950 Navy directed to prepare revised draft in ac­
cordance with the Secretary’s decisions,
January 30, 1951 Navy submitted draft to Secretary of Defense for
comment,
February 15, 1951Secretary received comments on the draft from
the military departments,
March 1, 1951 Revised draft prepared by Department of Defense
legal staff; held pending approval of Reserve 
policies,
April 6, 1951 Reserve policies approved,
April 27, 1951 Further comments from military departments re­
ceived,
April 16, 1951 Bill redrafted to conform to policies; sub­
mitted to military departments for comment,
April 27, 1951 Comments from departments received; additional
coordination in Department of Defense began,
June 26, 1951 Final draft submitted to the Bureau of the Budget,
July 1.6, 1951 Bureau of the Budget’s comments received,
July 18, 1951 Bill submitted to Congress,^
The above process is typical for all subjects as important and 
complicated as the Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1952, For less intricate 
matters, the process is naturally more simple. Generally, materials pre­
pared by the staff of the appropriate division of the Department of De­
fense are forwarded to the appropriate assistant secretary of the sub­
ordinate departments. The assistant secretary’s staff prepares comments 
from the viewpoint of the best interests of the particular department.
If the matter is important enough, the appropriate secretaries or their 
staffs might meet with Department of Defense personnel to settle disagree­
ments, The most common device, as of 1957, was an M  hoc committee of 
staff members,13 ranging from the most formal type of organization to
14lbid,. p, 1123,
^^Timothy W, Stanley, American Defense and National Security (Wash­
ington: Public Affairs Press, 1956), p, 122,
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informal meetings arranged by telephone. If all such efforts fail to 
bring agreement, the matter is submitted to the Secretary of Defense for 
decision— accompanied by a full set of staff papers showing concurrences 
and non-concurrences, as well as comments by the controller's office.
The orders of the Secretary of Defense, issued by the Adminis­
trative Secretary, are formulated as directives to the secretaries of 
the subordinate departments. They are for guidance only; they are not 
actual operating orders. Each department must issue regulations and 
orders to the extent necessary to put the guidance into operation. 
Frequently the resulting regulations must be submitted to the Department 
of Defense for approval prior to promulgation.
Department of the Army 
Within the Department of the Army there are five staff agencies 
working closely with Reserve policy: The Assistant Secretary of the
Army for Manpower, Personnel and Reserve Forces; the Assistant Chief of 
Staff for Reserve Components; the Office of the Chief, Army Reserve and 
ROTC Affairs, the National Guard Bureau, and the General Staff Committees 
on National Guard and Army Reserve Policy.
All five of these agencies are located in the Pentagon. By 1957, 
at least three of these had reached the status of "institutions" which 
are not likely to be changed appreciably, except by a major upheaval. 
These are the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower, 
Personnel and Reserve Forces; the General Staff Committees on National 
Guard and Army Reserve Policy and the National Guard Bureau. Each of 
these has a statutory base. The other two agencies, the Assistant Chief
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of Staff for Reserve Components and the Office of the Chief, Army Re­
serve and ROTC Affairs, do not have a statutory base.
The most powerful figure in the Army Reserve program tends to be
the Assistant Secretary of the Army (M, P & RF). This was particularly
true in 1957 with former president of the New Mexico Military Institute 
Hugh M. Milton II as incumbent. Milton came up through the military 
hierarchy, a most unusual source for Army civil authorities. He was a 
Kentuckian by birth, a mechanical engineer and a World War I veteran. 
After World War II, from which he emerged as a brigadier general, he 
served on the General Staff Committee on Army Reserve Policy. In 1957, 
he returned to active duty as Executive for Reserve and ROTC Affairs, 
later to be called Chief, Army Reserve and ROTC Affairs, where he was 
promoted to major general. In 1954, he became an Assistant Secretary 
of the Army on the recommendation of James P. Mitchell, the outgoing 
assistant secretary who was becoming Secretary of Labor.Milton’s 
personality and knowledge of Reserve affairs boosted the office in the 
public eye.
The Assistant Secretary’s Office was ’’institutionalized” by acts 
of Congress in 1952^7 and 1954̂ .̂ The Armed Forces Reserve Acto of 1952 
required the Secretary of the Army to designate an assistant secretary 
to have principal responsibility for supervision of the Reserve compon-
l̂ Reserve Officer, 30 (Jan., 1954), l6.
"̂̂ P. L. 476 , 82d Cong., 2d Sess. (Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1952}
^̂ P. L. 562, 83d Cong,, 2d Sess. (Act to Provide Two Additional 
Secretaries for the Army, Navy and Air Force), 1954»
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ents under the jurisdiction of that particular department « ̂9 The Assis­
tant Secretary for Manpower and Personnel was so designated, and later 
his title was lengthened by administrative ruling to include ’’Reserve 
Forces,”
The 1954 Act stemmed from a variety of earlier occurrences.
When President Eisenhower submitted his Reorganization Plan No, 6 in 
1953 to increase the number of assistant secretaries in the Department 
of Defense, he said further studies ’’should be initiated” by the secre­
taries of the three departments ’’with a view toward making these secre-
ontaries truly responsible administrators, , , . ” This touched off the 
appointment of the Davies Committee on Army Organization in late 1953» 
headed by Paul L, Davies, president of the Food Machinery and Chemical 
Corporation of San Jose, California, The committee heard 129 witnesses 
in a series of meetings held on 28 days over a period of three months.
The report of the group was the partial basis for the 1954 act which in­
creased to four the number of assistant secretaries in each of the three 
military departments. Although the act designated the responsibilities 
for only the Assistant Secretary for Financial Management, the intentions 
of Congress were clear. The 1952 provision was to be retained so that 
each department would have an Assistant Secretary for Manpower, Personnel 
and the Reserve Forces, 4̂
19p, L, 476» 82d Cong., 2d Sess,, 1952, sec, 256 (a),
S, Department of the Army, Organization of the Army, Report of 
the Advisory Committee on Army Organization. 18 Dec, 1953 (Washington: 
Government Printing Office, 1953)» P» 1.
S, Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Act to Pro­
vide Two Additional Assistant Secretaries in the Army, Navy and Air 
Force, Senate Report 1643 on S, 3466, 83d Cong,, 2d Sess,, June 15, 1954 
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1954)» p, 2,
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Before the increase to four assistant secretaries, the duties 
and responsibilities of the Assistant Secretary (M,P & RF) were ill de­
fined. They covered a multitude of functions ranging from membership 
on the Armed Forces Explosives Safety Board to management of the United 
States Soldiers’ home. After the increase, the diversity was reduced, 
but the office continued to carry the heaviest load of all the immediate 
assistants to the Secretary of the Army, with perhaps the exceptions of 
the Under Secretary and the Assistant Secretary for Financial Management.
The Office of the Assistant Secretary (M,P & RF) has continued 
to grow until, in 1957, it had a civilian deputy, a military executive 
officer (colonel), a civilian special assistant, and six military branch 
chiefs (all lieutenant colonels). One of these branch chiefs worked 
exclusively on Reserve Forces problems.
The second highest ’’institutions” within the Reserve establish­
ment are the General Staff Committees on National Guard and Army Reserve 
Policy.The two committees ordinarily meet in joint session in Wash­
ington about six times yearly; however, they may meet separately or more 
often. Meetings usually last from two days to a full week.
The National Guard committee, the oldest of all existing Army 
Reserve agencies, is composed of seven members of the National Guard and 
seven Regular Army members of the Army Staff. Except for one resident 
member, all Guard representatives are part-time personnel called to active 
duty only for the duration of the meeting. Each Guard member is ap-
22commonly called the ’’Section V” Committee because of its origin 
in Section V of the National Defense Act of 1920.
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pointed by the Secretary of the Army to represent a particular Army area, 
except the resident member who is appointed at-large. The law requires 
that these appointees have the approval of their respective governors. 
Nominations are sent, by the governors, to the chief. National Guard 
Bureau who prepares recommendations for the Secretary of the Army list­
ing three nominees for each vacancy in order of his preference.
The seven Army staff members on the National Guard Committee 
are Regular Army officers and represent the Offices of the Deputy Chief 
of Staff for Personnel, Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operation, 
Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, Assistant Chief of Staff for Intel­
ligence, Assistant Chief of Staff for Reserve Components, Comptroller of 
the Amy, and the Commanding General, Continental Army Command. They 
are given indefinite terms and are not eligible to serve as chairman.
The same officers serve as the Regular Army representatives on the Army 
Reserve committee.
There are seven Army reservists on the Army Reserve committee, 
in addition to the seven Regular Army representatives. They are appointed 
by the Secretary of the Army, one from each Army Area, upon the recom­
mendation of the commanding general of the Army Area concerned. One 
resident member is appointed at-large.
The term of office for both the National Guard and Army Reserve 
members, except resident members, is three years but one year extensions
Z^Letter from Major General Edgar C. Erickson, Chief, National 
Guard Bureau, 11 October 1957, to the author. Membership was raised 
from five to seven by Department of Army Memorandum 135-1» dated 28 Jan. 
1957» superseding the edition of 24 Oct. 1955»
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are possible for not to exceed two years.24 Resident members have four- 
year terms. The senior officer of each committee serves as chairman. 
When the committees meet in joint session, again the senior officer 
presides, regardless of his component.
Practically all the National Guard and Army Reserve members of 
the committees, except for resident members, are general officers. 
Usually they are commanders of Reserve Forces infantry divisions. The 
resident members, viho are full-time active duty personnel, are usually 
colonels. The Regular Army representatives are usually colonels or 
brigadier generals.
The resident members are appointed by the Secretary of the Army 
upon the recommendation of the respective committee chairman. They ad­
minister the papers and facilities of the committees, gather information 
and prepare the agenda for meetings. Between meetings, they may be re­
quired to represent their respective committees in various Department of 
Army activities.
Both the National Guard and Army Reserve committees are strictly 
advisory in nature. Under Section 3033, they are required to consider 
all proposed policies affecting the Reserve Forces and make recommenda­
tions thereon to the Secretary of the Army though the Chief of Staff. 5̂
As might be expected, the committees were not established through 
the initiative of the Army staff. The committee*s chief functions in­
volve a review of the civilian component policies of the Amy staff.
24u. S. Department of the Army, Memorandum 135-1. 28 Jan. 1957»
25u. S. Code. Title 10, sec. 3033 (1956).
51
Consequently, the committees, which look over the shoulder of the Regu­
lar Army, are not particularly desired by the Pentagon, They were 
forced on the Regular Army, by the National Guard lobby, in the National 
Defense Act of 1920.26
This is not to say that open antagonism exists between the 
Regular Army and the general staff committees. On the contrary, a great 
deal of deference is shown the civilian component members. Considerable 
work goes into the preparation of the oral presentations by members of 
the Army staff before the committees. Such presentations are usually 
rehearsed before high-ranking general staff officers before being given 
to the committees. And there is practically no hostility between the 
reservists and Army staff members as individuals, They are sometimes 
personal friends. The members of the general staff committees frequently 
receive their appointments through the support of friends in the Penta­
gon, chiefly in the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Reserve 
Components,
The relationship between the two organizations is a vague, offi­
cial coldness— a nebulous resentment. The Regular Army members know and 
dislike the fact that pressure groups, such as the general staff com­
mittees represent, are allowed to participate in official policy-making, 
but they must endure it because of the National Defense Act of 1920,
They know that, because the committees serve as ’’official leaks” of in- 
27formation, the National Guard and Reserve Officers Association are
^ Ârthur A. Ekirch, The Civilian and the Military (New York: Ox­
ford University Press, 1956), p, 202,
*̂̂ This is the view of certain Army officials who prefer to be un­
identified.
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prepared at almost any moment to do battle with the Pentagon in the 
newspapers and before Congress on any new policy unfavorable to the 
civilian components. This is despite the fact that committee meetings 
are ostensibly ultrasecret.
The third "institution" in the civilian component hierarchy is 
the National Guard Bureau, which occupies an extremely interesting posi­
tion as a staff agency for the Department of the Army, By virtue of its 
primary responsibility— the state National Guard units— the bureau is 
thrown into the caldron of American f e d e r a l i s m . 28
On occasion it seems halfway between the states and the national 
government. Through it comes information for the Army’s leaders on the 
needs and complaints of the National Guard units maintained out in the 
states by state authorities. Its liaison activities with the states, 
which are among the bureau’s most important functions, keep the person­
nel of the bureau better informed on the condition of the various Guard 
units than any other Army agency. Because of the bureau’s close rela­
tions with the states, its personnel frequently become highly sympathetic 
with the state viewpoint.
A majority of the bureau’s officers are Regular Army personnel, 
assigned to duty there just as they might be placed on duty with an in­
fantry regiment. The remainder are National Guard officers called to 
active service specifically for duty with the bureau. The voluntary re­
call of National Guard officers for this purpose is permitted by law.
2®William H. Riker, Soldiers of the States (Washington; Public 
Affairs Press, 1957).
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In 1950, Congress decided that up to forty per cent of the bureau*s of­
ficers could be national g uard s m e n .This is an important reason why 
the bureau has strong sympathies for state interests.
There are other reasons for the bureau’s loyalty to the state 
guard units. By law, the chief of the National Guard Bureau must be 
recommended by the governor of his state, must be above the rank of 
lieutenant colonel and must have been for ten years previous a member of 
the National Guard. These prerequisites have generally been sufficient 
to assure the accession of a loyal Guardsman to the office. Certainly, 
these legal prerequisites were meant to restrict the office to a true 
believer in National Guard doctrines. Never in the history of the bureau 
has it failed to provide a chief with strong inclinations for "getting 
along with state interests." Usually, the chief is a former state ad­
jutant general. For instance. Major General Raymond Flemming served as 
the adjutant general of Louisiana for twenty years before becoming chief 
of the National Guard Bureau.
Whether the bureau’s chief should be a Regular Army officer, vAio 
would be loyal to national Army interests, or a state-oriented Guardsman 
has been a matter of controversy for many y e a r s . I n  I916 when the 
National Guard Bureau was created, the chief was a Regular Army officer. 
The law which created the bureau abolished the old five-man militia 
board. This was actually no great change, so far as the loyalties of the 
bureau were concerned, because the militia board had also been dominated
'̂̂ P. L. 458, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., 1950.
30lbid.. p. 83.
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by Regular Army interests.34 The important change requiring the chief 
to be a guardsman came later in the 1920 amendments to the National De­
fense Act. The bureau became neither fish nor fowl. It became half­
state, half-national.
Thus, under the 1920 act, the National Guard Bureau was freed 
from considerable national control by the requirement that the chief be 
a National Guard officer.However, it must be remembered that, as a 
whole, the National Guard came under greater national control by virtue 
of the 1920 act. The National Guard was recognized as a Reserve compon­
ent of the Army under the act, and the President was given greater auth­
ority to call National Guard troops into national service during periods 
of emergency. Congress laid down standards for organizing, arming, and 
disciplining the state forces. By such familiar devices as fixing 
standards, inspections, advice, grants-in-aid, formulation of rules and 
regulations, supply of equipment and training, and the granting or with­
holding of recognition of units and their commanding personnel. Congress 
provided conditions which have enormously contributed to federal ascen­
dancy over state f o r c e s . 33
There were provisions in the 1920 act giving five positions on 
the General Staff to guardsmen, which most regulars claimed would sub-
34Frederick Wiener, ”The Militia Clause of the Constitution," 
Harvard Law Review. 14 (Dec., 1940), 181.
3^John Dickinson, The Building of an Army (New York: Century Co.,
1922).
^3lou1s Smith, American Democracy and Military Power (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 195l), p. 312.
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vert the ability to hold the Army responsible. Guardsmen, of course, 
lauded the idea. The approval of these provisions by one well known 
regular. Brigadier General John M. Palmer, was particularly discouraging 
to the regulars. Palmer, formerly on General Pershing^s wartime over­
seas staff and an expert on manpower policy, as well as an official ad­
viser to Congress, had led the congressional committees to this decision. 
It had been an easy decision for the congressmen to make, considering 
the increasing political power of the National Guard lobby. Long after 
its passage. General Palmer lauded the provisions of the act:
The principle that professional officers and citizen 
officers would serve together on the General Staff is proba­
bly the most highly constructive feature of that law. Under 
our military system, professionals and non-professionals must 
serve side by side in war and should therefore learn to under­
stand and to respect each other in time of peace. The lack 
of mutual understanding and respect was always the source of 
suspicion and friction in the past. Perhaps the greatest con­
trast between the crude War Department of 1917 and the more en­
lightened War Department of 1941 lies in the fact that today 
the professional welcomes and values the cooperation of his 
non-professional brother.34
There were many officers Who disagreed with Palmer, then and 
later. But as time passed, practically all personnel came to accept the 
assignment of approximately five national guardsmen on the Army staff, in 
addition to the personnel of the National Guard Bureau, as a suitable 
compromise between two strong forces. By 1940 almost all agitation 
against the system had died, although professional Army men continued to 
believe it was only the best solution to a bad situation.
After 1940 when all Guard units were mobilized, the National
34john McCauley Palmer, America in Arms (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1941), p. 119.
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Guard Bureau’s duties declined. Its chief wartime functions were the 
management of Guard records and the formulation of postwar Guard policy. 
It also handled the Army’s liaison activities with the various Home 
Guard and State Guard units which were authorized by an act of October 
21, 1940,̂  ̂and which were eventually established in forty-four states 
and Hawaii. In March, 1942, the National Guard Bureau was assigned as 
a section of the office of the Army adjutant general, and was made one 
of the administrative services of the Services of Supply in April, 1942. 
When the war ended, the bureau was shifted back to its old status as a 
special staff division in May, 1945*̂ ^
The path of the chief of the National Guard Bureau has continued 
to be rough, largely because of the bureau’s dual status. Until Major 
General Edgar G. Edgar C. Erickson broke the precedent in 1957» not a 
single chief had ever been reappointed to a second four-year term.3?
The previous Army reluctance to reappoint the chief was probably not 
accidental. There was wide speculation that the Department of bhe Army 
wished to prevent any bureau chief from consolidating his position with­
in the Pentagon. Also, the chief was frequently considered an outsider,
and at times he was thought of as a spy for National Guard interests.
To say the least, the chief was seldom a member of the intimate family 
of high ranking staff officers who keep the Department of the Army func­
tioning as a headquarters. These factors contributed to the "no reap-
stat. 1206.
3̂ U. S. National Archives, Federal Records of World War II (Wash­
ington: Government Printing Office, 1951), p. 138.
"̂̂Army Times (Reserve Edition). Aug. 10, 1957» p. 2.
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pointment” pattern.
When asked about his success as National Guard Bureau chief, 
Major General Erickson denied that his reappointment stemmed from any 
additional realism on his part concerning his role in the Pentagon hier­
archy, He said;
. . . any success that I have enjoyed during the past four years 
is attributed to the hard work and farsightedness of my staff 
in implementing approved policies of the Departments of the Army 
and the Air Force, and also the enthusiastic manner in which 
National Guard officials of the several States and unit command­
ers so willingly accepted and implemented necessary changes as 
they occurred,3°
This statement probably does not consider all aspects of the situation. 
Other observers said that General Erickson fitted well into the Army 
staff system. He saw the National Guard bureau as a part of the Army 
machine. He did not consider it an independent entity outside the ad­
ministrative hierarchy. He saw the desirability of cooperation with 
those who were responsible for the well-being of the entire Army; he won 
their respect as a player on the Army team. Therefore he was reappointed 
because of his great value as a stabilizing factor at headquarters,^^
The exact position of the National Guard Bureau is difficult to 
analyze. Officially, it is a staff agency which reports directly to the 
Chief of Staff, The chief of the bureau must on formal, official occa­
sions espouse the Department of Army viewpoint, although he is a Guard 
officer and although he frequently does not believe in the view. This
^^Letter from Major General Edgar C, Erickson, Oct. 11, 1957, to 
the author,
^%his is the view of at least one Pentagon official who desires 
to remain anonymous.
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is especially true when he is reporting the Army»s budget requests to 
Congress for the appropriation of National Guard funds. On less formal 
occasions, he usually espouses the National Guard viewpoint.
This schizoid position places him in a position of considerable 
importance as a mediator in the occasional Army-National Guard disagree­
ments. Few practitioners of the military arts, either in the National 
Guard or Regular Army, recognize this role as legitimate; some deny that 
the chief acts as a mediator at all. Others with a more detached and 
objective turn of mind, see the value of the bureau*s mediating qualities.
The most obvious example of the bureau’s harmonizing activities 
was in the 1957 "six-months’ training controversy" whereby the Depart­
ment of the Army, realizing the weekly drills of the Guard seldom went 
beyond basic training, ordered all new enlistees in the National Guard, 
except those vAio were veterans, to take six months’ active duty train­
ing. The National Guard lobby raised a tremendous clamor and besieged 
congressmen with protests. The department stood its ground, pointing 
to lack of readiness for combat on the part of the Guard. The question 
was resolved in the offices of the armed services committees, but the 
National Guard Bureau played an important part in the settlement. It 
stood halfway between the opponents and served as a mediator and agent 
of compromise.
Major General Erickson, chief of the bureau at the time, chose 
not to describe the role of the bureau in the controversy so summarily.
He said;
The National Guard Bureau did not serve as a mediator in the 
so-called six-months’ controversy. Members of the National
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Guard Bureau did appear before various Department of Defense and 
Congressional committees for the purpose of furnishing certain 
statistical information which was used in arriving at an amicable 
agreement.4
Major General James F. Cantwell, Chief of Staff of the State of 
New Jersey in 1957, has termed it more bluntly: "Practically [speaking, 
the National Guard Bureau attempts to harmonize the views of the National 
Guard and Department of the Army whenever possible through coordination 
between them,"^^
The other two Reserve agencies in Department of the Army, the 
Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Reserve Components and the 
Chief, Army Reserve and ROTC Affairs, are without a statutory base. 
Theoretically, they are separate entities, but as a practical matter, 
their functions are so intertwined that it has been impossible for each 
to operate independently.
Analysts have frequently attempted to explain the relationship 
by saying the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff is a planning and 
policy-making agency while the Office of the Chief, Army Reserve and 
ROTC Affairs is an operating agency. This differentiation is the offi­
cial view. Army Regulations^^ make the Assistant Chief of Staff for 
Reserve Components responsible for "(l) development and supervision of 
the Reserve Components Control Program, (2) initiation of, participation 
in, and monitoring of other policies and plans which affect the Reserve
40lbid.
^^Letter from Major General James F. Cantwell, July 23, 1957, to 
the author.
S. Army, Regulation 10-5, 22 May 1957, par. 31 (l), (2).
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Components." Under the same regulation,43 the Chief, Army Reserve and 
ROTC Affairs is charged with implementation of these policies. The 
actual functioning of the two agencies, however, makes the regulation 
somewhat of a myth— both agencies help plan the Reserve program, and 
both agencies are involved in implementation of the plans.
The same regulation, in addition, gives the Assistant Chief of 
Staff for Reserve Components "direct supervision and control over the 
Office of the Chief, Army Reserve and ROTC Affairs."44 As of 1957, this 
clause is not completely in effect. There exists no actual supervisor.
It is true that the Assistant Chief of Staff would win any showdown 
fights between the offices, but so far as the daily work of the two or­
ganizations is concerned, there is no strict demarcation that justifies 
the terms "supervisor" and "supervised." The heads of both offices are 
ordinarily major generals. The "supervising" office has considerably 
less tradition in the Pentagon hierarchy than the "supervised." And more 
importantly, the men who have served as Assistant Chiefs of Staff for 
Reserve Components have had much less experience in Reserve matters than 
the Chief, Army Reserve and ROTC Affairs. All the chiefs, starting with 
Brigadier General Wendell Westover in 1947 have been reservists called 
to active duty specifically to head the office. Consequently, the super­
ior position and status of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Reserve Com­
ponents has been frequently offset by the superior knowledge of the 
Chief, Army Reserve and ROTC Affairs.
43Ibid., par. 31 (c).
% b i d . . par. 37.
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One significant argument is often put forth to discredit the 
above approach and to show the Assistant Chief of Staff has an overpow­
ering role over lower echelons in the Reserve hierarchy. It is said his 
functions involve coordination of the work of the National Guard Bureau 
and the Chief, Army Reserve and ROTC Affairs. This, too, is unrealistic. 
Theoretically, he supervises the program of both Reserve components, but 
it is only in theory. The National Guard Bureau is carefully protected 
by the National Guard Association from extensive encroachment by Penta­
gon regulars. Its powers are based on law and the solicitude of dozens 
of congressmen. Unfavorable moves, by higher Army officials, will be 
immediately challenged by the National Guard lobby. The resulting ten­
sions make all such efforts particularly distasteful to Army authorities, 
and they are avoided. Thus, whatever regulations say, the Assistant 
Chief of Staff for Reserve Components lacks coordinating authority of 
any great moment. Any coordination beyond that desired by the National 
Guard Bureau is done in the shadow of the National Guard Association.
The Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Reserve Compon­
ents, as of 1957 a relative newcomer to the Reserve family, was acti­
vated November 1, 1956. This occurred after approximately five years 
of agitation by the Reserve Officers Association. This move toward 
greater status for the Reserve is perhaps the most delicate aspect of 
the Regular Army-Reserve relationship.
The activation order simply announced that centralized control
S. Department of the Army, General Order Number 45. l6 Oct.,
1950.
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of the Reserve components within the Army had been recognized as neces­
sary. The Reserves would be brought up one echelon closer to the Chief 
of Staff, and the existing deputy chiefs and assistant chiefs would lose 
a portion of their previous control.
Before the new office was established, the management of the 
Reserves had been scattered throughout the general staff. For instance. 
Reserve personnel matters were handled by a comparatively small division 
within the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel. "This 
meant that Reserve matters were somewhat buried within a large office 
and had to go through three or four echelons before they got to the 
Chief of S ta ff .Other Reserve matters were occupying other nooks and 
crannies in the Pentagon. Meanwhile, the Army based its justification 
of the system on the need for continued integration of Reserve-Regular 
Army policy-making. This approach. Reserve lobbyists maintained, was 
nothing but a respectable way of saying that the Regular Army would con­
tinue to keep a tight grip on Reserve expansion. Later, when the as­
sistant chief's office was created, the chain was partially broken. It 
was a compromise temporarily suitable to reservists whereby Reserve mat­
ters would be given a spokesman on the general staff.
The reorganization gave to a single officer a single responsibi­
lity. The numerous diverse aspects of the Reserve program were to be 
coordinated by one office.
This move toward centralized control stemmed, at least partially,
4&Letter from Brigadier General James H. Banville, Oct. 9, 1957, 
to the author.
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from the report of the 1953 Davies Committee on Army Organization, which 
had not been complimentary to the Army’s management of the Reserve pro­
gram. It said;
The necessity of maintaining, during a period of cold war, 
an Armed Force ready for combat places large importance upon the 
effectiveness of the Army Reserve, This Reserve does not now 
match the country’s needs.
Moreover, the Army has been unable, with its existing organ­
ization and program, to build up the unit strength and improve 
the morale and effectiveness of its Reservists, There is in the 
Committee’s opinion, an urgent need for improvement of the Re­
serve program. There is also need for the revision of existing 
organizational structure, , , ,
The Board recommended the abolition of the Office of the Special 
Assistant to the Chief of Staff for Civilian Components which had been 
established in 1949. Simultaneously, the board asked for the appoint­
ment of "a senior officer with special responsibility for developing a 
new and vitalized (Reserve) program,” The new Reserve structure, the 
board said, should report directly to the Chief of Staff, The 1956 
creation of the assistant chief of staff’s office was in accord with 
the board’s recommendations.
The new office was built around the old Office of the Special 
Assistant to the Chief of Staff for Civilian Components, Major General 
Philip DeWitt Ginder, the special assistant, became the first Assistant 
Chief for Reserve Components, He favored the reorganization and worked 
to develop the new concept until he left the Pentagon to become deputy 
commanding general of the First Army at the end of 1957.
S, Department of the Army, Report of the (Davies) Advisory 
Committee on Army Organization. Dec, 13, 1953"TWashington: mimeographed, 
1953), p. 37.
^^Letter from Major General Philip D, Ginder, Oct, 14, 1957, to the 
author.
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The domain and authority of the new assistant chief were from 
the beginning the crucial questions. It was decided that he should have 
authority, without reference to the deputy chiefs of staff, to resolve 
all difficulties unique to the Army Reserve Forces, subject to the ap­
proval of the chief of staff and higher Army authorities. His decisions 
were subject to review by the deputy chiefs of staff if they had a bear­
ing on the active Amy. Obviously, the great mass of Reserve matters 
are applicable, in one way or another, to the active Army. Thus, the 
Reserve still lack any appreciable degree of independence from Regular 
Army attitudes.
Perhaps the most potent of the roles to be played by the Assist­
ant Chief of Staff for Reserve Components was his authority as director 
of one of the five control programs of the Amy. Beginning in the early 
1950*s, the Army sought a new, clarified approach to its major objec­
tives, which so often had been cluttered with secondary considerations. 
Sixteen major goals or programs were isolated. They were seen as a 
basis for planning and as a basis for further clarification by increased 
emphasis on performance budgeting. In 1956, these programs were reduced 
to five: troops, installations, materiel, research and development and
Reserve components. By Army Regulation 10-5, dated 22 May 1957, the 
Assistant Chief of Staff for Reserve Components became director of the 
Reserve Components Control Program, with its concomitant influence over 
budget preparation, expenditures and establishment of goals. It is his 
responsibility to provide long range guidance on the Amy Reserve Forces 
matters, including size of forces, installation-support requirements and
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similar matters for five-year periods at a time.
As of 1957, the office contained, in addition to Major General 
Ginder, eleven division and branch chiefs, a deputy with the rank of 
brigadier general, an executive officer with the rank of colonel and an 
assistant executive officer who was a lieutenant colonel.
It must not be supposed that all Reserve policy matters were 
really moved under one roof through the creation of General Ginder*s 
office. All the various technical offices of the Army staff still play 
tremendously important roles in the Reserve program. For instance, the 
Office of the Provost Marshal General is extremely active in the prepar­
ation of policy for military police units in the Reserve Forces. The 
actual regulations governing such units are usually formulated by either 
the Assistant Chief for Reserve Components, Deputy Chief for Military 
Operations, or the Deputy Commanding General for Reserve Forces at Conti­
nental Army Command at Fort Monroe, Virginia, but they are sent to the 
subject-matter specialists, such as the Provost Marshal General, for 
comment. On occasion, such staff sections as the Provost Marshal Gen­
eral’s office might initiate Reserve policy which would be coordinated 
throughout the Department of the Army by the Assistant Chief of Staff 
for Reserve Components or by one of the deputy chiefs of staff before it 
was promulgated.
The troop basis (the number and type of Army units) for the 
technical services, such as military police units of the Reserve program 
is compiled by the technical service concerned. However, it is based 
on the over-all troop requirements and deployment schedule as established
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by the Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations. In other words, 
the Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations determines, with the 
approval of higher authorities, the number of combat troops needed by 
the Army, both in the active Army and the Reserves. The technical ser­
vices determine the type and amount of support needed for these fighting 
troops. The Assistant Chief of Staff for Reserve Components determines 
whether the strength allocated to the Army Reserve Forces will be Na­
tional Guard or Army Reserve troops.
The Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Reserve Compon­
ents currently serves as a newly selected foster parent to the Office of 
the Chief, Army Reserve and ROTC Affairs. Until 1954, the "chief" was 
known as the "executive" for Army Reserve and ROTC affairs. The old 
term, it was felt, according to official press releases, "suggested a 
purely administrative type function and therefore the Department of the 
Army made the change in order to conform with existing designations of 
other staff sections. . . . "50
The office was first conceived by General of the Armies John J. 
Pershing, chief of staff, in September, 1922. In a memorandum to his 
deputy, Pershing asked for recommendations on a new agency to handle 
Reserve matters. It was first organized as the "Reserve Section" of the 
Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G2 (Intelligence) in June, 1923, 
with Major C. F. Thompson as the first chief. Subsequently it was
^^Letter from Colonel J. M. Ernst, Executive Officer, Office of 
the Provost Marshal General, 3 Oct. 1957, to the author.
5QArmy Reservist. 1 (Jan., 1955), 11,
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moved to the Office of the Assistant Secretary of War in March, 1926, 
as the Office of the Executive for Reserve Affairs. In 1927, it was 
returned to function under the chief of staff, and on August 21, 1940, 
it was made responsible for ROTC matters, in addition to its Reserve 
functions. The name was changed officially to include the ROTC function 
in June, 1941. The following year, with World War II getting underway, 
the office was placed under the jurisdiction of the Adjutant General of 
the Army, where it had only advisory functions. On June 27, 1942, the 
office was established as an independent service under the Chief of Ad­
ministrative Services, Services of Supply. Then, on November 12, 1943, 
it was again moved so as to be in the jurisdiction of the Director of 
Personnel, Army Service Forces. When the war was over, the office was 
again established as a special staff section of the War Department.54 
Currently, the mission of the office remains the same as vrtien 
reestablished in 1945, that is, to promote the development of the Army 
Reserve and ROTC, to assist and advise the Chief of Staff and Secretary 
of the Army, to prepare budget estimates and justify them before the 
Bureau of the Budget and Congress, to maintain liaison with Reserve units, 
private associations and educational institutions, and to coordinate Re­
serve public information activities.
Since World War II, the Office of the chief has been occupied by 
reservists e x c l u s i v e l y .5̂  Several chiefs were appointed while serving
54lbid.. p. 11.
^^Brigadier General Edward W. Smith (1945-47); Brigadier General 
Wendell Westover (1947-49); Major General James B. Cress (1949-51); Major 
General Hugh M. Milton II (1951-53) ; Major General Philip F. Lindeman 
(1953-57); Major General Ralph A. Palladino (1957- ).
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on the General Staff Committee on Army Reserve Policy. Although there 
is no long established precedence or law which requires subsequent ap­
pointments to be made from the same source, the practice may become a 
tradition. Most observers agree that it would be a good one. It seems 
necessary for public relations reasons, as well as by provisions of 
law,^^ to have five reservists on duty with the Army staff at all times. 
There is no office more suitable for reservists. Consequently, the 
chiefs will probably continue to come from Reserve ranks. If this is 
true, their selection from among the membership of the general staff 
committee is entirely likely. It gives Pentagon leaders a chance to 
observe the officer for a couple years or more— an important aspect since 
Army leaders have no desire to appoint a chief vrfio will not adjust him­
self to the Regular Army team and to the Regular Army viewpoint.
The 1953 Davies Committee on Army Organization recommended that 
the Office of the Chief, Army Reserve and ROTC Affairs be split into 
Army Reserve and ROTC Sections. It further asked for a "strengthening 
of the leadership of the Reserve in each area."54 The first of these 
suggestions was refused by the Secretary of the Army and, so far as the 
second is concerned, no appreciable change in the office can be detected.
It must be remembered that the entire Department of the Army Re­
serve framework is a staff section and, theoretically at least, has no 
operating responsibilities. Operations are the responsibility of the
53u. S. Code. Title 10, sec. 3033 (e)(l956).
54u. S. Department of the Army, Report of the (Davies) Advisory 
Committee on Army Organization. Dec. 13, 1953""7Washington; mimeographed, 
1953), p. 37.
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Secretary of the Army and the Chief of Staff acting through a vast or­
ganization of zone of interior armies, often called "continental" armies 
to differentiate them from the overseas commands. The continental armies 
report to the Commanding General, Continental Army Command, Fort Monroe, 
Virginia, who is the highest operating authority for Reserve functions, 
as well as for other Army functions, under the Chief of Staff. Authority 
for management of the Army Reserve (but not for the National Guard) is 
delegated by each of the continental army commanders to a variety of 
corps areas and military districts, commanded by major generals, briga­
diers, and colonels. In some parts of the country. Army Reserve activi­
ties are handled by the commanding generals of the corps areas, which 
cover three, four or more states. Each state constitutes a military 
district, with headquarters usually in the state capitol. Where corps 
areas do not exist, the chief of the military district reports directly 
to the continental army headquarters in which he is located.
As of 1957, additional corps areas were being created to cover 
the entire United States. Each corps area was to be commanded by an 
active Army major general. The Army planned that the new corps areas 
would take over several functions formerly performed by military dis­
tricts.55 It was claimed that the change would permit reductions in 
personnel and facilities, but this was doubted in many quarters. The 
plan was frequently challenged by reservists who claimed it was an effort
55u. S. Department of the Army, Office of the Assistant Chief of 
Staff for Reserve for Reserve Components, Fact Sheet on DA Plan for 
Consolidation of Military Districts, undated, mimeographed.
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to create more positions calling for major generals, but this seems il­
logical considering that several military districts were already com­
manded by major generals. The Army status system would prevent major 
generals from commanding both echelons— either the chiefs of military 
districts will be demoted or the corps commanders will be promoted to 
lieutenant generals.
The military districts in turn delegate authority to smaller 
areas called unit adviser's offices. The size of such areas depend upon 
population and other factors. Usually they are ten or twelve counties.
The unit advisers, usually field grade officers, manage the Re­
serve units within their immediate locality and also assign sergeants 
to sub-stations at other cities within their areas. It is the intention 
of the Army to give every Reserve unit close supervision through this 
system of advisers.
Management of National Guard functions is, of course, the re­
sponsibility of state authorities. Each governor has an adjutant general 
as his chief staff officer, and he ordinarily has an over-all commanding 
general of all Guard units. The Army's varied interests in the Guard 
units are handled by the Continental Army Command and the continental 
armies through a set of senior Army advisers and unit advisers, similar 
to the Army Reserve organization.
Below army area headquarters, the echelons have almost no re­
sponsibilities other than the Reserve program. Above the corps areas, 
there are many other functions. Thus at army areas and above. Reserve 
matters are immeshed into the total Army picture.
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Previous to 1956, small staff sections handled Reserve matters 
at the Continental Army Command and at the various army headquarters, 
and consequently the Reserve frequently came out a poor second in the 
race for attention. In 1956, a deputy commanding general for Reserve 
Forces was allocated to Continental Army Command and to each of the con­
tinental armies. At Continental Army Command, the new job was allocated 
the rank of lieutenant general, which is currently the highest ranking 
position found in the Reserve hierarchy. At Army headquarters, the of­
ficer holds the rank of major general, and he has a Reserve Forces staff 
section as an aide. It is usually composed of an administrative division 
and an ROTC division, as well as Army Reserve and National Guard divi­
sions.
The previously described administrative structure has a profound 
influence on Reserve policies. First, the diffusion of policy-making is 
great. Power and responsibility are scattered throughout the Department 
of Defense and Department of the Army. Relations between the five major 
Reserve agencies of the Department of the Army are particularly con­
fusing, which suggests the need for administrative reorganization.
The new unification of the Armed Forces in the Department of De­
fense has required Army Reserve Forces policies to be, at least partially, 
agreeable to the other services. The necessity of equity among the ser­
vices has affected Army policies, usually to advantage. There has been 
a significant effort to build Army standards to be as high as those of 
the Naval Reserve.
The Department of Defense, as yet still in its formative stages.
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has been somewhat unable to coordinate well since it lacks long estab­
lished powers, procedures, and attitudes. Although the Reserve Forces 
Policy Board will be treated in detail later, it might be noted here, 
that the Department of Defense coordination has been the responsibility 
of a board. This board was handicapped by a slow, controversial begin­
ning, as well as the usual disadvantages accruing from the use of 
boards within an administrative organization.
Another important aspect of the Reserve structure has been its 
relation to the guilds interested in Reserve policy— the Regular Army, 
National Guard and Army Reserve interests. There has been considerable 
competition among these interests to get and maintain a preponderant in­
fluence over the Reserve agencies. This competition will be considered 
in detail later.
The institutional characteristics of the various agencies have 
been important. Some agencies have a statutory basis, and for this and 
other reasons, have a solidified position on the Army staff. The National 
Guard Bureau, lodged between the nation and the states is in a particu­
larly fortified position.
CHAPTER III 
CONGRESS AND RESERVE FORCES POLICY
"It was the intention of the constitutional fathers to give the 
Congress substantially, although not exclusive, control over the mili­
tary establishment."^ In this role, the Congress is an important factor 
in keeping the civilian components efficient and within democratic con­
trol. Congress attempts to establish long-term Reserve policies, or at 
least, to point out the ultimate ends toward which the Reserves should 
aim their efforts. It has established the basic organizational outline 
for the agencies responsible for the realization of Reserve objectives. 
"It sets the overall standards for the operation of these agencies, in­
vestigates their actions, and criticizes their performance."2
The fundamental powers of Congress to make military policy stems 
from Article 1, Section 8, of the United States Constitution. Of the 
eighteen powers of Congress specified there, six are concerned directly 
with the military forces, and five of these six deal with the land 
forces, including the Army Reserve and National Guard. Congress, says 
the Constitution, shall have power:
^Louis Smith, American Democracy and Military Power (Chicago: 




. . .  to declare war . . .  to raise and support armies, but no 
appropriation of money to that end shall be for a longer term 
than two years . . .  to make rules for the government and regula­
tion of the land and naval forces . . .  to provide for calling 
forth the militia to execute the laws of the Union, suppress in­
surrection, and repel invasions . . .  to provide for organizing, 
arming, and disciplining the militia, and for governing such part 
of them as may be employed in the service of the United States, 
reserving to the states respectively, the appointment of the offi­
cers, and the authority of training the militia according to the 
discipline prescribed by Congress . . .
To the extent to which the Congress has been able to exercise, 
in a practical way, these powers, it has depended upon its committee 
structure, chiefly the Armed Services committee of each house.
These committees have had an eventful past. Almost any student 
remembers the Civil War*s Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War. 
Later, during World War I, Senator George E. Chamberlain of Oregon, 
chairman of the Senate military affairs committee, was the leading 
critic of the War Department’s policies. Although he belonged to the 
same political party as the President, Chamberlain sought to make his 
committee another "Committee on the Conduct of the War." Until 1921, 
when the famous Budget and Accounting Act was passed, the House military 
affairs committee dominated military appropriations, although the appro­
priations committees had been functioning since 1865.3
In World War II, the military affairs committees, were, of course, 
important although they were displaced from the limelight by Senator 
Harry Truman’s war investigating committee. Further important functions
^Edward L. Katzenbach and John A. Ballard, Congress and Defense; 
Defense Appropriations ; Investigations ; and Relations with the Pentagon 
(Cambridge : Harvard Defense Studies, Serial No. 48» Reading Assignment 
No. 11, mimeographed, 1955)> p. 13.
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were denied the committees by the appointment, in 1944, of a select house 
committee on post-war military policy, which looked into the important 
matters of universal military training and unification of the Armed 
Forces.
In the early post-war years, the chairman of the House military 
affairs committee, the energetic, temperamental Andrew Jackson May, of 
Kentucky, was disgraced by his conviction for fraud against the govern­
ment,^
In 1947, under the Legislative Reorganization Act of that year, 
the military affairs committees and the naval affairs committees of each 
house were combined to form the two present armed services committees. 
Thus the color of unification came to the committees for the first time. 
There was no redivision of the committees into Army, Navy, Air Force 
subcommittees, as occurred when similar unification came to the house 
appropriations committee, two years later.
The approximately 37 members of the House armed services com­
mittee have divided themselves into either three or four standing sub­
committees and from three to twenty-one special subcommittees. On occa­
sion there has been a special policy subcommittee composed of the eight 
members with the longest tenure who, if members of the majority party, 
were also subcommittee chairmen.
The standing subcommittees were numbered rather than names and 
were assigned no specific province of responsibility. They simply con­
sidered whatever bills the chairman of the full committee chose to assign
4Louis Smith, op, cit,, p, 251,
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to them. The policy subcommittee served as an executive board to co­
ordinate the work of the other subcommittees.
At the beginning of the 80th Congress in 1947, a subcommittee 
on "personnel" handled Reserve Components matters with Mr, Dewey Short 
of Missouri, as chairman, Mr, Short, a Republican, was continued as 
chairman in the Democratic 81st Congress, Although he was one of twenty- 
one special subcommittee chairmen that session. Short was the only Re­
publican, His appointment represents the only occasion that a minority 
member has ever served as an armed services subcommittee chairman,5
In the 82nd Congress, beginning in 1951, a sixteen-man special 
Reserve subcommittee headed by Representative Overton Brooks, Democrat 
of Louisiana, was appointed. This was the beginning of a long career 
for Mr, Brooks as the chief House spokesman in Reserve affairs. At the 
time, Mr, Brooks was the second ranking Democrat of the House armed ser­
vices committee, having been elected to the 75th Congress of 1937 and all 
succeeding congresses. He was born in Baton Rouge, Louisiana. During 
World War I, he served with the 6th Field Artillery Battalion in France, 
After graduation from law school, he was appointed to be United States 
commissioner, and from that job he was elected to Congress from a district 
centering around Shreveport, Louisiana, In later years he was to be 
called "Mr, Reserve" of Congress for his devotion to the civilian com­
ponents.
In the Republican 83d Congress, 1953-54, there were three stand-
^Letter from Robert W, Smart, Chief Counsel, House Committee on 
Armed Services, Nov, 18, 1957, to the author.
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ing subcommittees and six special subcommittees. Reserve affairs, pre­
viously handled by a special subcommittee, were removed to the domain 
of Subcommittee No. 3. This was the first time the subcommittees had 
been assigned definite jurisdictions. Subcommittees 1, 2, and 3 were 
given responsibility for materiel, personnel, and reserve problems, 
respectively. In assigning Reserve affairs to Subcommittee No. 3> 
Chairman Dewey Short said:
This is a vital and important committee. You will notice 
that the members we put on there are men with a great deal of 
military experience, and fellows who have had a long and earnest 
interest in building up an effective and efficient fighting 
Reserve Force . . . ^
The rise to power of the Republicans also brought an end to the 
policy subcommittee which might on occasion have reduced the responsi­
bility of Subcommittee No. 3 for Reserve affairs. At the organizational 
meeting of the full committee on February k , 1953, there was also an ef­
fort made to end the life of the spe dal investigations subcommittee, 
but it failed.
The chairman of Subcommittee No. 3 for Reserve affairs was Rep­
resentative Leroy Johnson, Republican of California, who came to Congress 
in 1953* He was also a major general in the Army Reserve and commanding 
general of the 96th Reserve Infantry Division. Brooks was the ranking 
minority member. The subcommittee conducted eight weeks of study and 
hearings on the Reserve Officer Personnel Act which established the 
first statutory system of Reserve promotions.
Û. S. Congress, House of Representatives, Report of Activities 
of the House Committee on Armed Services. 83d Cong., Sept., 1954 (Wash- 
ington: Government Printing Office, 1954), p. 3*
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By virtue of a Democratic majority elected to the 84th Congress, 
Representative Carl Vinson, of Georgia, regained the chairmanship of 
the full committee in 1955» The structure of the committee remained 
almost the same. There were three standing subcommittees, of which Sub­
committee No. 1 was delegated responsibility for Reserve legislation.
Mr. Brooks became subcommittee chairman. From its work came the Reserve 
Forces Act of 1955> a three-year extension of the National Defense Faci­
lities Act of 1950 and an act to provide rehabilitation pay for reser­
vists vdio are forced off active duty because of reductions-in-force.
In the 85th Congress, Subcommittee No. 1 continued to have juris­
diction of Reserve matters and Brooks continued as chairman.
Although Reserve affairs have been delegated to the subcommittee 
level, it must not be assumed that the full committee chairman is with­
out power or influence over such matters. Throughout the life of the 
subcommittee, the chairman and the ranking minority member of the full 
committee have held ex officio membership on the subcommittee, and have 
greatly influenced Reserve affairs. Carl Vinson, often called "the ad­
miral" because of his earlier enthusiasm as a naval advocate, never will­
ingly relinquished any power to the Reserve subcommittee. In fact, he 
has been widely known as an autocrat.7
Although the authority of the committee chairman is great when­
ever he chooses to exercise it, there is also considerable autonomy 
vested in the subcommittees, including the Reserve subcommittee.
On the other side of the Capitol building, the Senate has steered
^Katzenbach and Ballard, op. cit.. p. 19.
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clear of Reserve subcommittees, and subcommittees of all types have been 
less used. There seems to be a greater friendliness for the functional 
approach on the Senate side, so that, for instance a materiel problem 
within the Reserves would be considered by a subcommittee responsible 
for materiel problems of the entire Armed Forces. In addition, the 
twenty-man Senate committee, smaller than the House committee, has less 
need for subcommittees. Also important is the desire of all members of 
the Senate committee to consider Reserve matters instead of delegating 
them to a small portion of the committee. Each member wants to be in­
fluential on all matters before the committee.
Even the staff of the Senate Armed Services committee is not 
conspicuous for division of labor. In 1957» one professional staff mem­
ber handled real estate matters exclusively, and the other two staff 
members shared the remainder of the work. Neither handled Reserve mat­
ters exclusively, except that the real estate man took charge of all 
armory construction interests of the committee.^ On the other hand, the 
House armed services committee assigned one of its four professional 
staff members to handle all Reserve matters.
There is much controversy over which of the two Houses of Con­
gress sees the Reserve picture with greater perspicacity. The highly- 
specialized House subcommittee holds many more Departmental briefings 
and hearing than the Senate committee, and therefore can possibly seek 
out. more details. This is especially true because each House member
^Interview with T. Edward Braswell, Jr., Staff Member, Senate 
Armed Services Committee, Sept. 16, 1957.
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serves on only one committee while Senators serve on two or three. 
However, it is said that the Senate, not so concerned about details, 
can see the defense picture with greater perspective.
Of great importance to the work of the congressional committees 
is the Office of the Chief of Legislative Liaison of the Department of 
the Army. The office is the official channel of communications from 
the Army to Congress, and it is the channel most often used for minor 
or routine inquiries from Congress to the Army. But, of course, con­
gressmen and their staffs may directly contact any Army agency which 
they choose.
Until World War I the Army had no agency responsible for legis­
lative matters. In 1918, the war plans division of the general staff 
was assigned to be responsible for War Department contacts with Congress. 
When the position of deputy chief of staff was created in 1921, one of 
its specified duties was the handling of legislative matters. The first 
holder of that office established a legislative branch as a "clearing 
house" for legislative proposals. In 1931, this branch became the bud­
get and legislative planning branch.
Upon reorganization of the War Department in 1942, a Legislative 
and Liaison Division was fomed as a staff agency. After World War II, 
it was placed under supervision of the Chief of Information. Redesigna­
tion as the Office, Chief of Legislative Liaison, came in 1950 when it 
was transferred to function directly under the Chief of Staff of the 
Army. In February, 1955, the organization was moved from the Army staff 
to the Office of the Secretary of the Army.
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Under the present organization the legislative division of the 
office coordinates the flow of legislative proposals to the Department 
of Defense, Bureau of the Budget, and to Congress. The liaison division 
answers the myriad complaints and questions from individual members of 
Congress. These two agencies have been important aides to Congress in 
military legislation.
From the end of World War II until 1950, the contact of congres­
sional committees with the Reserve Forces came almost entirely from leg­
islative consideration of bills sent through the legislative liaison 
division. From 1950 until the end of the Korean conflict, the contact 
grew out of the thousands of complaints received by congressmen concern­
ing the mobilization of reservists. Congress took upon itself the re­
sponsibility to investigate both the recall procedures and the promotion 
of reservists on active duty. After 1952 congressional initiative eased 
off somewhat but never to its earlier level. Representative Brooks’ 
Reserve Components subcommittee conducted numerous hearings, not only on 
the 1952 and 1955 Reserve acts, but on the Reserve program in general.
The motivation for the 1947-50 legislation, including provisions 
for drill pay, retirement, and disability benefits, arose from three 
basic sources. First, the Navy had possessed most of these privileges 
since 1938. The resulting comparison with Army Reserve austerity sup­
plied Reserve lobbyists and their congressional friends with convincing 
arguments for extension of these benefits. The Navy program served as 
a tremendous lever for additional Army Reserve legislation. Secondly, 
the Army itself was interested in the improvement of the Reserves,
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although it seldom gave the problem top priority. Last, and perhaps of 
most importance, was the general criticism of the public and Congress 
for the inadequacy of the Reserves.
Senator Margaret Chase Smith, Republican of Maine, provided 
particularly caustic comment, and introduced resolutions calling for an 
investigation of the Air Force and Army Reserve. Representative John W. 
Byrnes, Republican of Wisconsin, declared on the floor of Congress on 
May 6, 1948, that the Reserve program was "poorly conceived and poorly 
executed." Senator Harlan J. Bushfield openly charged the Army with 
"neglecting the Army Reserve and National G u a r d . O n  March 19, 1949, 
Senator Smith asked the Secretary of Defense for a comparative report 
on the Reserve programs of the three services, and on May 9, 1949, bit­
terly reported on the floor of the Senate the failure of the secretary 
to provide such a report.
To such criticisms. Secretary of the Army Kenneth Royall denied 
that "the fault lies entirely with the Army or any other specific agency 
since many factors are involved."!^ Generally speaking. Democrat Royall 
astutely chose to share the blame with the Republican Congress. He said 
the large Reserve troop basis was predicated upon the passage of univer­
sal military training legislation, still unenacted. He grumbled at the 
previous lack of inactive duty training pay which the War Department had 
only recently requested and received from Congress. He also decried the
%. S. Congressional Record. 80th Cong., 2d Sess., May 6, 1948, 
p. A 2769.
l^Letter from Royall to Rep. John W. Byrnes, April 15, 1948, File 
326.6 ORC, 1948, Departmental Records Branch, Department of the Army.
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lack of appropriations.
In January of 1947j Mrs. Smith, then a member of the House of 
Representatives, had introduced an inactive duty training pay bill for 
the Army and Air Force Reserves.Nothing happened to the legislation 
until Secretary of War Robert P. Patterson sent over a departmental bill 
to accomplish the same goal.
The bill passed the Senate without debate in the first session
12of the 80th Congress and came up for House debate in March, 1948. The 
discussion, very general in nature, brought out a major complaint against 
the bill. The National Guard was already receiving drill pay in the same 
amount Army reservists were destined to receive. In competing with the 
Army Reserve for recruits, the National Guard, whose responsibilities 
included state as well as national functions, would suffer. Young men 
would prefer to join the Army Reserve, which had only national functions, 
unless the National Guard received extra pay to offset the extra func­
tions. Representative Errett P. Scrivner, of Kansas, argued vigorously, 
but offered no specific amendment. The bill became law in the same form 
as recommended by the House committee.̂ ^
Almost as far reaching, and a great deal more complicated, was 
the Army and Air Force Vitalization and Retirement Equalization Act of 
1948 which permitted reservists with twenty years of satisfactory mili­
tary service to draw retirement pay after reaching sixty years of age.
% .  R. 1059, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 1947.
1 PU. S. Congressional Record. 80th Cong., 2d Sess., March 9, 1948,
p. 2418.
^̂ P. L. 460, 80th Cong., 2d Sess., 1948.
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In order to have a year of service credited as a satisfactory year, a 
reservist must have earned at least fifty "retirement points" by attend­
ing drill sessions, teaching classes or completing Army correspondence 
courses. During summer camp and other types of active duty, reservists 
receive one retirement point for each day of active service. The sum 
of all retirements points earned in a lifetime career determines the 
rate of retirement pay. The rate is geared to the active Army pay scale, 
so that whenever the regulars get a pay raise, the reservists also bene­
fit,^ This system gave reservists some assurance that their retirement 
pay would not suffer from inflation since each Regular Army pay raise 
would, constitute an adjustment.
The retirement bill was originally introduced under National 
Military Establishment sponsorship in 1 9 4 7 , but made no headway. In 
1948 the bill had no difficulty winning congressional committee approval. 
Floor debate was lengthy but noncontroversial. The bill became laŵ ° 
under the joint sponsorship of the Defense Establishment, the Reserve 
Officers Association and the National Guard Association,
Complications immediately arose, however, over the administration 
of the act. The effective date was not specific. During consideration 
of the bill, the House Committee on Armed Services had recommended the 
addition of a new section permitting the departmental secretary to set
^This was thought in many informed quarters to be an astute system 
whereby thousands of reservists would support Regular Amy pay raises,
5̂h, R, 2744, 80th Cong,, 1st Sess,, 1947.
L, 810, 80th Cong,, 2d Sess,, 1948.
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the effective date, but in no case could it be later than the first day 
of the seventh month following the enactment of the bill. The amend­
ment was subsequently accepted by the House and Senate and became a part 
of the law. Later the comptroller general ruled that in order for re­
servists to earn a satisfactory retirement year, they must begin to earn 
retirement points as of the enactment date. This was impossible be­
cause the National Military Establishment had not issued appropriate 
regulations and, in fact, was not required to do so by the act until 
January 1, 1949»^^ An amendment was needed to clarify the effective 
date of the law.
The following year, a bill was introduced into the 81st Congress 
making the effective date July 1, 1949*̂ ® As the bill was moving pain­
lessly through the House, Representative Overton Brooks offered an amend­
ment upon the request of Major General Milton A. Reckord, Adjutant Gen­
eral of Maryland and Legislative Chairman of the National Guard Associa­
tion. The amendment would have extended retirement privileges to per­
sonnel viio had served in the National Guard and state militia forces 
prior to June 3, 1916. Before this date, the system of national recog­
nition of state forces was not in existence, but nevertheless the bill, 
together with the amendment, passed the House on July IS, 1948, and the 
Senate on July 26, 1948. It was vetoed by President Eisenhower, who
S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Armed 
Services, Amending Reserve Retirement Provisions of the P. L. 810. 80th 
Congress, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., 1949, H. Rept. 1021 to accompany H. R. 
5508, p. 2.
18,’H. R. 5508, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949)
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would not permit the retirement privilege to be extended to "non-fed- 
erally recognized service,*’ Another bill without the obnoxious amend­
ment was quickly pushed through the House and Senate.The last of 
the statute’s complications had been finally cleared up.
Another major boost was given to the Reserve program by the 
passage, in 1949, of a disability and death benefits bill. The effort 
was begun in 1947 vdien Representative Margaret Chase Smith, of Maine, 
and Senator William F. Knowland, of California, introduced bills to this 
effect in their respective Houses. It was Senator Smith’s bill vdiich 
finally became law— without the support of the Department of Defense. 
Spokesmen for the department said the bill should await ”a single legis­
lative program dealing with all aspects of compensation of the armed 
21services.” Because of pressure from the civilian components, the re­
quest for delay was denied. It was passed first by the Senate in April, 
then by the House in June, 1949» Under the law, reservists won finan­
cial protection from injuries and death which occurred on short tours of 
active duty. Protection during longer periods of active duty was already 
provided by law.
Also in 1949 there came the first congressional steps toward an 
armory construction program. By early 1948 the Army staff was forced, 
by rising pressure, to take definite planning action. After the publica-
R. 5929, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. which became P. L. 297, 81st 
Cong., 1st Sess., 1949.
213, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. which became P. L. 108, 81st 
Cong., 1st Sess., 1949.
S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Hearings, 
Disability Benefits for Reserves. 81st Cong., 1st Sess., 1949, on S. 213, 
p. 4.
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tion of the 1%8 Gray board report, which inquired into the over-all 
conditions of all Reserve components, and after President Truman had 
focused attention on the Reserve problem through his Executive Order 
10008, the Army considered it essential that Reserve facilities legis­
lation be introduced under departmental auspices in the next Congress. 
This was accomplished. Chairman Chan Gurney of the Senate armed services 
committee introduced the bill in early 1949»^^
On May 17, 1949, Harold R. Bull, Acting Director of Organization 
and Training of the Army, was called before members of the Senate Armed 
Services committee to explain the armory problem. It was decided that 
the bill should be returned to the Department of Defense for revision 
in accordance with various principles of inter-service cooperation laid 
down by the Gray board. 3̂
In the same month the Secretary of Defense restated the legis­
lative items which he considered deserved high priority, and although 
the facilities bill had earlier possessed this status, it was no longer 
included. The Senate committee therefore gave the bill no further con­
sideration in 1949.
In the second session of the 8Ist Congress, the bill regained 
its priority. On April 20, 1950, the Bureau of the Budget released a 
statement that the bill "should not be further delayed." On May 5, 1950, 
the Secretary of the Army notified the committee that he considered the
^̂ S. 1646, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., 1949.
^̂ File D15-1-23, Departmental Records Branch, Department of the
Army.
88
bill of critical importance.24
The outbreak of the Korean War caused some delay in congres­
sional consideration of the armory bill, but once taken up, it went 
through Congress without difficulty. It was passed by the House on 
August 15, 1950, after an amendment by Representative Brooks which re­
moved any mention of a specific amount to be appropriated. The Senate 
version, which passed on August 21st, created twenty-two disagreements, 
only five of which were technical in nature. It was finally decided by 
a conference committee to authorize appropriation of $250,000,000 for 
the next five years. The conference also accepted the House language 
calling upon the Secretary of Defense to consult the respective armed 
service committees about the construction of specific armory buildings.
In 1955 the program was extended for three years and given auth­
orization for an additional $250,000,000. When this authorization ex­
pired in 1957, the Department of Defense asked for $150,000,000 more for 
a two-year period. Instead, Congress decided to authorize funds for 
only one-year periods thereafter. Furthermore, a one-year limit was 
attached to the appropriations themselves. Beginning with the budget 
for 1959, the Department of Defense must ask for authority and money for 
specific projects on a line-item basis. Projects not placed under con­
tract by the deadline date, must be resubmitted the following year for 
congressional approval.
The public furor over the inequitable recall of World War II
^U. S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, National 
Defense Facilities Act of 1950. 81st Cong., 2d Sess., 1949, S. Rept. 
1785, to accompany S. 9W ,  p. 4.
69
veterans into the Korean hostilities generated the great congressional 
interest in the Reserves. On American entry into the war. Congress 
enacted legislation permitting the involuntary recall of reservists for 
periods not exceeding twenty-one m o n t h s . X n  the same law, Congress 
also permitted the President to extend all enlistments for a period of 
twelve months. In both cases, the authority was to terminate July 9, 
1951, but the entry of the Chinese communists into the war required that 
both powers be extended until July 1, 1953»^^ Simultaneously, the per­
iod during which reservists could be involuntarily retained on active 
duty was lengthened from twenty-one to twenty-four months.
The public clamor over recall procedures centered around the in­
duction of inactive reservists who had neither participated in training 
nor received pay. Generally speaking, these inactive reservists were 
forced back to active duty before those who had drawn pay as participants 
in organized units. Even World War II veterans were recalled while 
draft-deferred students remained in school.
The policy of the Department of Defense to call inactive indi­
viduals of the Army Reserve prior to members of organized units was de­
fended by Brigadier General E. A. Evans, executive director of the Na­
tional Reserve Officers’ Association. The great need, he told the House 
Committee on Armed Services, was for individual replacements. To have 
taken the replacements from the organized units would have destroyed 
these units, leaving this country extremely vulnerable in case of all-out
L. 599, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., 1950.
26p. L. 51, 82d Cong., 1st Sess., 1951.
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war. It was a ’’proper” decision, Evans said.27
It was several months before Secretary of Defense George C. 
Marshall could calm the storm by a promise that reservists would there­
after receive considerable advance notice before recall.
Demands for quick releases of the reservists continued to bom­
bard Congress, and during the hearings on the Universal Military Train­
ing and Service Act of 1951 the House armed services committee succumbed 
to a demand for a twelve-months’ limit on involuntary service by those 
who were recalled out of the inactive Reserve. All would be released 
as soon after June 25, 1951, as they completed twelve months’ service, 
according to an amendment presented by the committee and accepted by 
the House of Representatives. The Senate version of the bill contained 
no such provision, and it was the responsibility of a conference com­
mittee to work out a compromise. The final version enacted into law 
required the release of all World War II veterans after seventeen months’
service.28
The clamor still did not end completely. In August of the same 
year, during debate over the defense appropriation bill for fiscal year 
1952, Representative James Van Zandt, of Pennsylvania, proposed a rider 
prohibiting the use of any part of the appropriation to pay salaries 
after November 30, 1951, of inactive reservists yAio were World War II 
veterans. It would have forced the Army to discharge all veteran re-
S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Armed 
Services, Hearings, Reserve Components. 82d Cong., 1st Sess., 1951, pur­
suant to H. R. 4860, p. 6.
28p. L. 51, 82d Cong., 1st Sess., 1951.
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servists. The proposal aroused tremendous controversy. Its opponents 
declared the period of recall had been settled and should not be re­
opened. The powerful chairman of the House armed services committee, 
Carl Vinson, took the floor in an effort to defeat the amendment, but 
to no avail. The amendment was accepted by a vote of 110 to 94,^^ but 
in later Senate action, the amendment was discarded and never reappeared.
The Reserve troubles of the Korean conflict found their partial 
solution in the Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1952.^0 Actually the De­
partment of Defense had been working on a proposed bill, a compilation 
of over-all Reserve policies, since 1949 when Secretary James Forrestal 
decided that Naval Reserve legislation should be extended to all the 
services. The Civilian Components Policy Board drafted an "omnibus" 
bill in 1950, but it failed to receive a hearing. Representatives Carl 
Vinson and Overton Brooks continued to prod the Department of Defense 
for additional Reserve proposals.During legislative hearings on se­
lective service matters in the latter part of 1950, defense officials 
promised to submit a Reserve bill within six months. In early January, 
1951, the chairman of the House armed services committee sent a note to 
the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower and Personnel asking for 
the bill on or before March 1, 1951. Mrs. Anna Rosenberg, the assistant 
secretary, put the department in high gear, and a bill was introduced
S. Congressional Record, 82d Cong., 1st Sess., Aug. 9, 1951,
p. 9752.
30p. L. 476, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 1952.
31nsw York Times. July 2, 1951, p. 13.
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into the 1951 session.32
The House committee made approximately 150 amendments to the 
bill, and on the advice of the Reserve Officers Association, the bill 
was ultimately superseded by H. R. i+Ô60 which in turn was superseded by 
H. R. 5277, and finally by H. R. 5426.33
The Reserve Officers Association made a penetrating study of the 
bill and was very influential in its final form. The National Guard 
Association, on the other hand, said, at the beginning at least, that 
it was "well satisfied with the existing laws and policies."3^ The re­
vised bill passed the House on October 15, 1951, without much interest 
from the Guard, but this attitude was not to continue.
By the time the representatives of the National Guard Associa­
tion testified on the bill before the Senate subcommittee, on May 26 of 
the following year, they had proposed 97 amendments to the bill, 96 of 
which had been accepted by the Department of Defense. Major General 
Ellard A. Walsh, the organization's chief lobbyist, told the group that 
the bill was a "non-reality" without universal military training. He 
declared that;
. . .  no action should be taken on the bill at this time and 
thus afford an opportunity for further study to determine what 
can be done in this connection with the subject matter of the 
proposed Act. As the National Guard sees it, this proposed 
measure, if enacted, would establish a Reserve system whereby
32h. R. 4667, 82d Cong., 1st Sess., introduced June 29, 1951.
33u. S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Hearings, 




the whole burden for national defense would fall upon the vet­
erans of the country who have already been placed in jeopardy as 
the result of war or emergency and who would again be placed in 
jeopardy if another emergency, comparable to the Korean emer­
gency should arise.35
Major General Milton A. Reckord, chairman of the Guardis legis­
lative committee, testified that the provisions of the bill would 
"almost completely federalize the National G u a r d . T h i s  same charge 
had previously been leveled against practically all legislation which 
the National Guard Association disliked, and to many observers it was a 
far-fetched conclusion to draw concerning the bill. On the following 
day, Earl D. Johnson, Assistant Secretary of the Amy, countered the 
Reckord statement;
"I can state unequivocally and officially on behalf of the 
Department of the Army that there is absolutely no intent and 
no desire whatever on the part of those responsible for the ad­
ministration of the Army, to change the traditional dual status 
of the National Guard, either by law or regulation.37
Assistant Secretary Anna Rosenberg also appeared before the Committee to 
deny the charges. She said, "The Department has been in almost contin­
ual contact with the senior representatives of the National Guard Associ­
ation, and this is the first intimation that we have had that the Na­
tional Guard Association is dissatisfied."^® She claimed the Guard had 
actually pointed to some of its own amendments as attempts to federalize 
the Guard.




Regardless of the denials, the National Guard Association’s 
drive against the bill pushed ahead. Letters began to pour into con­
gressmen’s offices from the various state adjutants general and their 
friends. Many, viiich were printed in the hearings, utilized the same 
terminology, hinting of a common origin. Among other charges, the let­
ters said that, (l) with universal military training impossible, the 
bill was unrealistic; (2) it does nothing for enlisted personnel or the 
National Guard; (3) it created a Reserve composed of veterans; (4) it 
was an entering wedge for the federalization of the National Guard; (5) 
it weakened the National Guard Bureau; (6) it would hurt National Guard 
recruiting, and (?) it would create a system of Ready and Standby Re­
serves which was "utterly unrealistic."^^
By the time the Senate acted on the bill in 1952, universal mili­
tary training had truly been killed. Consequently, a radically altered 
bill was passed.
During floor debate. Senator James E, Murray, Democrat of Mon­
tana, failed to win acceptance of an amendment providing for the appoint­
ment of osteopaths as Reserve officers. Two other amendments were ac­
cepted, however. The Senate spoke out in favor of motherhood by accept­
ing a proposal by Senator Robert C. Hendrickson, Republican of New Jer­
sey, to remove the ban against mothers in the Women’s Army Corps-Reserve. 
Another amendment by Senator Styles Bridges, Republican of New Hampshire, 
allowed service as Military and Naval Academy cadets to be counted 
toward Reserve longevity pay.
3?Ibid.. p. 306.
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The National Guard lost in its big effort to kill the bill, but 
won most of its minor skirmishes. The conference committee sided with 
the Senate version to retain the Inactive National Guard,a paper or­
ganization of those guardsmen who cannot participate in meetings. Also, 
upon National Guard Association complaint, a policy statement for the 
integration of the Reserves into the Regular Army management system con­
tained in the House bill was rejected. Another provision contained in 
the House bill vriiich repealed the dual oaths for national guardsmen was 
rescinded. The final law carried requirements for enlistment oaths to 
both the state and national governments. This requirement, the National 
Guard Association said, made it unnecessary for each state to pass a 
special oath law.^^
The conference committee also decided to retain the ban on
mothers in the Reserve portion of the Women’s Army Corps. In addition,
the provision for three categories of reservists— ready, standby and 
retired— although not favored by the Senate, was retained in the final 
version. The maximum size of the Ready Reserve was raised by the con­
ference committee from one million to one and one-half million men.
Thus, the discontent over Korean recall procedures had been the
springboard to extensive changes in the Reserve system.
The next major congressional effort on behalf of the Reserves 
began in 1953 and culminated in 1955. It was the Reserve Officer Per-
S. Congress, House of Representatives, Armed Forces Reserve 
Act of 1952. Conference Rept. 2445, to accompany H. R. 5426, 82d Cong.,
2d Sess., 1952, p. 34.
41lbid.. p. 35,
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sonnel Act of 1954,^2 which gave the Army Reserve its first statutory 
promotion law. It went into effect in 1955»
Earlier, there was considerable dissatisfaction among all Re­
serve components over the lack of long range promotion policy. It was 
claimed that the promotion system discriminated against civilian soldiers 
in favor of the regulars. There was sufficient pressure behind this 
claim that Congress almost inserted a hurriedly-formulated promotion 
provision in the Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1952. At Department of De­
fense insistance, a substitute provisionA^ was accepted and the Depart­
ment of Defense agreed to submit to Congress a new promotion plan. For 
the formulation of the bill, an interim committee, representing all the 
services, was created in the department.
The treatment of the departmental bill is an extremely interest­
ing example of congressional leadership in the Reserve area. Throughout 
its slow trudge to enactment, the bill was opposed by the professional 
military forces of the nation. The fight over the language in the bill 
was a clear-cut battle between the Reserve Officers Association and the 
Regular Army.
The clash began in May, 1953, in the chambers of the House 
Armed Services Committee. Republican Dewey Short was chairman. As cus­
tomary when Reserve legislation is under consideration, the Pentagon
^P. L. 773, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., 1954.
'̂ Ŝection 216 (a).
^U. S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Armed 
Services, Hearings, Reserve Officer Personnel Act of 1954. 83d Cong.,
1st Sess., 1953, pursuant to H. R. 1222, p. 1579.
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sent an active-duty reservist forth to do battle.Lieutenant Colonel 
A. H. Parker of the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Personnel, 
stated the Army^s opposition to the bill. The Army believed, he said, 
that it would be impossible "to draft a bill acceptable to all parties 
which would be substantially uniform for all reserve components."̂ ^
The hearings brought forth much statistical evidence intended 
to prove and disprove that the regulars had discriminated against re­
servists. Much antagonism was shovm for the terminal leave promotions 
handed to reservists as they left the service after World War II. The 
reservists complained bitterly of the number of citizen soldiers serving 
on active duty in ranks below that which they possessed in the Army Re­
serve while numerous regulars were serving in higher "temporary" grades 
than their "permanent" or Regular Army grades.
Perhaps the most heated argument stemmed from the fact that re­
servists called to active duty went in without any credit toward promo­
tion regardless of their experience in the Reserves. The promotion bill, 
as presented by the Department of Defense would have continued this sys­
tem. The Reserve lobbyists insisted on change. They demanded that re­
servists be given credit for their Reserve and civilian experience. The 
regulars insisted that military science was so unique and complicated 
that only actual active duty time should constitute credit for active- 
duty promotions.




able to Reserve interests. It had been changed extensively to meet the 
Reserve Officers Association’s desires. It passed the House without a 
single word of opposition being spoken,But despite the association’s 
pleas, the Senate Committee on Armed Services decided to delay addi­
tional hearings until 1954 in order to give the defense establishment 
time to make other proposals.
Senate hearings opened April 22, 1954> and still no word had 
been received from the defense department. Dr, John A, Hannah, the As­
sistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower and Personnel, appeared before 
the committee and asked for additional time. He told of important plans 
developed by the new Eisenhower administration to revitalize the Reserve, 
The promotion bill, he said, should wait the new over-all program. At 
the same time, Hannah spoke of several provisions of the promotion bill
as "intolerable,w48
The Senate committee agreed to a postponement of further hear­
ings, and did not again consider the bill until after the department 
sent over several proposed amendments on July 8th, On July 20, 1954, 
the committee heard Reserve planners recommend that the Secretaries of 
the three services be allowed more discretion than contemplated in the 
bill. Brigadier General-Senator Strom Thurmond, of South Carolina, 
national president of the Reserve Officers Association, and Major Gener­
al Maas, a Marine Corps reservist and for over fifteen years a congress-
S, Congressional Record. 80th Cong,, 1st Sess,, July 31, 1953,
p, 10672,
S, Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Hearings, 
Reserve Officer Personnel Act of 1954, 83d Cong,, 2d Sess., 1954, on 
H, R, 6573, p. 8,
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man from Minnesota, argued for the bill.
On July 27, 1954, President Eisenhower addressed a letter to 
the committee chairman, Leverett Saltonstall, Republican from Massachu­
setts, asking that the promotion legislation be “withheld until the 
entire system can be tightly evaluated. . . . Nevertheless, the
committee did not yield. The report, issued two days later, printed 
the letter, but made no recommendation for delay in passage. It did ask 
that the effective date of the bill be postponed almost a year— to May 
3, 1955'^^ During action on the Senate floor, the date was again put 
off until July 1, 1955, under an amendment offered by Senator Margaret 
Chase Smith. The delay was intended to give the Department of Defense 
additional time to prepare for the implementation of the Act, which in 
the case of the Air Force was a particularly complicated and time-con­
suming process.
During the following session of the Congress, in June, 1955, the 
congressional committees considered several minor amendments to the 
bill.^^ The defense department. Reserve Officers Association and National 
Guard were all deeply interested in a variety of extenuating circum­
stances which the new law would create. All worked together to clear up
the difficulties. The amendments were passed without controversy.
S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Reserve
Officer Personnel Act of 1954. 83d Cong., 2d Sess., 1954, S. Rept. 2010,
to accompany H. R. 6573, p. 2.
% i d . . p. 1.
51s. 1718, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., 1955, which became P. L. 11$,
84th Cong., 1st Sess., 1955»
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The fruit of five or more years of planning emerged in the Re­
serve Forces Act of 1955* Since 1948, Congress had been seeking a 
source of Reserve manpower which would not divert needed enlistments 
from the active service or rob the civilian economy of necessary man­
power. It sought a method for constantly replenishing the Reserve with 
fresh, young citizen soldiers without extreme reliance upon combat vet­
erans of previous hostilities. An attempted solution, inadequate at 
best, was written into the 1948 and 1951 draft acts. Under these laws 
both enlistees and draftees leaving the service were required to serve 
several years in the Reserve Corps or National Guard.
The 1951 law52 also ordered the National Security Training Com­
mission to recommend a universal military training program. The commis­
sion submitted a plan in 1952 which would have required all able-bodied 
eighteen-year-olds to put in six-months» active duty followed by seven 
and one-half years in the Reserve.53 The House, however, diluted the 
bill by amendments until it was practically meaningless, and then on a 
236-162 roll-call vote, recommitted the bill, thereby killing it. For 
the remainder of the Truman administration and during the first year 
under Eisenhower, the problem lay dormant. In late 1953, the Eisenhower 
administration began a series of studies in the Department of Defense, 
National Security Training Commission, and the Office of Defense Mobili­
zation. A National Reserve Plan was formulated and presented by Eisen-
L. 51, 82d Cong., 1st Sess., 1951.
53u. S. National Security Training Commission, Universal Military 
Training. Foundation of Enduring National Strength. First Report to the 
Congress. Oct., 1951 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 195^.
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hower in a special message to Congress on July 13, 1955» The admin­
istration wanted three million ready reservists and two million standby 
reservists by 1959.
The administration bill^^ provided for six months’ active duty 
training for youths between 1? and 19 years, followed by nine and one- 
half years’ training in Ready Reserve units. If an insufficient number 
volunteered. Selective Service would be used to maintain the quotas.
All men finishing two-year enlistments in the Army would be transferred 
to the Army Reserve, or perhaps the National Guard, for six years’ Re­
serve duty. All men in these programs would be required to participate 
in regular drill sessions at local amories ; otherwise they would be 
vulnerable to recall or discharge under "other than honorable" condi­
tions.
The House Armed Services Subcommittee No. 1 began hearings on 
February 8, 1955. In his testimony. Secretary of Defense Charles E. 
Wilson emphasized the need for immediate readiness on the part of all 
Reserves. On the following day. General Matthew B. Ridgway, Army Chief 
of Staff, said four or five years of National Reserve Plan operation 
would reduce the post-mobilization time for Reserves from ten to five 
months. Officials of the Air Force and Navy expressed fear that the 
plan’s short six-month training program would endanger their service’s 
long-term voluntary enlistment program.
By late February the most prominent public question surrounding
% .  R. 2967, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., 1955.
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the plan was the compulsory six-month draft of young men. On February 
19, several top military chiefs issued a press release calling the com­
pulsory provisions essential. Representatives of farm and labor organ­
izations appeared before the subcommittee on February 28th and declared 
the plan was an effort to foist on the country a form of universal mili­
tary training. This was denied by Assistant Secretary of Defense Carter 
L. Burgess who said the proposed program was "not an absolute parallel 
with UMT."
In closed sessions, the subcommittee authored a new bill,55 
which stripped away the main compulsory features of the old bill. It 
denied authority to grant "other than honorable" discharges, and the 
draft provisions were eliminated. During consideration by the full 
House armed Services committee, a proposal by Representative Arthur 
Winstead, Democrat of Missippi, to eliminate also the provision that re­
servists who failed to keep up prescribed training could be recalled for 
a maximum of forty-five days of active service, was rejected by a vote 
of 2-32. Winstead and Charles P. Nelson, Republican of Maine, were the 
only two members who favored throwing out this last bit of compulsion.
On April 27, 1955, the committee, by a 31-5 vote, issued a favorable re­
port on the bill.56
Probably the most controversial provision in the committee bill
R. 5297, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., 1955*
S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Armed 
Services, National Reserve Plan, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., 195$, H. Rept.
457 to accompany H. R. $297«
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•was the authority of the Army to assign men, who had finished their six 
months’ training, to National Guard units. This was a delicate pro­
vision. Many men would have intensely disliked being involuntarily 
transferred to certain Guard units— particularly those which were raci­
ally segregated or those which had reputations for "anti-labor union" 
activities. In addition, the committee bill quieted the Air Force and 
Navy fears by setting a 250,000 limit on the number of men who could be 
annually trained in the new program. It required the National Security 
Training Commission to keep a watchful eye on the welfare problems of 
the teen-age trainees. One new element of compulsion was added to the 
bill. Men who failed to carry out Reserve duties satisfactorily could 
be drafted for two years.
On May 18th, during floor consideration of the plan, a proposal 
by Representative Adam Clayton Powell, Jr., Democrat of New York, to 
prohibit enlistments in or transfers to racially segregated National 
Guard units threw the House into deep trouble. Powell’s amendment was 
agreed to by a 126-87 standing vote. On the following day, the House re­
jected an attempt by Chairman Carl Vinson to remove the anti-segregation 
amendment. The Vinson effort was voted down by a 116-143 standing vote 
and a 143-167 teller vote. Nevertheless, the segregation issue jeopar­
dized enactment of the entire bill. On another resolution by Represen­
tative Vinson, on the same day, the Committee of the whole House rose 
from its deliberations without acting either to pass or reject the bill. 
It was indefinitely postponed.
Although the President continued to press for action on the Re-
104
serve bill, nothing of importance happened until June 21, 1955» when 
Chairman Carl Vinson attempted to persuade his full armed services com­
mittee to approve a watered-down version of the Reserve bill.5? The com­
mittee, instead, voted 16-14, to send the bill to Mr. Brooks’ subcommit­
tee. On the following day. Subcommittee No. 1 approved for the full 
Committee an amended version of the Vinson bill. The new bill elimina­
ted all references to transfers to the National Guard, softened the pen­
alties against obligated reservists who failed to participate in meet­
ings and lowered the total Reserve obligation from eight to six years.
On the House floor an amendment designed to eliminate segreta- 
tion in National Guard units was rejected on a 105-156 standing vote.
Also rejected was a proposal by Representative Powell to deny the custo­
mary draft immunity to those men who enlisted in segregated National 
Guard units. Another amendment giving the National Security Training 
Commission operational control of the six-months’ program was refused.
The over-all bill finally passed the House July 1, 1955.
The Senate Committee reported out the bill on July 13th with 
several amendments, all of which were intended to strengthen and enforce 
the provisions of the bill. The Senate accepted all committee amend­
ments and passed the bill on July 14, 1955, by a vote of 80-1. The lone 
vote against passage was cast by Senator William Langer, Republican of 
North Dakota. An amendment by Senator William E. Jenner, Republican of 
Indiana, was rejected; it would have prohibited the assignment of mili­
tary personnel in any foreign country which had criminal jurisdiction
57h. R. 6900, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., 1955.
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over such personnel.
The final bill, as it came out of the conference committee, re­
tained the major provisions of the plan, but made a variety of minor 
changes. An annual limit in the six-months’ program was set at 250,000 
men although the Senate had not wanted to set a maximum. The bill dis­
carded the Senate plan to pay cash bonuses for participation in Ready 
Reserve training. It altered slightly the Senate provision which auth­
orized the six-months’ training graduates to be drafted if they failed 
to attend drill sessions, but it retained the House plan for a forty-five 
day recall to active duty for such persons.
President Eisenhower signed the bill on August 9, 1955* At the 
same time he expressed disappointment that it did not permit young men 
to be drafted into the Reserve components.̂ ®
When President Eisenhower signed the bill, he also mentioned the 
’’unwarranted disparity” under the bill between the $78 per month offered 
to the national guardsmen and the $50 per month provided for the Army 
reservists who undergo the identical six-months’ training. This defici­
ency was corrected on April 23, 1956, when the Congress approved an 
equalization measure introduced by Representative Overton Brooks. All 
trainees were given $78 per month.
Other than by direct enactment of legislation, the Congress has 
influenced Reserve policy in several other ways. The first important,
®̂New York Times. Aug. 10, 1955, p. 101.
59p. L. 490, 84th Cong., 2d Sess., 1956.
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official step toward adequate surveillance of the Reserve Forces came 
in 1949 with the establishment of the House Reserve components subcom­
mittee. It was created by a resolution of the House armed services com­
mittee on April 5> 1949, "to inquire into the adequacy of the organiza­
tion and training of the civilian components of the Armed Forces.” Rep­
resentative Dewey Short was chairman and a committee staff member, Bryce 
Harlow, later to be administrative assistant to President Eisenhower, 
was detailed to work with the Special Subcommittee. Because of the pre­
valent congressional attitude that the Reserve Forces were poorly man­
aged, it was intended that the subcommittee make a special investigation 
of the matter. The heavy pressure of other legislative work kept the 
subcommittee from meeting early in the session. In the meantime, the 
Department of Defense took steps to sooth the anxiety over Reserve mat­
ters.
The Civilian Components Policy Board was established within the 
Department of Defense on June 14, 1949. A chairman for the new board 
was found just fourteen days before the subcommittee hearings began on 
August 17, 1949. The department’s representative at the hearings.
Colonel Louis H. Renfrow, assured Chairman Short that the Board meant 
business and asked the subcommittee to delay any reports until the Board 
had a chance to function.
The creation of the Civilian Components Policy Board impressed 
Mr. Short, and he acceded to Colonel Renfrew’s request. "It looks to
S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Armed 
Services, Hearings, Matters Affecting the Civilian Components of the 
Armed Forces. 81st Cong., 1st Sess., p. 4401.
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me/’ he said, "as if there is an excellent opportunity for the military 
itself to take the required action to put the civilian components on an 
absolutely sound footing.Although the subcommittee heard several 
other -witnesses, nothing of importance was accomplished.
Of greater importance as a surveillance technique were the per­
iodic reviews of the Reserve program conducted by the subcommittee in 
1955 and 1956. The Brooks group made a serious effort to keep a watch­
ful eye on the implementation of the Reserve Forces Act of 1955» Begin­
ning approximately one-half year after the enactment of the law, hear­
ings were conducted about every five months. After each set of hearings, 
an interim report was usually prepared for the information of Congress 
and the public.
The first such report revealed the subcommittee’s great interest 
in the enlistment rate in the new six-months’ program and the problem of 
providing adequate armory facilities for Reserve units. The subcommittee 
commended the Air National Guard for "its excellent progress.It also 
said "the Subcommittee does not wish to leave the impression that it is 
entirely pleased with the operation of the Act, "̂ 3 did not wish to 
prejudge the program. The report complained that "it is disconcerting 
for the Congress to appropriate funds for needed Reserve facilities con-
6llbid.. p. 4393.
S. Congress, House of Representatives, First Interim Report by 
Subcommittee No. 1. Committee on Armed Services, on the Implementation of 
the Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1955. Publication No. 45, 84th Cong., 2d 
Sess., Jan., 1956 (Washington; Government Printing Office, 1956), p. 5303.
63lbid.. p. 5306.
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struction only to learn they are held up in the Bureau of the Budget and 
not apportioned to the military service for use."&^ The report ended 
with some compliments on the current recruiting publicity program for 
the Reserves. Other hearings occurred in the late spring and fall of 
1956, and February of 1957> and again in July of 1957» A variety of 
complaints and suggestions came out of the hearings.
A significant aspect of congressional policy-making for the Re­
serves has been the absence of party partisanship. Not a single policy 
has served as an election issue, and generally speaking, no prominent 
legislator has attempted to make political profit out of the Reserve 
program, except as a minor aspect of the over-all question of military 
spending.
On the one bill concerning the Reserves Forces which received a 
record vote, there was no evidence of party division. On the final con­
ference report on the Reserve Forces Act of 1952, 169 Democrats favored 
the bill in the House and 38 opposed it. The Republicans voted I46 to 
40 in favor of the bill. 5̂
Possibly some of the de-emphasis on party feeling stemmed from 
the overpowering influence of the two strong pressure groups interested 
in Reserve Forces policy. Certainly, the Reserve Officers Association 
and the National Guard Association exercised more influence over the 
members of Congress than did either political party.
% bid.. p. 5306.
S. Congressional Record, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., July 25, 1955,
p. 11410.
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Lack of strong party feeling in the armed services committee of 
the House is evident in the cooperation between the chairman and the 
ranking minority members. In 1949, Republican Dewey Short was appointed 
chairman of the Reserve components subcommittee, although Democrats con­
trolled the Congress. It is likely that this grew out of earlier cour­
tesies extended by Short to the ranking Democrat, Carl Vinson, when the 
Republicans controlled Congress in 1947 and 1948* Vinson had been al­
lowed to decide the appointment of all Democrats to the various subcom­
mittees in 1947. This came to be a customary power of the ranking mino­
rity member.
Local and sectional interest in the Reserves has not been so im­
potent as party interest. The pork barrel and patronage have been .im­
portant barriers to good military policy as a whole, and to a much lesser 
extent in Reserve policy.
Everyone is familiar with the furor caused by the deactivation 
of any Army post. Local business interests are especially active in 
seeking to retain every possible source of government funds coming into 
their area. In the case of the Reserve Forces, similar outcries resulted 
from the few, scattered relocations of National Guard units. No such 
thing has happened in the extremely frequent deactivations and reloca­
tions of Army Reserve units.
The public has been, in many instances, unconscious of the cash 
brought into a community from Army Reserve sources. Also, units have 
been switched, renamed and deactivated so rapidly by Army Reserve auth­
orities, the general public had little time to get accustomed or emo-
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tionally attached to a specific unit. This is not likely to continue.
In asking community leaders to cooperate with the local Reserve program, 
the Army has pointed out the generous cash offerings available to the 
area through a big Reserve program. With this information, there is 
strong likelihood that future mention of deactivations will bring a 
local outburst of agitation from special interests in the towns and 
cities.
The Army Reserve has also largely avoided the agitation of local 
interests concerning the geographical locations of military airports. 
This has been a never-ending headache for Air Force Reserve authorities. 
Since the Army needs only meager air facilities, it is usually exempt 
from the protests aroused by establishment of airports near residential 
areas.
The small towns, especially, have been interested in procuring 
Army Reserve and National Guard armories. So far, however, pressure for 
political decisions in choosing the location have not been great. This 
is mostly because funds were not scarce. Any community that could sup­
port an Army Reserve unit could get an armory. The residents of the area 
did not need to create political pressure in order to secure a project, 
except when there was doubt of the ability of the area to meet the cri­
teria laid down by the Bureau of the Budget and Department of Defense.
Congress has nevertheless insisted, from the beginning of the 
construction program, that full plans for each project be submitted to 
the armed services committees for review. Behind the scenes, congressmen 
were no doubt influential in selecting exact locations, deciding which
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cities within their district would get priority in Army construction, 
and getting funds for specific projects released by the Bureau of the 
Budget. Very little discussion of such local matters have occurred in 
official hearings, however.
There is some evidence of regional feeling on Reserve policy.
The record vote taken on the Reserve Forces Act of 1955 shows a varying 
degree of interest in the new six-monthŝ  program according to geograph­
ical area. There was only one opposing vote in the House from all the 
eleven western states from Colorado to the Pacific Coast. This was the 
greatest support given by any part of the country. On the other hand,
42 per cent of the Representatives from the six states surrounding the 
Great Lakes (Pa., Ohio, Mich., Wise., 111., Ind.) in addition to West 
Virginia opposed the bill. This was the area of heaviest opposition.
The determination of the role of Congress in the Reserve build­
up of the 1940^3 and 1950’s is extremely difficult. It requires the 
analysis of congressional activities in the enactment of some ten major 
pieces of Reserve legislation and several other minor acts. At first 
glance, it is obvious, that Congress has not been the originator of spe-
^^An exception to this general statement occurred during House Ap­
propriations subcommittee hearings in 1955* Representative Daniel J. 
Flood was very much interested in a Reserve Armory being constructed in 
his home town, Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania. Since Wilkes-Barre was only 
a "hop, skip and jump from four coal mines," the armory ought to be 
heated with a coal burner, he thought. The Reserve authorities agreed, 
considering the fact that Flood was a member of the Army subcommittee 
of the House appropriations committee. But as soon as Flood was defeated 
for re-election, plans for the coal burner went out the window. Instead, 
an oil burner was installed. When Flood was reelected to Congress, he 
declared the switch to have been an "atrocity." His tirade required four 
pages of small print in the report of the hearings.
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cific Reserve policies. Insofar as policy details are concerned, the 
congressional committees and Congress, itself, have been little more 
than a review board. Except where there is great public interest, as 
in the Korean recall procedures, individual congressmen have shown little 
interest in the details of policy. Extremely few seek to interfere with 
the managerial authority of the department. In other words. Congress 
has had an extremely small place in the formulation of the multitudinous 
details which constitute the body of the Reserve program.
There is strong evidence, too, that Congress has refrained from 
interfering with technical military matters relating to the Reserves. 
There has been almost no discussion among congressmen, for instance, 
concerning the troop basis— whether reservists will be organized as 
artillerymen or infantrymen— or any other matter requiring professional 
military knowledge. In these areas, Congress usually accepts the recom­
mendations of experienced military leaders. Except where there is con­
troversy among soldiers. Congress is not likely to debate technical 
military problems. For this reason the military services, including the 
Reserve Forces, usually present every new policy in military terms and 
have it announced by a uniformed soldier.
To what extent has Congress accomplished its goals for the Re­
serve? The goals, usually vague, involved little more than a general 
build-up in the size and efficiency of the Reserve Forces. As of 1957, 
few experienced reservists would say that the program is sufficiently 
effective. Certainly, it is not so large a program as Congress has gen­
erally desired.
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While it is necessary to recognize the occasional decisive acts 
of Congress, it is evident that the Army formulated most of the Reserve*s 
policies. It was also the Army, or at least the Department of Defense, 
that drew the total defense picture and pointed out the place of the 
Reserves in that picture. Although Congress constantly desired informa­
tion which would provide perspective, such information was rarely forth­
coming. Even if it were available, there is some doubt of the ability 
of the Congress, with its committee structure, to make good use of the 
information.
Nevertheless, Congress ultimately played the more decisive role 
in the over-all build-up of the Reserve Forces. Generally speaking. 
Congress wanted more Reserve strength and the managerial authorities 
wanted less. Through years of harassment, the Reserves prospered only 
to a limited extent. Almost every inch of the way was won in a battle 
against administrative apathy. There was constant agitation by congress­
men for administrative action. It was Congress that provoked the Army 
into action on behalf of the Reserve. Although Congressional success 
was not a full victory, the Reserve program is, nevertheless, an excel­
lent example of legislative leadership.
CHAPTER IV
APPROPRIATIONS AND RESERVE FORCES POLICY
"Since the days of the Glorious Revolution of 1688 there has 
been no question but that the sine qua non of democratic government has 
been legislative control of the purse,These words by two leaders of 
the Harvard Defense Studies are declared by their authors to be "beyond 
the pale of the arguable." However, on occasion Congress seems to be 
willing to appropriate any amount asked by military authorities; conse­
quently this statement is perhaps less certain than the authors believe. 
Nevertheless, the power to appropriate is an important aspect of Am­
erican democracy. It is a fundamental factor in the formulation of 
Army Reserve Forces policy.
The Constitution makes Congress the custodian of the public 
purse, but the function has been largely delegated to the appropriations 
committees of each House, As the years have passed, subcommittees have 
assumed more and more of the responsibilities until now, just as Arthur 
W, Macmahon has said, "Subcommittees are the realities of the appropria-
^Edward L. Katzenbach and John A, Ballard, Congress and Defense; 
Defense Appropriations ; Investigations ; and Relations with the Pentagon 
(Cambridge : Harvard Defense Studies, Serial No, 46, Reading Assignment 




There have usually been about ten subcommittees within each of 
the two appropriations committees. Until 1949, there was a subcommittee 
to study Army and Air Force estimates in addition to the Navy subcommit­
tee in each House. There was little coordination between them.^ In 
1949, the two were combined in each House to form a defense appropria­
tions subcommittee. The 1950 Appropriations bill was the first since 
the budget system was established in 1921 to unify the Armed Forces’ 
appropriations.
As it turned out, however, the unification in its pure form was 
short-lived in the House. The subcommittee divided itself into three 
subgroups of from three to five persons each to study particular parts 
of the defense budget. One group studied Army estimates; another 
studied Navy estimates, and a third took the Air Force estimates. In 
the Senate, no such division was considered necessary, and all the mem­
bers, usually around fifteen, studied the entire defense budget.
The members of the subcommittees have not been without consider­
able experience in military affairs. Elias Huzar reports that almost 
half of the members of the two subcommittees from 1933 to 1949 had some 
experience in the military forces.^ That experience was mostly in the 
Army, but a few had served in the Navy or Marine Corps. However, such
^Arthur W. Macmahon, "Congressional Oversight of Administration: 
The Power of the Purse I," Political Science Quarterly. 58 (June, 1943), 
176.
^Elias Huzar, The Purse and the Sword (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 1950), p. 2?.
%bid.. p. 30.
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experience is seldom a good foundation for decisions on appropriation 
bills; the purview of military duties is usually too limited. The ap­
propriations experience of the members was probably more valuable in 
this function.
In 1954, six of the nine members of the House subcommittee were 
lawyers. Six had seen military service at one time or another, and one 
of these had been a Reserve colonel in World War II, The average age 
was 54»̂  At that time the subcommittee membership ’’had more experience 
with military appropriations than any of the civilians at the secretar­
ial level who testified before them, with the single exception of the 
Department of Defense Comptroller, Wilfred J, McNeil,”̂  They also had 
more experience with military finance than all but a few of the generals, 
admirals, and other servicemen who testified before them. In practically 
all instances their education and experience were much broader than that 
of the military witnesses.
The 1957 Army subgroup, composed of four Representatives desig­
nated to study Army appropriations, was similarly well prepared, Robert 
L, F, Sikes, Democrat of Florida, was a 51 year old graduate of the Uni­
versity of Florida and held a commission as a colonel in the Army Reserve, 
Another member, Gerald R, Ford, Jr., of Michigan, was a Yale Law School 
graduate with 47 months’ experience in the World War II Navy, Edward T, 
Miller of Maryland was an infantry officer in World War I and a colonel 
of infantry in World War II, Daniel J, Flood of Pennsylvania had both a
^Katzenbach and Ballard, op, cit,, p, 3* 
^Ibid,, p, 3*
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master’s degree and a law degree.?
This information on the background of the subcommittee members 
seems inconsistent with the beliefs of so many observers who enjoy that 
great American pastime of criticizing legislators. So far as the Army 
subcommittee is concerned, the derogatory approach seems inaccurate.
At least, it ought to be suspect. The Army subcommittee works hard. 
Numerous comments by the members during hearings and on the floor of the 
House show their sincere concern with the tremendous responsibilities 
of recommending the Army portion of defense expenditures. Their ques­
tions frequently revealed a great desire for information that would lead 
to a solution of the major policy problems, only to find the generals 
and colonels had no such information.
The congressional hearings on defense appropriations, including 
those for the Reserve Forces, are colorful. In 1954, the House appro­
priations subcommittee on military affairs heard testimony from 96 gen­
erals and admirals, 180 colonels and captains, together with miscellane- 
ous civilians and lower-ranking military officers. Relatively few wit­
nesses, of course, were heard by the full committee. All nine members 
listened to the Secretary of Defense, the secretaries of the services 
and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The remainder appeared before the pro­
vincial subgroup with its aides, one clerk and one stenographer.
House subcommittee hearings usually begin in January and last 
until early May. The Senate subcommittee studies the bill from about
?U. S. Congressional Directory. 85th Cong., 1st Sess., 1957, p.
134.
A“Katzenbach and Ballard, op. cit., p. 2.
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mid-May to mid-June. In 1956, similar to other years, the three sub­
groups of the House subcommittee remained in combined session for about 
one month, hearing broad policy statements by military leaders with 
particular emphasis on the roles of the various services, missiles, and 
strategic jet bombers.
It appears that there is a powerful motivation at work leading 
these congressmen to make a conscientious effort. Undoubtedly, they 
sense the tremendous importance of their work in the cold war with Russia. 
In addition, mistakes in this area by earlier congresses have frequently 
returned to haunt them. Often times, the country was unprepared when 
military might was badly needed. Later the vengeance of the voters has 
been painfully felt by congressmen who earlier were niggardly with mili­
tary appropriations. It is with care that any member of Congress now 
speaks against the appropriation of military funds.
There is always a certain amount of trivia and nonsensical pro­
posals displayed in the Reserve Forces budget hearings. For instance, 
in 1956 the members of the Senate subcommittee showed concern over the 
inability of rural residents to participate in the branch of service of 
their choice. Some small towns would have only enough men to support 
one reserve unit, but not enough for every branch of service. The sen­
ators suggested a solution— let the men join any branch of service, then 
train together in one unit. Practically everyone well versed in Reserve
%. S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Appropriations, Hearings, 
Department of Defense Appropriation Bill, 1956. 85th Cong., 1st Sess.,
1955, p. 64.
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affairs would oppose such an effort; it lacks appreciation for the 
specialized training demanded of units of the various services. The 
senators, perhaps with sincerity, did not understand why the Department 
of Defense hesitated.
This is certainly no worse than the attempt by Brigadier General 
Philip F. Lindeman, Chief of Army Reserve and ROTO Affairs, on the same 
day, to sidetrack responsibility for f a i l u r e s . Senators John Stennis, 
Democrat of Mississippi, and Margaret Chase Smith, Republican of Maine, 
said they had heard complaints from reservists about inept training pro­
grams. Lindeman insisted the problem was the fault of the reservists 
themselves. It was the unit commanderas job to achieve good instruc­
tion, he claimed. Senator Stennis finally agreed that maybe this is 
true, but pointed out that the Army had ultimate responsibility for get­
ting good commanders who could achieve good instruction.
Another topic of discussion, the use by governors of National 
Guard planes, recurred frequently. Congressmen saw no reason for the 
United States Government to help pay for the Governors» air travel, but 
Department of the Army officials hesitated to forbid the use of these 
planes by the commanders-in-chief of the National Guard units. In 1953, 
the report of the house committeê ^ went so far as to recommend a 
11,238,000 reduction in the National Guard appropriation for "operation 
and maintenance of aircraft," allegedly to reduce this use of Army planes.
lOlbid.. p. 643.
S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Appropria- 
tions, Department of Defense Appropriations Bill, 1954, House Rept. 680 
to accompany H. R. 5969, 83d Cong., 1st Sess., 1953, p. 25.
120
Typical also of the details in which the committees frequently 
get immersed was the persistent effort to extend the franking privilege 
to state adjutants general; other examples include the occasional con­
sideration which the committees give individual cases, as in 1951, when 
Senator McCarran coerced the commanding general of the Sixth Army to
delay the transfer overseas of the son of a prominent West Coast busi-
12nessman.
The incidence of trivia and misleading witnesses can be easily 
overmephasized. The preponderance of testimony in the hearings has been 
sincere and helpful. The few exceptions that are found seem to be 
fairly evenly divided between professional witnesses and congressmen, so 
far as the Army Reserve Forces hearings are concerned. It would be most 
dangerous to conclude that congressional hearings fail to provide per­
spective of over-all Reserve policy because of the ineptness of congress­
men.
The hearings reveal many attempts to get the generals to talk 
about something except trivia. So often, the military and civilian auth­
orities before the committee refuse to give candid discussions of major 
policy problems. They do not care to have their problems aired— in or 
out of official hearings; they consider it bad public relations. Con­
sequently, their prepared statements are usually dry rehashes of certain 
basic facts relating to the progress of the program. On most occasions,
12U. s. Congress, Senate, Committee on Appropriations, Hearings, 
Department of Defense Appropriations Act for 1952. 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 
on H. R. 5054, 1951, p. 1659.
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if a legislator wants candid information, he must get it from less of­
ficial sources.
The difficulty in extracting frank statements from witnesses 
has been of great concern to those committees of Congress which deal 
with military affairs, probably more than other committees. Statements 
about this difficulty are frequently uttered in the hearings. Generals 
are asked, "Is this your personal recommendation to this committee or 
is this the bureau’s official view which you are reporting?"; or fre­
quently they are asked, "What is your personal opinion?" Seldom do the 
congressmen secure satisfactory answers.
Since the removal of Admiral Louis Denfield in President Truman’s 
administration and the pressured exodus of General Matthew Ridgeway 
under President Eisenhower, both allegedly for their remarks in conflict 
with administration policy, the committees have been particularly in­
terested in the matter. They seek to defend witnesses from rebuke by 
their departmental superiors for statements during hearings.
Despite the tendency of the generals to refrain from broad pol­
icy discussions of Reserve policy, many high-level policy matters get a 
hearing before the committees. Usually it is the members of the commit­
tee who provoke such discussions. They have been especially diligent in 
considering the over-all power of the President to recall reservists, 
although this is perhaps not a legitimate topic for an appropriations 
subcommittee. They have been particularly anxious about Regular Army 
encroachment on National Guard prerogatives and about the dilatory atti­
tude of the Regular Army toward the Reserve Forces, in general. From 
the early years of the 1950’s to the present date of 1957, the committees
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have shown close surveillance of the over-all plan to turn various 
National Guard units into anti-aircraft battalions, in later years to 
be supplied with nike missiles, for protection of our big cities. Tre­
mendous concern for the joint use of armories by all components is re­
vealed by the hearings. To a lesser extent, the committees have shown 
their broad perspective by attempting to force military authorities to 
a decision on the major Reserve question of the era— to what extent can 
the country rely on the Reserves rather than the Regular Army.
One other aspect of appropriations subcommittee hearings deserves 
consideration. A high percentage of "executive" or secret hearings is 
characteristic of the subcommittee, as it is with a few other committees 
dealing with the national security. These range from five to forty per 
cent of the testimony before the Department of Defense subcommittee.^^ 
Similar percentages apply to the hearings on the Reserve budget. As 
practiced on other types of defense hearings, the decision as to whether 
Reserve hearings will be open or secret is left almost entirely to the 
discretion of the departmental authorities presenting the testimony.
There are several important differences between the House and 
Senate Subcommittees. First, the Senate subcommittee does not start 
with the raw budget as does the House subcommittee. The proposed de­
fense expenditures are considerably refined and much more information is 
available after the House hearings. The Senate subcommittee can afford 
to be less concerned about details. It can sit as a high review and 
appeal board. It can and does concentrate on the changes made by the
^^Katzenbach and Ballard, op. cit., p. 11.
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House subcommittee and by the full House of Representatives.
Because of its role as an appeal board, the Senate subcommittee 
is usually capable of taking a broader view of its area of surveillance. 
There are other reasons for this fact. The official purview of the sub­
committee is the over-all defense budget. The ei^t- or nine-man House 
defense appropriations subcommittee, also responsible for the over-all 
defense budget, tends to accept the view of its three- or four-man sub­
groups, one for each of the services, which on occasion is distinctly 
provincial.
Also, House members serve ordinarily on only one subcommittee 
of the appropriations committee while Senators serve not only on more 
than one committee but also on more than one subcommittee of the appro­
priations committee. It is frequent for a Senate subcommittee member 
to be thrown into formal official contact with other aspects of defense, 
such as through service on the joint atomic energy committee. In addi­
tion, the Senate subcommittees are usually reinforced by at least three 
ex officio members from the Senate armed services committee. Many poli­
tical scientists thus believe the Senate is able to see American defense 
with more perspective.
Senate hearings are shorter in duration, mostly because time-con­
suming ̂  novo hearings are deemed unnecessary. So many times, also, 
the Senate subcommittee limits itself to the matters which the Department 
of Defense and the President deem worthy of added attention.
The Senate subcommittee usually works under a great deal of ex­
ecutive pressure. By the time the subcommittee begins to function, the
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desires and fears of the Department of Defense are well refined, and 
the light of publicity is turned on the hearings. The President may 
even make a speech or issue a press release concerning matters before 
the subcommittee. If not the President, the Secretary of Defense, or 
his generals, will have comments to make and pressure to wield concern­
ing the decisions to be made by the subcommittee. The administration’s 
pressure is nearly always toward an increase in appropriations, and 
more often than not the subcommittee increases rather than reduces 
House figures. "However, the Senate is somewhat sensitive to the alle­
gation frequently voiced on the House side that it (the Senate) often 
undoes the work of the House and does not really believe in economy."!^ 
For this reason, and others, the Senate frequently makes cuts of its 
own.
The appropriations committees do not make all the spending de­
cisions. As is widely known, there must be an authorization for appro­
priations which is processed, in the case of the Reserve Forces, through 
the armed services committees.
Basic legislation creating the Army Reserve and National Guard, 
as national forces, were passed in the early years of this century and 
constitute the major authorizations for appropriations. Several laws 
of more recent origin are immensely important, however, as authorizing 
legislation. The Inactive Duty Training Pay Act of 1947̂  ̂provides
^Ernest S. Griffith, Congress— Its Contemporary Role (New York; 
New York University Press, 1951), p. 79.
^̂ P. L. 460, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 1947.
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authority for large annual drill pay expenditures. The Army and Air 
Force Vitalization and Retirement Equalization Act of 1948^^ permits 
expenditures for retirement salary of reservists. There are several 
acts authorizing disability benefits for reservists.
Perhaps the most interesting of all such laws are those pro­
viding for the armory construction program, starting with the National 
Defense Facilities Act of 1950. The armed services committees had an 
important role in the determination of the amount of money to be ex­
pended on the program. The original bill, introduced into the 81st Con­
gress, authorized the appropriation of $400,000,000 over a period of 
eight years. On the House floor, the exact amounts were stricken from 
the bill, but they were replaced in the Senate version so that
$135,000,000 would be authorized over a period of three years. As the
17law was finally passed, it provided for $250,000,000 for five years.
1AWhen the first act expired it was extended by another law 
which again, when introduced provided for "such amounts as may be appro­
priated from time to time."^^ The armed services committee of the House 
again took action to set a maximum. A committee amendment was adopted 
in the House limiting appropriations to $500,000,000 for the next eight
L. 810, 80th Cong., 2d Sess., 194Ô.
S. Congress, House of Representatives, Armed Services Commit­
tee, National Defense Facilities Act of 1950, Conference Rept. 3026 to
accompany H. R. 8994, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., 1950, p. 1.
®̂P. L. 302, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., 1955.
'̂̂ Congressional Record, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., April 27, 1955, p.
5160.
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years— meaning the 1950 Act would be extended to allow $250,000,000 
from 1955 to 1957. The decisive role of the armed services committees 
is thus seen in the appropriating process.
The Reserve budget studied by the congressional committees has 
come to be, ostensibly, fairly simple in structure. The effort toward 
performance budgeting in the Department of the Army has brought im­
portant changes in all Army appropriations, especially since 1949 when 
the Eberstadt Committee said, "The budgetary and appropriation structures 
of the Army and Navy are antiquated." The scattered Reserve Forces ap­
propriations have, as of 1957, been gathered together into four items: 
Reserve personnel. National Guard, military construction for Reserve 
components, as well as certain funds which appear under the general 
"operations and maintenance of the Army" item. The last is a grouping 
of several projects from three of which the Reserves draw support for 
their summer camps and other operations closely connected with active 
army expenditures.
Except for the four budget items above, which are required by 
law, there seems to have been no congressional influence on the structure 
of the Reserve budget. The appropriations committees always seek more 
detail— perhaps by force of habit— but otherwise, they take the budget 
structure as it is handed to them by defense officials. The appropria­
tions are enacted in the same terms as requested. It is likely, however, 
that further reduction in the number of Reserve items might very well 
stir congressional complaints.
The Reserve budget is the responsibility of the Office of the
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Assistant Chief of Staff for Reserve Components. This office has the 
responsibility under the Army Program System which provides for the com­
pilation of five-year plans for each of the Army’s five major objectives. 
The Reserve Forces, which constitutes one of these objectives, has its 
force level, installation requirements, and materiel requirements estab­
lished by Assistant Chief of Staff for Reserve Components before budget 
planning begins. These are decisions of the most basic character and 
are approved by the Chief of Staff and higher civilian authorities.
They constitute "budget guidance."
Using the budget guidance, each subordinate command prepares its 
budget. In the case of the Army Reserve Forces, the Field Army Head­
quarters is the focal point for bringing together National Guard and 
Army Reserve budget estimates, which are then forwarded through the com­
manding general. Continental Army Command to the appropriate staff sec­
tion in the Pentagon. The National Guard Bureau directs the preparation 
of over-all National Guard estimates, and the Chief, Army Reserve and 
ROTC Affairs directs similar preparations for the Army Reserve. In each 
case, the figures must be submitted for review to the General Staff Com­
mittees on National Guard and Army Reserve Policy.
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Reserve Components coordinates 
these functions and prepares the final draft for consideration by the 
budget advisory committee, composed of the chief of staff, comptroller, 
heads of the general staff sections, and a few other top officials.
With the approval of the Budget Advisory Committee and the Secretary of 
the Army, the budget begins the long tedious process through the Depart-
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ment of Defense, and the Bureau of the Budget. Then it is ready for
study by the congressional appropriations committees.
"The Committees on Appropriations, like Congress as a whole,
have been favorably disposed toward the civilian components of the
20Army," says Elias Huzar. This student of military appropriations cites 
numerous evidences of the historical validity of his pronouncement. He 
tells of the enthusiasm of the appropriations committees for the 1935 
Thomason Act ivhich set up a ten-year program for training one thousand 
Reserve officers annually, from which fifty would be chosen for inte­
gration into the Regular Army.^^ He tells of the solicitude about ap­
propriations for the Citizens’ Military Training Camps, meager but im­
portant Reserve officer training program between the two World Wars, 
and about the interest in the National Board for the Promotion of Rifle 
Practice. He tells, most of all, of the loving care lavished on the 
National Board by the committees.
The more recent work of the subcommittees— since the period 
studied by Huzar— is an important, but not particularly exciting story, 
so far as the Reserve Forces are concerned. Except for rare, brief 
flurries, the hearings and the recommendations have stirred little public 
interest except among a few politically-minded reservists.
During World War II, the Congress appropriated annually the in­
significant sum of $100 to handle the minute expenses of the war-adjourned 
Reserve program. It was neither controversial nor of any importance
20nuzar, op. cit., p. 270. 
îRuzar, op. cit.. p. 247.
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Chart No. 3
APPROPRIATIONS FOR THE NATIONAL GUARD, ARMY RESERVE 
PERSONNEL AND ARMY CONSTRUCTION, 1947-1950








1952 202,982,000 104,810,000 24,000,000
1953 115,300,000 73,000,000 20,000,000
1954 210,035,000 85,500,000 9,094,000
1955 218,530,000 90,000,000 15,000,000
1956 308,239,000 130,289,000 31,611,000
1957 320,000,000 215,000,000 55,000,000
1958 333,800,000 207,000,000 55,000,000
&These figures do not include miscellaneous funds from the appro­
priation item "Operations and Maintenance of the Army" which are used to 
support certain Army Reserve Forces activities.
^Supplemental Appropriation Act of 1951.
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except as a sort of reservation of a position in the budget structure.
Beginning in 1946, the first post-war budget for the Reserve 
system was enacted.it, too, was largely noncontroversial; it gave 
$110,000,000 for the recuperation of the National Guard and $$6,000,000 
for the Organized Reserve Corps, but in the following session of Con­
gress, President Truman asked in a message to Congress^̂  for permission 
to divert sixty million dollars from the National Guard and thirty mil­
lion from the Organized Reserve Corps for active Army salaries. On May 
1, 1947, Congress agreed^ to the recommendations of the House appropria­
tions committee^5 and allowed the Organized Reserve Corps reduction and 
all but $4,875,000 of the request for National Guard funds to be trans­
ferred. Later in the year, it became apparent that the balance of the 
funds would not be sufficient to carry out National Guard responsibili­
ties. After considerable clamoring by national guardsmen, eager to re­
build their forces, over four million dollars was taken from the Air 
Force for National Guard use. The final National Guard budget was thus 
$61,775,000 and the Organized Reserve Corps got $26,000,000.
For fiscal year 1948, the budget estimates came to fifty-six 
million dollars for the Organized Reserve Corps and $110,000,000 for the
22p. L. 515, 79th Cong., 2d Sess., 1946.
23U. S. Congress, House of Representatives, Supplemental Estimate 
for Appropriations for 1957 for the War Department. House Document No.
92, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 1947, p. 2.
24p, L. 46, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 1947.
25u. S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Appropria­
tions, Appropriation Bill, 1947. House Rept. 200 to accompany H. R, 2849, 
80th Cong., 1st Sess., 1947, p. 10.
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National Guard. These figures were approved by the House subcommittee^^ 
except for a ten per cent reduction in civilian employees of the Reserve 
program amounting to slightly more than one million dollars. The full 
House approved these amounts but the Senate subcommittee asked for con­
siderable increases. In testimony before the Senate subcommittee, the 
National Guard Association requested an ̂ 88,815,949 increase for the 
National Guard and the Reserve Officers Association asked for a 
$100,000,000 increase for the Organized Reserves. The Senate subcommit­
tee settled for a total of $136,533,176 plus a $25,000,000 contract
authorization for the National Guard and $80,681,900 for the Organized 
27Reserve Corps. ' The conference committee decided to break even on the 
Organized Reserve Corps appropriation and $67,828,000 was appropriated.^® 
The National Guard prospered much more; it got $134,000,000 in addition 
to a contract authorization of $15,000,000.
The 1948 session of Congress brought the biggest upsurge in Re­
serve enthusiasm since the war. The long-desired, newly-passed Inactive 
Duty Training Pay Act^? permitted the Army Reserve to be paid, as the
Navy and National Guard had long been paid, for attendance at weekly
U. S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Appropria­
tions, Military Establishment Appropriation Bill, 1948. House Rept. 495 
to accompany H. R. 3678, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 1947, p. 15.
'̂̂ U. S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Appropriations, Military 
Establishment Appropriation Bill. 1948. Senate Rept. 465 to accompany 
H. R. 3678, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 1947, p. 25.
®̂P. L. 267, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 1947*
29p, L. 460, 80th Cong., 2d Sess., 1948.
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drill sessions. The act brought a tremendous increase in appropriations 
for the fiscal year 1949. For the National Guard, the War Department 
requested $240,000,000 vihich the House subcommittee readily approved.
The Organized Reserve Corps request for $125,000,000 was reduced to 
$100,000,000 which reduction the subcommittee attempted to explain:
The committee was not impressed with the presentation of 
the needs for the funds requested or with the manner in which 
this program is apparently being conducted. Too many men are en­
couraged to enlist in the Reserves and then hear nothing further 
from such enlistment. The committee was informed that a total of 
518,069 officers and 644,590 enlisted men had joined the Reserve 
ranks and are willing to devote their time and energy toward de­
veloping a balanced national defense force, but of these numbers 
only a small number of units have been given assignments; . . .
The committee is in deep sympathy with the purposes of the 
Organized Reserves and sincerely trusts that during the coming 
fiscal year and with the expenditure of the funds here recommended 
are made available it will be possible for this organization to 
provide some organized activity. . . .  30
The House accepted the recommendation but the Senate subcommittee 
pushed both funds higher. The highest figure heretofore mentioned for 
the Guard, $298,113,759 was recommended.31 The Organized Reserved Corps* 
loss in the House subcommittee was restored so that its recommended ap­
propriation would be $125,000,000. These figures were accepted completely 
by the full Senate and almost completely by the conference conmittee.
The final appropriation gave the Organized Reserve Corps its full 
$125,000,000 as originally requested, and the National Guard got fifty 
million more than originally requested— a total of $290,000,000.32
3%. S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Appropria­
tions, Appropriation Bill. 1949. House Rept, 2135 to accompany H. R.
6771, 80th Cong., 2d Sess., 1948, p. 15.
31u. S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Appropriations, Military 
Functions Appropriation Bill. 1949. Senate Rept. I763 to accompany H. R. 
6771, 80th Cong., 2d Sess., 1948, p. 7.
32p, L. 766, 80th Cong., 2d Sess., 1948.
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Mien the inactive-duty training pay program for the Organized 
Reserve Corps commenced on October 1, 1948, there were no experience 
figures available upon which to base estimates as to how many individuals 
would participate. It was thought the pay would be a much greater in­
centive than it actually was and that the appropriation would be insuf­
ficient. As a result, priorities of units and individuals for pay were 
established and requirements were made stringent. But on December 31, 
1948, only nine per cent of the appropriation had been expended. I'lhen 
the fiscal year ended, it was discovered there were more than enough 
funds^^ because the severe restrictions had served to limit expenditures.
For the next fiscal year, 1950, the appropriating process was 
unexciting, so far as the Reserve Forces were concerned. With little 
discussion the appropriations went through the House and Senate exactly 
as requested in the Présidentes budget. The National Guard got 
$216,000,000 and the Organized Reserve got $115,000,000.^^ As it turned 
out, however, these figures proved to be so inadquate that cutbacks were 
necessary. Additional costs resulted from a military pay raise given in 
the Career Compensation Act of 1949, and persons in drill status in­
creased over 150,000 in the first four months of the fiscal year, re­
quiring the program to be contracted greatly in the last part of the
year.35
33y. S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Appropria­
tions, Hearings, Department of Army Appropriations for 1950. 81st Cong., 
1st Sess., 1949, on H. R. 4146, p. 54.
L. 434, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., 1949*
33u. S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Appropria­
tions, General Appropriation Bill. 1950. House Rept. 1797 to accompany 
H. R. 4146, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., 1949, p. 291.
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For 1951, interest in the Reserve budget was higher, although 
it was only a minute portion of the experimental omnibus appropriation 
bill of that year which supplied funds for the entire governmental estab­
lishment. In the case of the National Guard, the administration re­
quested $210,700,000, but the House appropriations subcommittee raised 
the figure to $212,400,000. The Guard’s recruiting program last fall, 
the subcommittee said, was a big success— quotas were oversubscribed—  
the National Guard was to be commended. The additional funds, according 
to the subcommittee’s report^  ̂were for ’’service contracts and utilities,” 
but no further explanations were offered. The bill, as passed by the 
House of Representatives, accepted the subcommittee recommendations com­
pletely, but only after a bold effort by Representative Robert L. F.
Sikes, of Florida, to get the National Guard portion increased^? by an 
additional five million dollars. On the floor, Sikes quoted National 
Guard Bureau chief Kenneth Cramer’s pleas for more money; ” . . .  this 
budget was prepared under the assumption that attendance at armory drill 
would be 75 per cent by enlisted men and 85 per cent by officers.” At­
tendance, Cramer said, was increasing and insufficient funds might result 
in the necessity to suspend drills. The ensuing debate brought out com­
ments not often heard against the National Guard. Representative 
Charles A. Plumley, of Vermont, declared, ’’the trouble with him [cramer^ 
is he talks too much.” Plumley suggested that the Bureau Chief use some
S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Appropria­
tions, General Appropriation Bill, 1951. House Rept. 1797 to accompany 
H, R. 7786, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., 1950, p. 291.
^^Congressional Record. 81st Cong., 2d Sess., May 9> 1950, p. 6740.
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of the money for drills that he uses to fly National Guard planes around 
for governors. These comments, of course, provoked a defense for the 
National Guard. Afterwards the subcommittee chairman, George H. Mahon, 
of Texas, rose to oppose his fellow subcommitteeman*s motion. He assured 
the House the Guard could ask for a supplemental appropriation next 
spring if funds proved inadequate, and the amendment was defeated 2? to 
32.
The Senate subcommittee reduced the figure again to $210,500,000,
which was lower than the original budget request. The full Senate,
nevertheless, allowed the small National Guard decrease on July 25,
381950, and on August 25, 1950, approved a conference committee report
which accepted the Senate f i g u r e . ^9
The Army Reserve budget underwent similar experiences. The 
President requested $110,000,000 but the House committee raised the fig­
ure to $115,000,000. The increase was on the request of Army officials,
however. Previous to the printing of the President's budget, the Bureau
of the Budget had refused permission to request the full $115,000,000. 
Afterwards, with attendance at Reserve drills increasing, the bureau re­
lented, and the House subcommittee approved the request with a strong 
statement for additional build-up of the program.
The committee again this year, as it did last year, desires 
to emphasize the necessity for a well-planned, well-thought-out 
Reserve program. The continual shifting of programs has ser-
^^Congressional Record. 81st Cong., 2d Sess., p. 11312.
9̂u, S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Appropria­
tions, General Appropriation Bill. 1951. Conference Rept. 2991 to ac­
company H. R. 7786, 81st Cong,, 2d Sess., 1950, p. 62.
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iously handicapped the development of an effective Reserve Corps 
and has had a very detrimental effect on the morale of the re­
servists. . . .  It is hoped the proposed new program will be one 
which the reservists can rely upon and really put their efforts 
into without fear of a new change next week or next month.
The figures approved by the House subcommittee were approved by 
the full House. Major General James B. Cress, Executive for ROTC and 
Reserve Affairs, appeared before the Senate subcommittee to encourage 
the continuation of the five million dollar increase. He was partially 
successful. The subcommittee approved almost all of the increase, and 
the recommendation was accepted by the full Senate. The conference com­
mittee voted complete acceptance of the Senate version, thus giving the 
Organized Reserve Corps $114,525*000 for fiscal year 1951*
In late 1950, after the outbreak of the Korean War, the President 
made a request for supplementary military appropriations including 
$17,648,000 for the National Guard and $6,506,000 for the Organized Re­
serve Corps.Little discussion was aroused and these two particular 
provisions were approved by the Congress in the amounts requested.
For 1952, the House subcommittee made only minor reductions in 
both National Guard and Organized Reserve Corps requests. In both cases, 
the reductions were based on delays in the actual procurement of civilian 
employees. The full House accepted the figures and they were likewise 
accepted by the Senate subcommittee and the full Senate. The National
S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Appropria­
tions, General Appropriation Bill, 1951. House Rept. 1797 to accompany 
H. R. 7786, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., 1950, p. 291.
S. Congress, House of Representatives, Supplemental Estimates 
of Appropriations for the Armed Forces. House Document 657, 81st Cong.,
2d Sess,, 1950, p. 3*
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Guard got $202,982,000 and the Organized Reserve Corps got $104,810,000 
for the year. The armory construction program, for both Reserve and 
National Guard, got $24,000,000.^^
For the fiscal year 1953> when the Korean War was being fought 
less aggressively, the over-all military budget was cut considerably.
The administration requested for the Reserve Forces:
Military Construction, Army Reserve Forces $ 24 0̂00,000 
Reserve personnel 115,486,000
Army National Guard 220,000,000
The House subcommittee left only $20,000,000 for armory con­
struction, $73,000,000 for the Organized Reserve Corps and $115,300,000 
for the National Guard— figures which eventually became law with the 
Senate subcommittee and full Senate approval. They were evidently satis­
factory to the administration; no requests for restoration of any of the 
amounts were heard.
For the fiscal year 1954, the Eisenhower administration’s orig­
inal budget estimate called for $15,000,000 for armory construction, 
$103,909,000 for the Organized Reserve Corps, and $211,273,000 for the 
National Guard. These figures constituted increases in all three areas 
over 1953 appropriations. On the other hand, the House subcommittee made 
reductions in all three, but Reserve construction was the only area cut 
below the previous y e a r . 3̂ Again the House subcommittee figures went
L. 179, 82d Cong., 1st Sess., 1951.
S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Appropria­
tions, Department of Defense Appropriation Bill, 1954. House Rept. 680 
to accompany H. R. 5969, 83d Cong., 1st Sess., 1953, p. 25.
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through to become law without debate in the House or Senate. Reserve 
construction was given $9,094,000; Reserve personnel received $85,500,000 
and the Army National Guard got $210,035,000.^
For 1955, the executive budget called for $15,000,000 for Re­
serve construction, $90,000,000 for the Army Reserve, and $218,530,000 
for the National Guard. These figures were approved by the House sub­
committee, the full House, the Senate subcommittee and the full Senate. 
The Senate subcommittee added language giving the executive officers 
authority to transfer $36,000,000 to Reserve construction and $25,000,000 
to the National Guard from the "Procurement and Production, Army" ac­
count.
The $15,000,000 for construction was recommended by the Senate 
subcommittee to remain available until expended and exempt one million 
dollars of it from the provisions of Section 4 (d) or the National De­
fense Facilities Act of 1955 which requires the states to contribute 25 
per cent of National Guard building funds. The subcommittee also pro­
posed that all National Guard funds expended for anti-aircraft units be 
without regard to Section 6? of the National Defense Act which requires 
all National Guard funds to be apportioned among the states on the basis 
of personnel strength. All the subcommittee’s Reserve recommendations 
were enacted by the full Senate.
The conference committee agreed to accept all the provisions
4̂p. L. 179, 83d Cong., 1st Sess., 1953.
S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Appropriations, Department 
of Defense Appropriation Bill. 1955. Senate Rept. 1582 to accompany H. R. 
8873, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., 1954, p. 5»
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attached to the appropriation as passed by the Senate except for the 
authorization to transfer $36,000,000 to Reserve construction from Army 
procurement and production appropriations. This was reported back to 
the Houses as still in disagreement. The matter was settled outside the 
official framework of the Congress. Representative Richard B. Wiggles- 
worth presented the solution to the House and won its acceptance— the 
$36,000,000 authorization was to be trimmed to $18,000,000. The figure 
was also accepted by the Senate.46
For the fiscal year 1956, the first increases in the Reserve 
budget estimates came from the executive branch. The President’s amended 
requests boosted the Army Reserve estimate by more than eleven million 
dollars to $130,289,000. The National Guard estimate was raised almost 
fourteen million to become $308,239,000. The armory construction pro­
gram remained at $31,611,000. The increases were based on the potential 
revitalization of the Reserve program by the passage of the Reserve Forces 
Act of 1955 vdiich created the six-months training program. With almost 
no discussion, the Reserve Forces appropriation slipped through exactly 
as requested by the President.
For 1957 the administration’s estimates were even higher. Forty- 
million dollars was requested for Reserve construction, $215,000,000 for 
Reserve personnel and $306,000,000 for the National Guard. The House 
subcommittee reduced only the Reserve personnel budget. The eight million
4̂ U. S. House of Representatives, Committee on Appropriations, De­
partment of Defense Appropriations Bill. 1955, Conference Rept. 1917 to 
accompany H. R. 8873, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., 1954, p. 3.
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dollar decrease, the subconunittee said,^? was a recognition of the "re­
duced six-months training input." The new program had not won popularity 
as anticipated. The subcommittee decided the full request was not needed 
"in view of experience to date." The House accepted the subcommittee’s 
recommendation.
The Senate subcommittee received no request for restoration of 
Reserve personnel and consequently reiterated the House’s Reserve per­
sonnel appropriation. The subcommittee boosted the construction figure 
to sixty million dollars and the National Guard to #321,492,000. The 
recommendation for the National Guard would permit that component to 
reach a new peak of 425,000 men.^&
The two Houses, through conference committee action, agreed on 
slight reductions in the Senate figures. The armory construction program 
got $55,000,000; the National Guard got $320,162,000, and the Reserve 
got its previously decided $215,000,000.
For 1958 the budget carried provisions for only Army Reserve 
personnel and National Guard. The armory construction program awaited 
renewal of its legislative authorization, and appropriations had to 
await a supplemental bill later in the session. For Reserve personnel, 
$207,000,000 was requested, of which $197,000,000 was recommended by the 
House subcommittee. This constituted an eighteen million dollar reduc-
S. House of Representatives, Committee on Appropriations, De­
partment of Defense Appropriation Bill, 1957, House Rept. 2104 to accom­
pany H. R. 10986, 84th Gong., 2d Sess., 1956, p. 25.
S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Appropriations, Department 
of Defense Appropriation Bill. 1957, Senate Rept. 2260 to accompany H. R. 
10986, 84th Cong., 2d Sess., 1956, p. 3«
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tion from the previous year’s spending. It would cause considerable 
cutback of the six-month training program which by this time was bulging 
at the seams. The result was a low roar of dissatisfaction. Already 
the Army had temporarily suspended entry into the popular program, and 
public interest in the re-opening date was increasing.
In the midst of dissatisfaction. Representative Overton Brooks, 
chairman of the Reserves subcommittee of the House armed services com­
mittee, called a one-day hearing to examine the potential effect of the 
budgetary limitation. Representative Robert Sikes, who headed the sub­
committee that made the cut, was invited, and Assistant Secretary of the 
Army Hugh Milton testified, Milton was quite willing to have the Na­
tional Guard budget increased, but was vague on the plight of the Army 
Reserve, Time and again, he was asked to reveal the terrible calamity 
vriaich would overtake the Reserves should the budget not be raised,
’’Sikes did everything but promise an appropriation increase , , , if 
only Milton would give some indication for the record of an urgent need 
for such an increase. No indication came,9 Milton was eager to evade 
any request for the restoration of funds. This attitude was no doubt in 
accordance with instructions from superiors in or above the Pentagon,
The House approved the $197,000,000 recommendation of its commit­
tee and the bill went to the Senate subcommittee. Again Pentagon offi­
cials refuse to ask for an increase, but the subcommittee nevertheless 
recommended a twenty million dollar increase. In addition, the Army was 
to be allowed to keep approximately ten million dollars left unspent from
49Army Times (Reserve Edition). June 1, 1957, P* 10.
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the previous fiscal year. The specific purpose of the increase, the sub­
committee sai'd, was to permit entry of an additional 20,000 young men 
into the six-month program. The full Senate accepted the recommendation. 
On a basis of a conference committee report, the two Houses 
finally accepted a compromise figure— $207,000,000— the amount originally 
requested in the President’s budget.
The circumstances were more favorable to the National Guard.
The $320 million budget request was approved by the House subcocuuittee 
and by the House itself. The Senate subcommittee tacked on an additional 
forty million dollars. This was at the request of the Army. Actually 
Deputy Secretary Donald Quarles of the Department of Defense had said, 
"the job could be done with a $13.8 million increase." Nevertheless, 
the Senate voted the full forty million for the Guard. It was trimmed 
back to $13.8 million by the conference committee, leaving a total of 
$333,800,000 for expenditure.
Armory construction funds were appropriated in the supplemental 
appropriation bill for fiscal year 1958.50 The administration request 
for $55,000,000 was trimmed to $46,000,000 by the House subcommittee.
The larger amount was later restored by the Senate subcommittee and 
enacted into law just as the session was coming to a close.
Elias Huzar’s statement that Congress has looked favorably on 
the Reserve components, so far as appropriations are concerned, is veri­
fied for the post-World War II years. In five of the fourteen acts making 
appropriations to the Army Reserve from 1946 to 1958, at least one portion
50p. L. 170, 85th Cong., 1st Sess,, 1957.
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of the act has exceeded the Présidentes budget requests. The Army Re­
serve enjoyed an eleven million dollar increase over presidential esti­
mate in 1948, but that was the only year this generous disregard of the 
President’s budget occurred for the Reserve, In three other acts, the 
Reserve request was reduced, but on the other eight occasions. Congress 
appropriated the same amount as requested by the executive branch.
The National Guard fared even better. The appropriation acts of 
1948, 1949, 1957, and 1958 exceeded the budget estimates by $24,000,000, 
$50,000,000, $14,100,000, and $13,800,000, respectively. Cuts below the 
estimates were made for the four years between 1951 and 1954, but except 
for 1951 all such reductions were minor in scope. In the remaining acts, 
the amount appropriated was the same as requested by the President.
In one of the six acts making appropriations for anriory con­
struction, the final amount exceeded budget estimates by $15,000,000.
On two occasions, the amount was the same as requested and in the other 
two acts, the appropriations were below the estimates.
For proper perspective, it must also be noted that the appropria­
tions committees were generous to military functions in general. In ten 
of the fifteen years between 1934 to 1949, the Army was given more money 
than was requested by the President. Congress appropriated less than 
the President’s budget estimates for the Army in only five years.
The treatment of the various items in the Reserve Forces budget 
by the two Houses of Congress is interesting to compare.
^^James L. McCamy, review of The Purse and the Sword, by Elias 
Huzar, American Political Science Review. 45 (June, 195l), 564*
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The House of Representative’s treatment of the Reserve personnel 
budget was generous, but not so much for other items. Out of thirteen 
bills containing Reserve personnel appropriations from 1948 to 1958, 
the House lowered the President’s estimates seven times, never increased 
them, and approved without change six times. The Senate raised the 
House figure four times, lowered it once, and allowed it to remain the 
same eight times.
The House lowered the President’s estimates for the National 
Guard three times, raised them once and let them remain the same nine 
times. The Senate lowered House figures once, raised them five times, 
and let them remain the same seven times.
In the six bills carrying funds for Reserve construction, the 
House lowered the President’s estimates three times and allowed them to 
remain the same three times. The Senate never attempted to lower House 
figures, voted to raise them twice and allowed them to remain the same 
four times.
The Reserve personnel appropriation went to conference four 
times, for 1948, 1949, 1951, and 1958. In 1951, the Senate was seeking 
a slight reduction of the appropriation, but on all other occasions it 
sought increased figures. It won its point completely in every year ex­
cept 1948. Then the two Houses compromised evenly on the Organized Re­
serve Corps budget. In other words, the Senate won out when it wanted a 
reduced Reserve budget and also in two out of the three cases when it 
desired a higher Reserve budget.
In the six conferences mediating disagreements over the National
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Guard— in 1948, 1949, 1951, 1955, 1957, and 1958— the Senate sought an 
increased National Guard budget five times. In 1951, it sought to lower 
the figures, which it achieved. On the five other occasions, it won its 
way completely one time, was generally successful three times, and par­
tially lost its fight once to the House version.
Construction appropriations went to conference three times,
1955, 1957, and 1958. In every case, the Senate was seeking to raise 
the appropriations. In 1955 and 1957, the Senate broke even with the 
House in conference and won its way entirely in 1958.
Certainly the Senate conferees have been more successful in the 
conferences concerned with Reserve Forces appropriations. It appears 
at first glance, from the number of Senate increases, that the Senate has 
been a greater friend to the Reserve Forces than the House of Representa­
tives. This, of course, arises from the nature of the Senate as an ap­
propriations appeal board and does not constitute a good basis for the 
conclusion. Some foundation for the statement can be found, however, in 
the appropriation acts for 1948, 1949, 1957, and 1958, where the Senate 
made great increases in the Reserve Forces appropriations while the House 
was hesitant.
To Elias Huzar’s statement about congressional generosity for the 
Reserve Forces, another generality can be validly added— the appropria­
tions committees have been critical of the Army Reserve (but not National 
Guard) program. It has been constructive, sympathetic criticism.
As previously reported in this study, the committees have looked 
with suspicion on any hesitation by the Regular Army to build the Reserves.
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The most vociferous criticism has been directed toward regulars as sabo­
teurs of the civilian components. This is not to say that congressmen 
have not shown great admiration for West Pointers, but they have more 
frequently visualized the graduates of the Military Academy as members 
of a caste system who have no appreciation of the "new blood" provided 
by Reserves which might revitalize the decadent peacetime Army during 
periods of emergency.
As early as 1934> the House appropriations committee was criti­
cizing the management of the Organized Reserve Corps for the large num­
ber of over-age-in-grade officers contained on the Reserve rolls. The 
following year, the same committee took the Army to task for the slow 
production of new Reserve officers through the college Reserve Officers 
Training Corps. 2̂ The criticism has continued year by year. In the 1958 
hearings, the House subcommittee’s members had arrived at the point of 
condemning the Pentagon for failing to spend all the money appropriated 
for the Army Reserve,
This favorable disposition toward the Reserves and the frequent 
criticism of the officers responsible for the Reserve Forces has been a 
fundamental factor in the postwar growth of the program. It was the 
willingness to recommend healthy appropriations and the severe criticism 
of bureaucratic lethargy by congressional committees which weighted the 
scales in favor of an expanded Reserve.
It must, of course, be understood that these influences stemmed 
basically from the power of the Reserve Forces lobby, from the general
^^Huzar, op. cit., p. 271.
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interest of the American people, and from other sources. Nevertheless, 
Congress and its appropriations committees must be given much credit, 
or discredit for the great post-World War II expansion of the Army Re­
serve and National Guard.
The most obvious and most far-reaching aspect of the appropria­
tions process, so far as the Reserve Forces are concerned, is the tremen­
dous solicitude which the appropriations committees show to the National 
Guard. It stems, of course, from the influence of the National Guard 
Association and the grass root qualities of the Guard units themselves.
The solicitude has not been a recent development. It pre-dates 
World War II, but only since World War II have the propensities for eco­
nomy been of such character that the National Guard had little to worry 
about. Before World War II with military spending deemed unnecessary, 
it was difficult for any military function to get sufficient funds, even 
the National Guard. Then "the committees were apologetic about their 
inability to do a better job by the National G u a r d , "̂ 3 ^ut frequently 
the committees reduced other portions of the military budget and diverted 
the savings to the National Guard program.
Since World War II, with high military spending being more pala­
table, the National Guard has appeared on occasion to many people to be 
writing its own ticket. Certainly the committees showed great deference 
to National Guard opinions. It has even become customary for the commit­
tees to print the National Guard lobby’s views in its official reports 
so that the colleagues of the members will be informed of the path which
^̂ Huzar, op. cit., p. 273.
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the National Guard Association is taking.
The deference shown to the Guard has, by no means, been limited 
to financial affairs. The committees display rapt attention of all as­
pects of the Guard’s livelihood. As Representative Sikes said in the 
House appropriations subcommittee hearings for 1952, "The National Guard 
is something we in Congress have always been interested in."^^ The mem­
bers inquire into the success of the Guard’s nike anti-aircraft program, 
training conditions, and numerous other matters. On occasion, they have 
even considered the dangers involved in "favorite politicians" assuming 
high positions in the National Guard organization.^^
Another characteristic of the National Guard’s special position 
with the appropriations committees is revealed in the aid offered by the 
committees to subvert the President’s budget. Seldom, of course, does 
the National Guard Bureau chief openly request funds over and above those 
allowed in the budget, but there have been a number of subtle methods 
used whereby this can be accomplished without affronting higher executive 
authorities. The appropriations committees have, more than once, helped 
such efforts. They inquire into the amounts originally requested by the 
National Guard Bureau in estimates submitted to the bureau of the budget. 
They asked the National Guard Bureau’s personnel for their "personal 
opinions" and provide other opportunities for the bureau spokesman to 
make an argument for additional funds. Usually, the bureau chief is
% b i d . . p. 943.
s. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Appropria­
tions, Hearings, Department of Army Appropriations for 1957. 84th Cong., 
2d Sess., on H. R. 10986, 195̂ , p. 1323.
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more than happy to use the invitation to get more money, but he hesi­
tates to antagonize his departmental superiors. By indirection, he tells 
the committee his hopes for money. Such Guard statements as "it will 
be an austere but adequate year" is meaningful to the congressional 
friends of the lobby.Occasionally, the bureau chief is bolder and 
says, "We actually need at least --- millions more but I am not permit­
ted to submit an official appropriations request .for it."
Other agencies indulge in this strategy, but the National Guard 
Bureau employs it, perhaps, most frequently.On several occasions, 
the bureau would probably not attempt to go beyond the President’s bud­
get except for National Guard Association pressure, which acts directly 
and with greater persistency on the bureau than it does on Congress.
The bureau feels that it can risk offending the Bureau of the Budget 
but it seldom dares to challenge the National Guard Association. Re­
quests for additional funds are thus backed by a common front. The bur­
eau, using these indirect methods, can get increases whether higher ex­
ecutive authorities approve or not.
The Reserve budget has never been a matter of political-party 
partisanship in either the appropriations committees or in floor debate. 
The committees have been proud of this record.5̂  Frequent references to 
this fairly unusual outlook are made during committee hearings and on 
the floor. Representative Engel, a Republican from Michigan, said in
^^Interview with Frances J. Hevdtt, Staff, U. S. Senate Appropria­
tions Committee, Sept. 18, 1957.
5’̂Huzar, op. cit., p. 126.
5%uzar, op. cit., p. 32.
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1949  ̂"There never has been a time during the 13 years I have been on 
this Subcommittee when there was any politics in the Subcommittee. Time 
and time again we divided, yes, we disagreed but never along political 
l i n e s . "59 nonpartisan character of subcommittee actions has contin­
u e d . The over-all size of the military budget has been the subject of 
considerable party controversy but it has never reached the Reserve 
Forces.
Of a similar vein is the lack of direct competition for funds 
between the National Guard and Army Reserve. The tremendous competition 
between the two— so easily seen in other matters such as recruiting—  
has not spread to the appropriations field. The appropriation for each 
component is decided independently. An increase for one component does 
not necessarily mean a decrease for the other. On the contrary, the two 
appropriations have tended to rise and decrease simultaneously. There 
has been no atmosphere of competition in the legislative branch as there 
has been in the executive branch.
The appropriating power, as a method of providing surveillance 
over the Reserve Forces, is somewhat unique. It is generally concluded 
by most political scientists that democratic government depends on leg­
islative control of the purse. A look at military appropriations for
5^Congressional Record. April 14, 1949, p. A 2401.
^^interview with T. Edward Barswell, Staff, Senate Appropriations 
Committee, Sept. 16, 1957*
^%illiam H. Riker in his Soldiers of the States (Washington: Pub­
lic Affairs Press, 1957), P« 93, seems to believe there is considerable 
competition. He sees the larger National Guard appropriations as proof 
that the National Guard lobby is more effective than the Army Reserve 
lobby in this competition.
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specific years will make any student wonder if the conclusion is legiti­
mate. In periods of military emergency, the legislative branch is ex­
tremely lacking in vigilance. Millions of dollars are expended accord­
ing to executive inclinations. But the purse strings have always been 
tightened later. Congress has seldom forgotten, for any lengthy period, 
to protect its great power over spending.
The degree of congressional oversight through the appropriation 
power over Reserve agencies has been far from consistent. Generally 
speaking, it has been lax since World War 11. The Reserve Forces re­
ceived all the funds Congress thought they could use. The appropriations 
were in lump sums with almost no limitations attached. The riders that 
were attached were usually meant to exempt the Reserve Forces from the 
ordinary legal requirements. For instance. Congress frequently suspen­
ded the requirement for a 25 per cent state contribution on National 
Guard buildings of a non-armory nature; construction funds were allowed 
to "remain available until expended" in later y e a r s a n d  permission 
was given on two occasions to transfer additional funds from the Regular 
Army to Reserve Forces accounts.
Indeed, the surveillance functions ordinarily performed by Con­
gress have been more often performed by the Bureau of the Budget. The 
bureau has withheld funds and laid down broad criteria for the Reserve 
Forces.
62Although the U. S. Constitution says Anny appropriations may be 
made for no longer than two years, this applies only to "raising and 
supporting Armies." The construction of armory buildings is deemed ex­
empt from this limitation.
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Although the practice of impounding Reserve funds began in 1947 
under President Truman, the greatest use of the power has been under 
President Eisenhower. Reserve personnel funds, as appropriated by Con­
gress, were only partially spent during several Eisenhower years. The
greatest non-use of funds, however, was because of the inability of the
Army to meet the criteria for the construction of armories as laid down 
by the Bureau of the Budget.
One restriction was on the cost of the armory per participating 
reservist. Initially, the limit was $800 per man for the authorized 
strength of the Reserve unit and $1,300 per man for the "on-board 
strength" (the number actually participating in training). Later, the 
bureau relaxed the requirement to permit a twenty per cent variance in 
the requirement for individual armories, providing the over-all construc­
tion program averaged out to the above figures.
Similar requirements have been enforced throughout the construc­
tion program. Before a unit could get a new armory, its actual strength 
must have been equal to fifty per cent of its authorized strength. In 
no case could an armory be built to serve less than an eighty-man unit
or no more than a total of five units.
The congressional appropriations subcommittees have been extremely 
resentful that the Bureau of the Budget could make additional rules with­
out consulting Congress. Representative John J. Riley declared, in the 
hearings for fiscal year 1958, that he didn’t like the bureau "changing
S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Appropria­
tions, Hearings, Department of Army Appropriations for 1958, 85th Cong., 
1st Sess., 1957, p. 1253.
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rules" after Congress passed them.
Representative Daniel Flood, at the same hearing, said,
I am concerned about the principle of the thing. . . . More 
and more are we in the Congress and particularly in the Appro­
priations Committee and even more particularly in that part of 
the Appropriations Committee which is the Defense Subcommittee 
concerned about this exercise of these rights and privileges by 
the Bureau of the Budget. We are becoming conscious daily that 
the Bureau of the Budget is doing indirectly what it has never 
been able to get a law to do directly as the spokesman for the 
executive, exercising a line item veto on an act of Congress.^
Others, resentful that the armory construction program was being 
delayed, spoke of the Bureau of the Budget as "arbitrary" and decried 
the necessity for the "imprimatur" of "this new octopus" on every govern­
ment project.
Thus, appropriations have been important in Reserve Forces policy­
making, but congressional generosity has, to some extent, moved the 
critical area of decision-making on appropriations matters to the execu­
tive branch. The crucial factors are the amounts requested by military 
leaders and the willingness of these military leaders to expend the full 
amounts as appropriated. It is important to note, however, that congress­
men have been instrumental in getting the budget estimates to be higher. 
Their encouragement of bigger Reserve estimates has been easily seen, 
especially after the Reserve Forces were caught tremendously unprepared 
for the Korean War. Congress has also, as already reported, harassed 





It is fairly clear that Army chieftains have not been enthusi­
astic to build a big Reserve, Their lackadaisical approach to new leg­
islation from 1945 to 1957 is sufficient to verify this conclusion.
Yet, there is a long history of argument among the components which 
further verifies the fact.
Since early in the nineteenth century there has been sporadic 
debate on military manpower policy. The Regular Army has traditionally 
reiterated the theories and practice of John C. Calhoun, Secretary of 
War from 1817 to 1825, and Major General Emory Upton, military theorist 
of the post Civil-War period. These two leaders were the foremost con­
tributors to the United States Army^s "lasting shape,the expansible 
standing army. They favored the maintenance in peacetime of a skeleton 
standing army to be filled in with civilians in time of war. The plan 
involved no dependence on trained citizen reserves.
One of the chief opponents of the expansible standing army has 
been the late Brigadier General John McCauley Palmer, who espoused George
^Frederick M. Stern, The Citizen Army (New York; St. Martin’s 
Press, 1957), p. 139.
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Washington^ 5 well-regulated citizen militia as the prime foundation of 
our defense. In addition, Reserve Force interests have championed this 
view.
Although the argument frequently bubbled and boiled, it was usu­
ally nothing more than a heated academic discussion. At all times, the 
Regular Army deemed the Reserve Forces highly inefficient, but until 
World War II, there was little antagonism. The blending of the Reserve 
Forces into the Second World War brought open disharmony. The National 
Guardsmen, in particular, complained about discrimination in promotions, 
job assignments, and other treatment. The regulars, on the other hand, 
claimed the guardsmen, and especially their generals, were incompetent.
One incident, in itself unimportant, was typical of World War II 
antagonism. While mobilized guardsmen were returning from field maneu­
vers in Tennessee to their station in Arkansas, some of them yelled ob­
scene remarks at a group of women on a Memphis golf course. Crusty 
Lieutenant General Ben Lear ordered a long, forced march for punishment. 
The resulting publicity, including vehement orations on the floors of 
Congress, provided an excellent vehicle for the National Guard to air its 
anti-regular Army views. Later, the Guard division’s commanding general, 
Major General Ralph T. Truman (whose cousin, Harry, was a member of the 
United States Senate), was relieved of his command. Many people won­
dered if the Regular Army made a practice of removing National Guard 
generals.
pRoland Young, Congressional Politics in the Second World War 
(New York; Columbia University Press, 1956), ^  Ï59.
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After the Reserve Forces were mobilized in 1940, the Regular 
Army was extremely harsh in its evaluation of the Reserve Forces* readi­
ness for combat. Although Americans were awakened to the actual con­
ditions of our defenses, it nevertheless hurt the sensitive ears of 
guardsmen and reservists. In May, 1940, Lieutenant General Hubert J. 
Brees, the referee of the Louisiana training maneuvers, caught public 
attention by a thorough-going critique of the Reserve Forces* actions 
in the maneuvers. He was publicly critical of the commanding general*s 
leadership. So widespread was the publicity that General George C. 
Marshall, the Army Chief of Staff, made a statement that he hoped it 
would not happen again.3
There were numerous charges throughout World War II that the 
Regular Army was discriminating against citizen soldiers in the matter 
of promotions. During Senate inquiries in both 1941 and 1944, the charge 
was denied. General Marshall explained to a Special Senate Investigat­
ing Committee in 1941 the complications of the promotion system. Promo­
tions in the Regular Establishment, he said, had been limited by the pay 
increases involved in the promotions— the government simply could not 
afford many promotions. National Guard promotions were regulated pri­
marily by the requirement of a position vacancy prior to advancement.
Army Reserve promotions depended upon the number of years of service. 
Marshall said he hoped soon to have a common system of promotion for all 
components, but for the time being he was more worried about discrimina-
^Mark Skinner Watson, Chief of Staff ; Prewar Plans and Preparations. 
Historical Division, Department of the Army (Washington; Government 
Printing Office, 1950), p. 205.
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tions against the Regular Army. It was widely thought, he said, that 
the Army Reserve and National Guard already had their mobilization 
grades while the regular officers entered the emergency with grades ap­
propriate to a small peacetime force.
The senatorial investigation of 1944 considered the halting of 
permanent promotions in the Regular Army for the duration of the war.
In the hearings. Senator Harley M. Kilgore, Democrat of West Virginia, 
insisted that the National Guard and Army Reserve were being "kicked in 
the teeth" in the promotion system.^ Information was brought out that 
94*5 per cent of all promotions to general officer rank had gone to reg­
ulars, 2.4 per cent to national guardsmen, and 1.8 per cent to organized 
reservists. The Regular Army position was defended by Major General M. 
G. White, a National Guard officer on duty with the general staff. He 
denied the charge of discrimination by comparing the number of promo­
tions to all grades for each component with the total membership of the 
component. White said that Regular Army officers constituted 4 per cent 
of the entire officer corps and got 5.4 per cent of all promotions; the 
National Guard received exactly its share of promotions, and the Army 
Reserve received far more than its share.5
There was also serious disagreement over the competence of top 
National Guard and Army Reserve leaders. Of the twenty-one National
Û. S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Military Affairs, Hearings, 
Promotions in the Regular Army. 78th Cong., 2d Sess., 1944  ̂p. 1.
5lbid.. p. 11.
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Guard major generals inducted into the service in 1940, eight had been 
separated by March, 1944»  ̂ Reserve Forces personnel concluded, gener­
ally speaking, that their colleagues were ousted to make room for more 
regulars at the top. The truth of the allegation is doubtful. Large 
numbers of Reserve Forces colonels and generals were over-age-in-grade. 
Whether any were more incompetent than regular officers will probably 
never be known. Regardless, it seems to have been highly desirable that
some be replaced. This the Army attempted to do, early in World War II.
nA law was requested and enacted giving the War Department authority to 
appoint a special board to reclassify Regular Army personnel, and by 
administrative order, the same board also took jurisdiction over civilian 
component personnel. General Malin Craig, former Chief of Staff, was 
recalled to active duty to head the board which began the process of 
reassigning and dismissing unsatisfactory officers.
There was considerable protest that General Craig*s group, and 
its subsidiary reclassification system, was only a stylish way of oust­
ing National Guard officers. To protect the War Department from further 
charges, still another advisory board was established, composed of former 
officers of the Reserve components. Its purpose was to guide the Sec­
retary of War in special cases involving the reclassification of senior 
National Guard and Army Reserve officers with unsatisfactory records.®
&Ibid.. p. 13. William H. Riker says in his The Soldiers of the 
States (Public Affairs Press, 1957), p. 114, that all National Guard 
major generals except two were replaced by regulars as commanders of 
National Guard divisions during 1941 and 1942.
'̂P. L. 190, 77th Cong., 1st Sess., 1941.
%atson, op. cit., p. 244.
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The antagonism has persisted since World War II, but bitterness 
did not openly erupt during the Korean War. There were some charges of 
National Guard ineptness, particularly at Camp Pickett, Virginia. In 
general, however, the regulars were grateful for the speedy aid rendered 
by the Reserve Forces, and antagonism was not in evidence. This is 
partly because only a few National Guard divisions were mobilized. It 
was widely assumed the Army chose only the better-prepared Guard organi­
zations for mobilization. Thus, it was the excellence— not the inade­
quacy of the units— that won public attention.
It has frequently been said that the Regular Army has opposed a 
large Reserve program in the hope that universal military training will 
eventually be adopted. Colonel William H. Neblett, 1949 President of 
the Reserve Officers Association, agrees in his book Pentagon Politics, 
with this view.9 But he believes it important to make clear that the 
Regular Army wants a "German" style of universal military training which 
is little more than permanent "peacetime conscription" to maintain a 
large standing army.^^ This, he says, is true despite War Department 
Circular 347, August 25, 1944, wherein General Marshall announced plans 
for a small postwar military establishment which would be reinforced in 
times of emergency by organized units drawn from a civilian army re­
serve. The circular, according to Colonel Neblett, was for publicity 
purposes only. It was for the purpose of off-setting the effect of 
recent anti-Army publicity.^^ Regardless, Neblett says, Marshall*s
%illiam H. Neblett, Pentagon Politics (New York: Pageant Press, 
1953), pp. 112-116.
lOlbid.. p. 97. l^Ibid.. p. 115.
léO
circular was later discarded by well-concealed deception in Circular 
119, April 24, 1946, issued by General Dwight D. Eisenhower.
Others agree on the UMT question, as revealed by the following 
testimony by the executive director of the Reserve Officers Association, 
Brigadier General E. A. Evans, before the House Committee on Armed Ser­
vices, April 22, 1948:
Representative Philip J. Philbin: In other words as you inter­
pret the attitude, they {the Army) felt that they need not build 
up either the Organized Reserves or the National Guard because 
they are going to get universal military training or the draft. 
General Evans: I have heard that statement made.
Representative Dewey Short; My contention. General, is that 
if the Army had done its duty and supported the Guard and Re­
serves, having made a sincere, earnest and determined effort to 
build them up, we would not have this UMT legislation here.
General Evans: I agree with you completely.
During the same year, idien Congress was fretting at taking a 
stand on universal military training, a group of seventy-four war veter­
ans in the House of Representatives cooperated in pushing for a build-up 
of the Reserves as a substitute for compulsory service. The group, led 
by Republican Representative Edward A. Mitchell, of Indiana, assumed 
that a Reserve build-up was the opposite of universal military training—  
that the Regular Army desired UMT without the assignment of UMT graduates 
to Reserve units.^
There has been a widespread feeling among Congressmen that this
l^Ibid.. p. 114.
13U. S. Congressional Record, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 7975, 
quoted from Hearings, House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Ser­
vices, April 22, 1948.
^^New York Times, Feb. 26, 1948, p. 12.
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was the policy of the regulars. In 1954 Representative Philip J.
Philbin reiterated this belief;
Congress has repeatedly given all branches of the service 
funds to build up large Reserves and to strengthen the National 
Guard, but in a surprising number of instances these funds have 
not been substantially used, indicating that there was no real 
wholehearted effort to build up the Reserves. The reason for 
this is plain. There were some in the military who were so in­
tent upon putting UMT across that they were not interested in
building up the R e s e r v e .
Many other members of Congress have been quick to charge the Regular 
Army with intentionally holding back the Reserve Forces.
Senator Margaret Chase Smith has said "the War Department liter­
ally abandoned any planning or thinking during World War II about future 
Reserve plans and progress and after the war for many years made only 
half-hearted efforts on a Reserve program."^^
Representative Harry R. Sheppard, Democrat of California, after 
severely questioning Major General Harold R. Bull, the Army’s Director 
of Organization and Training, said that "I cannot find any legitimate 
excuse other than the fact that a lot of officers are not interested in 
the Reserve program. . . Somebody on top is not producing. There is
no excuse."17
Representative Robert L. F. Sikes, Democrat of Florida, said
l̂ U. S. Congressional Record, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., Aug. 9, 1954, 
p. 13761.
l̂ U. S. Congressional Record, 84th Cong., 2d Sess., April 12, 1956, 
p. 6189.
17u. S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Appropri­
ations, Hearings, Department of Army Appropriations for 1950. 81st Cong., 
2d Sess., p. 51.
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It is great concern to this Âppropriations^ Conunittee that no 
really workable Reserve program has been brought forward in all 
the years since World War II. The Committee has seriously won­
dered on many occasions whether there is any real interest in 
and appreciation for the Reserves among many of the professional 
soldiers who dominate the thinking in the Pentagon. . . . Re­
serves are pushed around in little ways— denied promotions, 
denied even the right to participate in study courses after the 
age of 45* Heretofore they have been denied the right of weekend 
drills. Our committee assumed that a quirk in the law was at 
fault but found that there had simply been no implementation of 
regulations to permit weekend training of Reserves.
Representative Clin E, Teague, Democrat of Texas, said:
Problems concerning the Reserves have always been shunted to the 
bottom of the file of things to do on the desks of our military 
leaders. Too few of our military men who have been charged with 
our Reserve affairs have actually carëd whether or not we build 
a Reserve. Some have actually tried to keep us from doing it.
Too many of our civilian Secretaries charged with the Reserve 
responsibility have either devoted their time to other matters 
or have been ineffective spokesmen for reservists. I believe 
that it can be proven that the Regular Services have over and over 
attempted to prevent our having a strong Reserve. It makes little 
difference vdiat kind of a law we pass here in Congress, unless 
the people handling this program want it to work, it will not 
work.19
While considering whether the Regular Army would sincerely at­
tempt to implement the Reserve Forces Act of 1955, Representative Leroy 
Johnson, Republican of California, said he believed the Pentagon was so 
"afraid and ashamed" of what had "been done to massacre the Reserve sys­
tem" that "they will use every possible means to make the thing work suc- 
cessfull."^® Others have said jokingly that the Regular Army has
S. Congressional Record, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., May 17, 1955,
p. 6496.




attempted to keep reservists so utterly disgusted and confused that 
they will already be fighting mad whenever war comes.
The criticism of Senator Margaret Chase Smith has been the most 
persistent of all. She said, on the floor of the Senate, May 9, 1949, 
that:
. . .  my experience on these (Reserve) matters has been an un­
broken series of opposition on the part of the War Department 
and its successors . . . This opposition is particularly puz­
zling because most of my measures propose only that the Air 
Force and Army Reserves be given that which the Naval Reserve 
has enjoyed for a long time.^l
In a rousing oration to the national convention of the Reserve Officers 
Association in Boston on June 24, 1955, she said her inactive duty 
training pay bill was opposed by the Pentagon. She told of more opposi­
tion to her Reserve retirement bill and how her death and disability 
coverage bill had been given a "kind of pocket veto"— the Pentagon 
failed to make any comments on the bill. Senator Smith said she unsuc­
cessfully attempted to get the adoption of an Army Reserve medal and com­
mendation ribbon by executive action; after she tried legislation, the 
Pentagon decided to create the decorations by executive order. On Dec­
ember 2, 1955, in a letter to the chairmen of the armed services commit­
tees, she deplored a "mounting bitterness between the Pentagon and re­
servists" and urged the establishment of a Senate watchdog committee over 
Reserve affairs.
Perhaps the most vehement words have come from Representative 
Thomas B. Curtis, Republican of Missouri, who charged in a March 19, 1955,
p. 5858.
S. Congressional Record, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., May 9, 1949,
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speech to the Oklahoma City, Oklahoma Life Underwriters that:
, . . the nation’s highest military leaders are sabotaging 
congressional efforts to develop a workable Reserve program, 
in favor of a large standing army. The Military Establishment 
is determined that no Reserve will work . . . These leaders 
do not want the National Guard to be attractive.
Representative E. Keith Thomson, Republican of Wyoming, in a
similar vein, has said the Regular Army is keeping the Reserve program
"dangerously weak," and he made references to a "West Point Protective
22Association" as a "playhouse for promotion."
The Regular Army leaders’ lack of enthusiasm stems from a com­
bination of three motives. First, as patriotic Americans and military 
specialists, they feel it would be unwise for the United States to de­
pend upon a non-professional force in this age of specialization. Sec­
ond, by neglect, perhaps because of the necessity for solving more 
pressing problems elsewhere, they have allowed the Reserve Forces to 
languish. Third, they believe the rise of the Reserve involves a con­
current decline in the Regular Army; because the Reserve challenges 
their interests, they show no enthusiasm for its growth.
The most poignant reason given for the Regular Army’s hesitancy 
is the possibility that Reserve Forces’ can never be adequately trained 
for modern warfare. A greater degree of specialization is required in 
the Army today than ever before. It is doubtful whether the weekly two- 
hour drill period will keep the citizen soldier in readiness.
The Army says, "The appearance of nuclear arms on the battlefield
2%. S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Hearings,
A National Reserve Plan, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., 1955, p. 10.
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has wrought a revolution in tactics— a revolution that calls for more 
men— more highly trained than ever b e f o r e . "̂ 3 More men are needed be­
cause greater dispersion of troops is necessary in nuclear warfare.
More men are needed '̂ because we must have the mobility and capacity to 
rapidly exploit the effect of those weapons . . .  to move in , . . 
clean up , . . move on.”^  But this plea for more men has, in practical 
effect, included reservists only where Reserve Forces pressure groups 
and Congress have forced it on the Army. The professional military 
leaders believe the new weapons require active-duty soldiers.
There is considerable evidence, historically speaking, for 
doubting the ability of citizen soldiers in a war where a premium rests 
on rapid mobilization. Reserve Forces personnel, called in 1940 to "be 
fit to fight by February," required almost as much training as raw re­
cruits. This would probably have been true in the Korean War except 
for the abilities learned by the Reserve Forces in World War II. It 
might have been true anyway. Since most of the National Guard stayed 
home, it cannot be determined how fast the entire Guard could have been 
mobilized.
Of course, all regulars do not hold the same dubious view of the 
Reserve Forces. It is interesting to note the position, on this issue, 
of a noted military leader. Lieutenant General Raymond S. McClain, a 
civilian banker from Oklahoma City and the only citizen soldier to com-
S. Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Army Reserve 
and ROTC Affairs, The Right to Live; A Presentation in the National 
Interest, undated (issued in Oct., 195?)» p. 13.
% b i d . . p. 13.
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mand a unit as large as a corps in World War II. He said, in 1954, 
after his integration into the Regular Army, "Let no one tell you that 
the so-called civilian soldier is no good, and that our wars have to be 
fought by regulars.This view is probably not widely held among 
regulars, however.
There seems to be adequate reason for the Regular Army to be­
lieve that the Reserve Forces are truly a challenge to its vested in­
terests. On several occasions and in a variety of official pronounce­
ments, the administration has said that a major purpose of building the 
Reserves is to reduce the size of the Regular Army. In 1949 Secretary 
of the Army Kenneth Royall told Congress, in his requests for Reserve 
appropriations, that he "hoped" to reduce the Regular Army by building 
up the Reserves.26 Congressmen have inquired how soon after a build-up 
in the Reserves would it be possible to cut the Regular forces.27 in 
1954, the Senate Interim Subcommittee on Preparedness, speaking through 
its chairman. Senator Leverett Saltonstall, Republican of Massachusetts, 
reprimanded the Eisenhower administration for 'heglecting" the Reserves 
and said, "If we reduce the size of the Regular Military Establishment, 
we must have a Reserve Force which will be able to take up the slack 
caused by the reduction." A year earlier, the same subcommittee had said
26nsw York Times. March 24, 1949, p. 21.
S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Hearings, 
National Security Training Corps Act. 82d Cong,, 2d Sess., 1952, on S. 
2441, P» 468.
2%ew York Times. Jan. 30, 1954, p. 8.
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that "If we were to reduce the Regular Military Establishment, it would 
be essential to have a continuous rotating Reserve which was revitalized 
in its operation and b e i n g . E v e n  General Lawton Collins, the Army 
Chief of Staff, acknowledged this policy in 1953. Defending Army Re­
serve appropriation estimates for fiscal year 1954, he said, "If we are 
to reduce the standing army, we can do that only if we maintain a strong 
and vigorous National Guard and Reserve program.Also the American 
Legion has recognized the possibility of replacing certain parts of the 
Regular Army with citizen soldiers. At its Atlantic City convention in 
September, 1957, the organization adopted a resolution urging the re­
placement "of every unit, man and machine cut from the active services 
in the last year with a unit, man, or machine in the Ready Reserve.
Also of importance is the vague, nebulous feeling on the part of 
many regulars that, if it were not for the Reserve Forces, the Regular 
Army would receive bigger appropriations. This is of extremely doubtful 
validity.
These army convictions on the necessity of protecting its own 
position have, consciously or unconsciously, been the primary motives 
for the regulars’ resistance to the Reserves. The greatest evidence of 
hesitancy came to the dramatic forefront during the tour of Brigadier
29u. S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Interim 
Subcommittee on Preparedness, Investigation of the Preparedness Program, 
Senate Document No. 152, 83d Cong., 1st Sess., 1953, P* 6.
30u. S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Appropriations, Hearings, 
Department of Defense Appropriation Act for 1954, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., 
1953, p. 121.
^lArmy Times (Reserve Edition). Sept. 28, 1957, p. 6.
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General Wendell Westover as Executive for Reserve and ROTC Affairs.
His service was between 1947 and 1949, a period of rampant Reserve agi­
tation. In two years, he succeeded in irritating the Pentagon regulars 
to the point of open hostility.
At that time, and for several years thereafter, the Executive 
for Reserve and ROTC Affairs was the highest official concerned solely 
with Reserve matters within the Army establishment. Yet, he had ex­
tremely little authority for finalizing Reserve plans. A set of.assis­
tant and deputy chiefs of staff determined most Reserve policy. Each 
assistant or deputy chief had responsibility, in his particular func­
tional area, for initiating and processing Army plans until a decision 
was forthcoming from the Chief of Staff or the Secretary of the Army. 
Among these, the executive was a relatively minor figure.
As plans for improving the Reserve continued to be lost in the 
shuffle, Westover grew suspicious of the Regular Army’s motives. Grad­
ually, relations between Westover’s office and the top general staff of­
ficers grew cold. Files of the internal papers which flowed between 
the offices reveal that administrative efficiency was undoubtedly im­
paired by the misunderstandings. Westover complained frequently of the 
failure of other Pentagon offices to consult his office on matters per­
taining to the Reserve. Such complaints ordinarily took the form of 
gentle reminders that his own staff ought to be consulted on a specific 
matter or a courteous note claiming that planning on a given topic "im­
pinges on the responsibilities of this office," and therefore ought to
be coordinated.32
32piie 326.6 (I94Ô) Departmental Records Branch, Department of the
Army.
169
On September 30, 1948, General Westover wrote directly to the 
Secretary of the Army asking to be heard on the question of ROTC pay.
He called the secretary's attention to the fact that staff papers pre­
pared by other Pentagon agencies had "omitted mention of certain non­
concurrences and their justifications recorded by this division,"̂ 3 
Later in a memorandum, to the higher-ups, he said:
While coordination has been improved somewhat, it is yet far 
from being acceptable and it is believed that this is perhaps 
due to volume of work constantly flowing through the subordin­
ate branches vriio, in their hurry to finish a paper on scheduled 
time, either forget to secure our coordination or are unaware 
that their problem impinges on the responsibilities of this
office.34
It appears that General Westover made no effort to appease his 
superiors. Letters written by him, on file in the Departmental Records 
Branch, Alexandria, Virginia, reveal his antagonistic attitude and 
biting comments concerning Pentagon staff matters. One typical example 
is his comments on a proposed letter to all reservists "in order for all 
Reserve officers to have a better understanding of the ORC program."
The letter was a public relations move, with the intention of spreading 
the blame for current criticism of the Reserve over a wider area, in­
cluding the Congress. The letter said:
During the past year and a half, there has been considerable 
criticism of the progress of the ORC program. The criticism, 
generally speaking, has not been constructive in nature; in many 
cases it has been highly inaccurate as to facts and in some
^^Memorandum from Brig. Gen. Wendell Westover to the Secretary of 
the Army, 30 Sept., 1948, File 326.6 (1948) Departmental Records Branch, 
Department of the Army.
34Fiie 326.6 (1948) Departmental Records Branch, Department of the
Army.
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instances has reached the stage of constituting a disservice to 
the country by undermining the confidence of the people in the 
Department of the Army and certainly affecting the teamwork which 
should exist between the Regular Establishment and the Reserve 
components. It is time the situation be fully clarified. The 
following information is therefore offered. . . .
On May 25, 1948, this draft letter was submitted to Westover for com­
ments. He needled his superiors, in his reply, by asking them to 
straighten out the difficulties rather than talk about them. He said 
the "inaccuracies of fact referred to in the letter can be blamed only 
upon lack of dissemination of the facts." He said the letter would not 
"engender the desired understanding and cooperation" and struck out bit­
terly against Pentagon acquiescence in National Guard demands concerning 
the formulation of the troop basis. He denied the truth of the "im­
plication" in the letter that adequate funds had been requested by the 
Department of the Army for the Reserve. He pointed out several areas 
where the Army could show its good faith on Reserve matters if it cared 
to do so.35
The President’s Executive Order 10007, in effect, called a halt 
to the lack of cooperation among the Pentagon agencies. The order called 
for a report on the progress of the Reserves on January 1, 1949. It 
caused the Office of the Director of Organization and Training, pre­
viously resistant on Reserve matters, to become more cooperative. A 
member of the office’s staff told an aide to Westover that;
This may prove embarrassing, and General Bull (the Director) 
is much worried about it. The Office of the Secretary of De-
^^Letter from Brig. Gen. Wendell Westover to the Director of Or­
ganization and Training, Department of the Army, 21 May 1948, File 326.6 
(1948), Departmental Records Branch, Department of the Army.
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fense is bound to call for a report around December 15, 1948, 
which is only five weeks away, and it is necessary that pro­
gress be reported.3°
Despite the lessening of tension, General Westover had left the 
Pentagon before the end of 1949, two years short of finishing his four- 
year term,
Westover’s troubles pointed out the overpowering influence of 
organization and administrative procedures on Reserve policy in the late 
1940’s. The high staff divisions, immediate to the chief of staff, in­
sisted on keeping control over Reserve activities. Actually they had 
little insight into, and were slow to initiate policy for, the Reserve 
components. With the ’’operational” aspects of staff action in the hands 
of the assistant and deputy chiefs, Westover’s office could do little 
more than make suggestions, which it frequently did.
Memoranda were constantly going upward from the executive’s of­
fice, such as the one of April 30, 1947:
It has been called to the attention of this division that 
there is no uniform system of maintaining records of the activi­
ties of members of the Organized Reserve Corps while on inactive 
status. Some records are being maintained, but the type and ex­
tent appears to be entirely up to the individual instructor . . . 
it is recommended that the Adjutant General be directed to de­
velop a suitable form of record to be maintained in the field, 
on each Reservist.
Even if the executive had the authority or the initiative to do more than 
make suggestions, it would have been impossible because of the lack of 
information available in his office. A monopoly on information existed
3%emorandum for the Record, by Lt. Col. G. R. Tyler, Assistant 
Executive Officer, Office, Executive for Reserve and ROTC Affairs, 5 Nov. 
1948, File 326.6 (1949) Departmental Records Branch, Department of the 
Army.
172
within the general staff sections, which were the great coordinators of 
the four functional areas of Army activity: personnel, intelligence, 
plans, and logistics. The executive’s office, on a special staff level, 
was without the massive amounts of data necessary to perform adequately. 
As time passed during the Westover incumbency, his office refrained from 
making comments on certain staff papers because of the lack of informa­
tion,3?
Typical, also, of the Reserve troubles of the Westover era was 
the preparation of the Reserve budget. The office of the executive had 
insufficient information with which to prepare the budget, and it was 
not required to do so by the regulations. The general staff divisions 
had both the information and the responsibility. Yet, the Reserve as­
pects of the Army budget continued to be mishandled, and on occasions, 
the representatives of the general staff divisions blamed the executive’s 
office for "poorly supported" b u d g e t s , 38
There appeared to the Reserve lobbyists to be one absolute method 
of ending the bickering among the staff sections. There should be a 
general staff officer responsible solely for Reserve activities. Such
37por instance, see Memorandum from Colonel George R, Butler,
Deputy Executive for Reserve and ROTC Affairs, to the General Staff Com­
mittees on National Guard and Army Reserve Policy, 10 Jan, 1949, File 
326,6 (1949) Departmental Records Branch, Department of the Army,
3&In discussions on the 1950 budget among high level Army leaders, 
Dec, 22, 1948, there was an unfriendly flurry between representatives of 
the Logistics Division and the executive’s office as to which office had 
responsibility for the Reserve budget, Lt, Col, Hawkins of the Control 
Office of the Logistics Division claimed his division had "little con­
cern" for the Reserve and that, furthermore, this part of the budget was 
the "least satisfactory" in all the Army, Col, George R, Butler, Deputy 
to Westover, in a sharp rejoinder, claimed the general staff sections 
were responsible for the inadequacies. File 326,16 (1948) Departmental 
Records Branch, Department of the Army,
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a staff officer, under the authority of the chief of staff, would have 
power to finalize Reserve policies. He would perhaps be a lieutenant 
general, probably from the Regular Army, capable of maintaining the 
status of the Reserve in discussions with the older, embedded staff 
sections. It was assumed such an officer would become emotionally in­
volved with the progress of the Reserve Forces.
The drive toward the appointment of a high staff officer to con­
trol Reserve matters, grew out of roots in the Reserve Officers Associa­
tion. It sprang from the agitation of 1947 and 1948» Before General 
Westover left office, he said, in an official memorandum to the General 
Staff Committees on National Guard and Army Reserve Policy, that any 
such officer "should be afforded authority to direct and control, in the 
name of the chief of staff, the operational functions of the general and 
special staff" which relate to Reserve matters.^7 x t the same time, he 
condemned a suggestion that the Reserve and ROTC sections of his own of­
fice be separated into two different Pentagon agencies.
In 1948 the Reserve Officers Association procured from President 
Truman the famous Executive Order 10007 which suggested the appointment 
of a high ranking staff officer to direct the Reserves.As a result 
Major General Charles W. Ryder was made a special assistant to the chief
^^Memorandum to the Director of Organization and Training, November 
23, 1947, File 326.6 (1947) Departmental Records Branch, Department of 
the Army.
^̂ At least, the executive director of the Reserve Officers Associa­
tion claimed the association was the "instigators" of the executive order. 
U. S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Aimed Services, 
Hearings, Reserve Components. 82d Cong., 1st Sess., p. 12.
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of staff. In a memorandum of December 21, 1948, Army Chief of Staff 
Omar N. Bradley, dismissed the matter with the following memorandum to 
Ryder:
1. Your assignment as my special assistant for civilian com­
ponent affairs has been made necessary by the President's 
Executive Order No, 10007 and the President's accompanying 
letter to the Secretary of Defense, dated 15 October.
2. Your assignment gives you direct access to me at all times.
It will not, however, alter present channels for doing business 
either in the Headquarters, Department of the Army, or in the 
Army.
3. It is my desire that you become an expert in civilian com­
ponent affairs by:
a. familiarizing yourself with present and planned 
army policies . . .
4. By your superior knowledge of civilian component affairs,
I expect you to be able to offer advice to all concerned with a 
view towards:
a. implementing and expediting current plans.
b. assisting in, and following through on, the development 
of future plans.
5. Whenever you feel that problems affecting the civilian com­
ponents are not being solved properly, I want you to report to
me.41
Although the office of the special assistant lacked authority 
and could not be held responsible for any failures in the Reserve, it 
was an important step toward representation for the Reserve Forces on 
the general staff.
Also, early in 1949, a Civilian Components Coordinating Committee 
began to operate within the Department of the Army, under the monitor- 
ship of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Plans and Operations. There 
was representation on the committee from all the general staff sections
4lMemorandum from General Omar N. Bradley, Army Chief of Staff, to 
Major General Charles W. Ryder, 21 Dec. 1948, File 326.6 (23 Nov. 1947), 
Departmental Records Branch, Department of the Army.
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as well as from the Office of the Special Assistant, Comptroller, Na­
tional Guard Bureau, Executive for Reserve and ROTC Affairs, Chief of 
Information and the headquarters of Amy Field Forces. It was an im­
portant element in keeping harmony within the Amy staff. After the 
committee had functioned over two years. Major General Lawrence C.
Jaynes, who was Ryder’s replacement as the special assistant and formerly 
commanding general of the New York-New Jersey Military District, said:
This committee meets weekly and has proven very effective with 
respect to a common understanding and able teamwork. The commit­
tee puts out margr fires, but its main activity is in anticipating 
and preventing fires. 2̂
The appointment of the special assistant or the coordinating 
committee made no difference in the over-all handling of Reserve matters 
in the Pentagon. Reserve matters continued to be processed by the same 
general staff sections in much the same fashion as earlier.
Furthermore, the Amy staff resisted any change in the system.
The Regular Army sought to prevent any further increase in the prestige 
and status of the Reserves. To allow any autonomy would permit encroach­
ment upon their own prestige. Regulars argued, instead, that integration 
of Reserve and Regular Army administration was essential to effective 
management. They said that an autonomous Reserve would lay the way open 
for a lack of coordination.
The regulars relied heavily in their argument on the 1948 report 
of the Gray board which said:
All organizational, administrative, training and supply 
functions of the Reserve Forces should be handled by the staff
^^Reserve Officer. 2? (Jan., 1951), 10.
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sections which handle the same functions in the regular ser­
vices and no special organizational structure should be set 
up.
The resistance continued even after the passage of a provision 
in the Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1952 which said:
The Secretary concerned shall designate a general or flag 
officer for each Armed Force under his jurisdiction to be di­
rectly responsible for Reserve affairs to the Chief of Staff 
of the Army, Chief of Naval Operations. . . . ^
This provision, however, made sure that the Army did not abolish 
the position of the Special Assistant to the Chief of Staff for Civilian 
Components, although that officer continued with practically no staff 
or responsibilities.
The Reserve Officers Association, meanwhile, continued to press 
for more rank for Reserve leaders. Writing in the organization’s jour­
nal, Colonel C. M. Boyer, executive director, demanded the appointment 
of an assistant secretary of the Army and a deputy chief of staff to 
handle Reserve matters as their major function. He said:
At the present time, the Reserve program flows through the 
staffs of the various services. We realize that each of these 
staffs is confronted with problems of such global and immediate 
importance that consideration of Reserve problems must be re­
lated to a subordinate status.
To end the confusion he wanted a deputy chief to take control of 
all operational and administrative functions previously handled by the 
various general staff sections. His requests were not arbitrary. He
S, Department of Defense, Committee on Civilian Components, 
Reserve Forces for National Security (Washington: Government Printing 
Office, 1948), p. 20.
44u. S. Code. Title 10, sec. 264 (1956).
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recognized that many of the aspects of policy-making, common to both the 
active and Reserve Army, should be retained under the jurisdiction of 
the various general staff sections, Boyer also asked that the field 
armies be reorganized to have a deputy commander in charge of each of 
the Reserve components. In the same issue of the Reserve Officer Maga­
zine. Colonel John W, Mayo, a national executive committeeman of the 
organization, charged that the Pentagon’s various assistant and deputy 
chiefs of staff had "stifled” the implementation of ideas put forth by 
the Executive for Reserve and ROTC Affairs,
In 1956, Senator Margaret Chase Smith introduced a Senate bill 
providing for the rank of lieutenant general for the Special Assistant 
to the Chief of Staff for the Reserve components. It never reached the 
floor, however,
The drive for a Reserve chief, comparable to the deputy chiefs 
for administration, operations, and logistics was never publicly opposed 
by Army leaders. Public relations-wise, it would have been a most un­
popular move to oppose increased prestige for the Reserves, The Regular 
Army approach was one of passive resistance. Yet, there was never a 
chance that the Reserve chief would be promoted to lieutenant general or 
given a higher status so long as the Regular Army general staff officers 
continued with the lesser rank of major general and held the title of 
assistant chief of staff,
^̂ Col, C, Mo Boyer, "It’s Time for a Change," Reserve Officer. 29 
(June, 1953), 10,
463, 3336, 84th Cong,, 2d Sess,, 1956,
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An up-grading of the general staff officers, beginning in the 
late 1940*s, paved the way for proportionate advancement for the Reserve 
chief. During the war, there were four assistant chiefs of staff, all 
major generals, operating under the chief of staff. By 1951 the duties 
of these officers had been handed over to a new set of deputy chiefs of 
staff with the rank of lieutenant general. From 1951 to 1954, the Army 
staff was overloaded with a set of deputy chiefs, all lieutenant gener­
als, and also a full set of assistant chiefs, all except one of whom 
were major generals. In 1954 an ad hoc committee of the Army staff made 
recommendations which eventually ended most of the duplication. The out­
come was the delineation of five major functional areas, each headed by 
a deputy chief with the rank of lieutenant general.
The status-conscious Regular Army staff then acquiesced in a 
similar up-grading of the Reserve chief. The switch of the regulars 
from assistant to deputy chiefs made acceptable the creation of an As­
sistant Chief of Staff for Reserve Components in 1956. The promotion of 
the general staff officers to lieutenant generals assured the continued 
leadership over the proposed Assistant Chief of Staff for Reserve Com­
ponents with the rank of major general.
Thus, the Army produced the gift sc long requested by the Re­
serve Officers Association, but the gift involved far less freedom from 
Regular Amy domination than the association desired. The same Regular 
Amy supervision still existed at the next higher echelon.
The new office, however, gave some new powers to the Reserve 
hierarchy. For the first time, the Reserve chief could forward plans
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and policies which pertained exclusively to Reserve matters directly to 
the vice chief of staff, without referral to the various deputy chiefs. 
Any policy vrtiich, in any way, touched on active army interests, contin­
ued to be coordinated with the appropriate deputy chief.
The leading figure in the decision to raise the status of the 
Reserve chief was General Williston B. Palmer, at that time the vice 
chief of staff. Earlier, in 1954, he had served on the ad hoc committee 
which reorganized the Army staff and later he was deputy commander of 
all American troops in Europe. Approximately a year after the decision 
was made. General Palmer recalled the purposes and benefits which he 
had anticipated from the decision:
There were two staff divisions, ’’Reserve and ROTC Affairs” 
and the National Guard Bureau, each of which administered a sep­
arate element of the annual Army Appropriation. It had become 
progressively more evident that, if we were ever going to relate 
our reserve components to JOS (Joint Chiefs of Staff) approved 
programs for all forces, both active and reserve, necessary for 
the Army to make a single picture of its reserve component 
availabilities and capabilities; it could not be done effectively 
with two separate reserve programs, which historically were more 
closely related to the aspirations of the respective reserve com­
ponents than to the strategic necessities of the United States.
The creation of an Assistant Chief of Staff for Reserve Com­
ponents amounted to removing the Special Assistant (for Civilian 
Components) from his ivory tower and giving him the necessary 
staff to take on a real, comprehensive, and continuing job of 
supervising a unified Reserve Components Program. The necessary 
staff was provided, without any over-all increase in spaces, by 
collecting from other general staff divisions the people they 
were using to keep track of the two Reserve Components sepa­
rately; these people who had been scattered here and there, were 
now gathered into a coherent group working under an officer who 
had been given specific responsibilities.47
Although, in 1957, when General Palmer was writing, his optimism
47ietter from General Williston B. Palmer, Oct. 25, 1957, to the 
author.
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for administrative efficiency within the Reserve framework had not come 
true, there was evidence that the new assistant chief's office would 
eventually become an efficient coordinator of the two Reserve components.
The office can never, however, get an equal voice with active 
army staff sections so long as it continues on an assistant chief level 
and active army matters are handled on a deputy chief level. The active 
army will continue to veto all Reserve proposals which are not in com­
plete accord with Regular Army interests. The veto will occur deep in 
one of the deputy chief's staff sections, and there is little chance 
that the light of public attention will ever reach it. Therefore, the 
Reserve Officers Association will likely continue to have the same goal—  
to get Reserve matters on a sufficiently high level within the Pentagon 
that such matters will receive equal attention with active army interests.
Most regulars who are well informed on Pentagon politics hedge 
on the question of giving Reserve matters to a special deputy chief of 
staff. For instance. General Palmer commented thusly:
What is "a Deputy Chief of Staff level”? For that matter, 
what is ”a level" of any sort? On the General Staff organization 
chart, the Assistant Chief of Staff for Reserve Components is 
actually shown in a box that is placed above the Deputies, but 
it was merely a matter of convenience in spacing a chart on a 
sheet of paper. Is the rank of the titular chief the criterion—  
lieutenant general or major general? Or is immediacy of access 
to the Chief of Staff the criterion? Or is it the variety, per­
sonal authority, and global extent of the responsibilities as­
signed? . . .  No one mentioned the "Deputy Chief of Staff level" 
because that expression is gobbledegook which actually conveys 
no definable meaning.
This is decidedly not the view of the Reserve Officers Association.
%bid.
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Whether there is a formal, intentional Regular Araiy pressure 
group pulling the strings to assure continued domination of the Reserve 
cannot be answered by a study of the Reserve question alone. The entire 
Regular Army framework, as an institution, must be given much more study. 
So far it has received no sustained attention, except in the case of the 
Aimy*s effort to prevent the establishment of an independent Air Force.
The job facing American political scientists and sociologists, 
so far as the Regular Army institution is concerned, is not easy. Regu­
lar armies the world over associate their interests with national secur­
ity and national honor. Just which of their pleas is truly in behalf 
of the national interest is extremely difficult to determine, especially 
by the non-military political scientist or sociologist. Such questions 
have been traditionally left to the legislator.
^%he effort occurred throughout the 1920’s and again in the late 
1940’s. No adequate study exists on the episode of the late 1940’s. A 
combination of books makes information adequately available on the sit­
uation in the 1920’s. These include: Harry Howe Ransom, "The Air Corps 
Act of 1926— A Study of the Legislative Process" (unpublished Ph.D. dis­
sertation, Department of Political Science, Princeton University, 1954). 
Ransom presents most clearly the techniques used by the Army to scuttle 
encroachments on its vested interests. He says the military establish­
ments are "peculiarly prone to resistance to change," and he calls Con­
gress, in this instance, a "broker" with final powers of arbitration 
whenever it cares to use them. In General William Mitchell’s Winged 
Defense (New York: B. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1925), which is one of the best 
primary sources, the author says that the Army and Navy saw in air power 
"the curtailment of their ancient prerogatives, privileges and authority" 
(p. viii). He said "changes in military systems come about only through 
the pressure of public opinion or disaster in war" (p. xviii). Mitchell 
allots to Congress the special duty to keep the military alert. Other 
sources include: Roger Burlingame, General Billy Mitchell (New York: 
McGraw-Hill Co., 1952)j Ruth Mitchell, ^  Brother~Bill (New York: Har- 
court. Brace and Co., 1953) and R. Earl McClendon, The Question of Auto­
nomy for the United States Air Arm. 1907-1945 (Maxwell Air Force Base, 
Alabama: The Air University, 1950).
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On practically all public questions, including the Reserve 
question, the viewpoint of the regulars has not been clearly set forth, 
and the consensus is not known in any definite way. If it were avail­
able, its diversity would probably be surprising to those who see the 
Army as an isolated, indoctrinated group. It is true that the hierar­
chical structure of the Army establishment usually produces a highly 
conformist pattern of thought on the part of most of its members, but 
random observation of opinion will not verify this to be true on the 
Reserve question.
Opinion differs for a variety of reasons. The biggest divergence 
probably stems from the thousands of officers integrated into the Regular 
Army after World War II. Many were active duty reservists for several 
years before moving over to a career status, and a few continue to es­
pouse their previous anti-Regular Army prejudices.
In addition, because of a lack of information throughout the 
services, the regulars have not been articulate. They have had little 
experience with Reserve affairs. Until the 1950’s, and to a small ex­
tent thereafter, regulars avoided service with the civilian components.
As an advisor or instructor with the Army Reserve or National Guard, there 
was little chance to show one’s military prowess, and the opportunities 
for mistakes were plentiful. Consequently, a strong preference existed 
for other assignments, and the officers tended to remain uninformed on 
Reserve matters.
Since there are no public opinion polls on Regular Army opinion, 
and there is no formal Regular Army lobby organization available for
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study, it is necessary to look to the actions and statements of Regular 
Army leaders for indications of interest group activity. Whether the 
actions of high-ranking officers are valid indications of over-all opin­
ion is unknown; it must be recognized to be, at best, an assumption.
There is a chance that further sociological study will reveal numerous 
cliques and interests within the Regular Army— so that the actions of 
top Army leaders do not portray the interests of the entire Regular 
Army. Perhaps it is true, as thousands of wartime soldiers insisted, 
that a powerful *’WPPA,’* a West Point Protective Association, exists as 
a pressure group within a pressure group. Usually, however, the West 
Point interest is considered identical to, or at least the dominant 
force in, the ranks of the Regular Army.
At least the leaders of the Regular Army have opposed the build­
ing of a large Reserve Force. As officers, they see the accumulation 
of Reserve troops under the leadership of Reserve officers, as a chal­
lenge to their role in both peace and war. They consider the Reserve 
Forces, and particularly the National Guard, as amateurs unworthy of the 
people’s trust, even as foot-soldiers. The requirements of atomic war­
fare, the regulars feel, makes dependence on the Reserves even more risky.
However, for at least two reasons, the propensities of the Regu­
lar Army to deny the Reserves an important role and high status should 
not be considered resolute. First, the Regular Army has a much bigger 
status problem on its hands in the well known inter-service rivalries 
stemming from the 1947 unification. The Reserve question is compara­
tively trivial; it might be lost by default.
In addition, as time passes, the regulars themselves might see
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more clearly the interest they have in a large citizen Army. The Re­
serve function provides many jobs for regulars. Frequently, these jobs 
are high-ranking— a thing which almost every soldier seeks. After serv­
ing with the Reserves, a regular officer has a vested interest in his 
knowledge of the Reserves, and he is likely to protect his interest.
It is already well known that the regulars do not show the same 
ill will toward the Army Reserve as they do toward the National Guard.
If there must be a Reserve organization, the Regular Army prefers a 
national force, over which it will have control, rather than a state 
force.
Thus revealed is the quandary with viiich the Regular Army strug­
gles. As the number of regulars assigned to Reserve duty increases, 
there is a chance the Regular Army will embrace the Reserves as its own 
offspring and no longer treat them as foster children thrust upon it by 
the Congress and the other pressure groups.
CHAPTER VI 
THE RESERVE OFFICERS ASSOCIATION
The Reserve Officers Association represents, in 1957, approxi­
mately 65,000 officers of the Army Reserve and the Reserve branches of 
the other services. It was organized in 1922 by the merger of a small 
group of Reserve officers of Washington, D. C., with a similar group in 
New York City. The groups, led by Brigadier General Henry A. Reilly and 
Brigadier General John Ross Delafield, had the tacit support of General 
of the Army John J. Pershing.^ The first operations of the organization 
were conducted from Reilly’s office, but later in 1922, a small office 
was opened at 1653 Pennsylvania Avenue, Northwest, in Washington near 
Blair House. The first national convention of the association was in 
1923 in Detroit. Delafield was elected the first national president.
At the end of Delafield’s term, with membership at about 14,000, Briga­
dier General Roy Hoffman, a well known citizen soldier of Oklahoma, was 
elected president.
Through the years until the beginning of World War II, the as­
sociation worked for bigger military appropriations, an expanded ROTC 
program, and a more substantial Citizens’ Military Training Corps.
^Reserve Officer. 27 (Feb., 1950), 12.
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In 1940 the Reserve Officers Association had 35,000 members out 
of about 120,000 Americans who held Reserve commissions throughout the 
nation. There were 729 chapters.
In January, 1942, following the Pearl Harbor attack, organiza­
tional activities ceased for the duration of the war. The membership 
lists were frozen, and the organization’s assets were turned over to a 
board of trustees who were to serve as caretakers until the active mem­
bers returned from war.
In May, 1945> the organization came to life again. The wartime 
board of trustees relinquished control to a new executive director. 
Brigadier General E. A. "Art" Evans, who was until that time on active 
duty in the Pentagon. Two years later, the membership of the associa­
tion reached 14-0,000.
After the Air Force was separated from the Army in 1947, the 
association revised its constitution so as to recognize the new indepen­
dent status of the air am. An Air Force section was created within the 
organization. The new constitution was adopted at the national conven­
tion in Denver, June 16-19, 1948. Two years later, June 30, 1950, Con­
gress granted the association a charter based on the new constitution.^ 
The constitution provides for the election of a president, a 
vice president for each of the three services, a national executive com­
mitteeman for each of the three services, three junior vice presidents, 
a judge advocate, a chaplain, a surgeon, and a historian. These officers 
are chosen at the annual convention for one year terms. So that none of
2p. L. 595, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., 1950.
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the services can dominate the organization, the presidency is rotated 
among the Army, Navy, and Air Force. Thus, an Army president is fol­
lowed by a Navy man who is followed by an Air Force man.
The charter, as provided by Congress, requires a financial audit 
to be submitted to the Congress by January 15th of each year.
There are six committees of the association which handle policy 
matters in the interim period between conventions. These are the com­
mittees on the Reserve program, budget and finance, legislation, publi­
cations, constitution and by-laws, and public relations.
So far as actual managerial authority is concerned, the presi­
dent is not powerful; however, he carries considerable national influence. 
When Captain Robert Granville Burke left the presidency in July, 1953, 
he said that during his term of office, he traveled in excess of 98,000 
miles on Reserve Officer Association business. Over one-third of this 
travel had been furnished by the armed forces without cost. He spoke in 
seven foreign countries and eighteen states.3
The real governing authority of the association is vested in the 
fourteen-man national executive committee, composed of all the top offi­
cers of the association. This committee has the authority to appoint 
the paid professional employees of the Washington office, including the 
executive director, who is the association's chief lobbyist. The commit­
tee holds periodic meetings in which policy is made for the guidance of 
the full-time employees. In addition, the committee appoints the na­
tional treasurer and the national public relations officer, who are not
^Reserve Officer. 29 (Aug., 1953)> 18.
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paid employees.
The fundamental policies of the association are, as in most 
other organizations, made in a series of chapter, state, and national 
conventions. In the 19$0*s the organization had well over one thousand 
chapters, all of which could submit resolutions to their respective 
state conventions, which in turn could submit them to the national con­
vention. The resolutions passed by the national conventions each year 
are binding upon all chapters.
In the national conventions of 1949, 1950, and 1951, there were 
a total of 162 resolutions passed. Several were duplicates of resolu­
tions passed in earlier years and when these are eliminated, the re­
mainder adds up to 91 in all. In that particular period, the associa­
tion sought cash allowances for uniforms, earmarking of Reserve funds, 
appointment of an assistant secretary for Reserve affairs in each of the 
services, the ending of the requirement of sixty per cent attendance of 
enlisted men at drill sessions before officers could be paid, the appoint­
ment of a deputy chief of staff for Reserve matters, a new promotion 
law, the merger of the Reserve Officers Association with the Air Reserve 
Association, and many others.̂
The main purpose of the Reserve Officers Association has been, of 
course, to influence in its own behalf the law and administrative regu­
lations which govern the Reserve Forces of the various services. The 
objectives, as announced by the association, are usually stated more 
delicately— to aid in the development and execution of a strong defense
^Reserve Officer. 27 (Dec., 1951), 4»
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policy with special interest in the Army Reserve. The organization has, 
generally, sought to build the Amy Reserve in size and status. As offi­
cers, the members have a sincere, but one-sided view of what constitutes 
strengthening of the Reserve. The association has no enlisted members, 
and consequently there has been no great effort toward such things as 
higher pay scales for enlisted men.
When the association was being incorporated by Congress in 1950, 
the exact wording of its objectives was a matter of debate. According 
to the proposals of the association, it would "assist in" the development 
of military policy. The incorporation bill was referred to the Senate 
judiciary committee which in turn requested comments from the Department 
of the Army. Gordon Gray, at that time Secretary of the Army, strongly 
objected to the words "assist in." In a letter from Gray to Chairman 
Pat McCarran of the Senate judiciary committee, it was recommended that 
the words be replaced by "promote" in order to "make it abundantly clear 
that the organization has no right to assist in the development and ex­
ecution of Reserve policy."5
Since World War II, the Reserve Officers Association has main­
tained its national headquarters in an old stone mansion just beyond Rock 
Creek Park outside of the Washington business district at 2517 Connecti­
cut Avenue, Northwest. From this point, the national officers and the 
national executive director stay in touch with Reserve affairs, contact 
administrative officials, testify before congressional committees and,
^Letter from Gordon Gray, Secretary of the Army to Senator Pat 
McCarran, Feb. 1, 1950, Departmental Records Branch, Department of the 
Army,
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in general, superintend the interests of the Reserve officers of the 
nation.
It was at first planned to have in the national headquarters 
three assistant directors, one each for the Army, Wavy, and Air Force, 
in addition to an officer manager, legislative assistant, editorial and 
public relations chief, and a field service assistant. These plans did 
not mature on schedule, and for the first six or seven years after World 
War II, the three assistant directors had also to fulfill the other 
functions.^ By 1957, the association has a paid professional staff con­
sisting of the executive director, deputy executive director, the three 
assistant directors for Amy, Navy, and Air Force business, a supervisor 
of membership campaigns, two legislative consultants, an administrative 
assistant to the executive director, an editor of the association’s 
magazine, and several clerical and field liaison personnel.
The executive directors of the association have been registered 
with Congress as lobbyists and, at the time, reported that their salary 
to be $1,250 per month. The longest tenure of any of the executive di­
rectors since World War II was that of Brigadier General E. A. Evans, 
who served for seven years. He left in 1952 to become the $25,000 per 
year city manager of Miami, Florida. He was replaced by his assistant, 
Charles M. Boyer, a colonel formerly assigned to the Reserve branch of 
the Army G3 office. Although he was a skillful Washington representa­
tive, his tour was not completely successful so far as harmony within
LE# A. Evans, "Report of the Executive Director," Reserve Officer, 
28 (Aug., 1952), 6.
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the national headquarters was concerned. He was reprimanded in the re­
port of the national president at the 1953 national convention. Presi­
dent (Gapt.) Robert Granville Burke of the Navy Reserve told the assem­
bled delegates that he wanted the
. . . chain of command between the national president and the 
executive director to be reaffirmed by this convention as the 
same as written into the constitution. There is one and only 
one top official in the organization and that should be the 
person elected national president. Unfortunately— and this has 
not to do with personalities; this is a fault as I see it in our 
set-up— we have two heads going, in many instances, their sep­
arate ways. There is a chain of command prescribed in our con­
stitution, that fixing of responsibility should be followed and 
understood by all.?
The national president commented at the same time about a current 
effort to render the executive director less responsible to the national 
association's officers by permitting the removal of the executive di­
rector only with the approval of the national convention. The national 
council of the association, composed of representatives of the state de­
partments as well as national officers, in a meeting in February, 1953, 
had passed a resolution to this effect, abrogating that provision of the 
constitution which allowed the national committee to remove and appoint 
the executive director.
The dissension had grown out of the threatened secession of a 
group of old line Naval officers who desired to maintain the autonomy of 
the Naval Reserve officers within the Reserve Officers Association.® 
Boyer, an ardent Army man, was brusque and impatient during the episode.
^Reserve Officer, 29 (Aug., 1953)» 5*
Interview with Colonel Clarence E. Barnes, former president. 
Reserve Officers Association, Nov. 20, 1957.
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as were the Naval officers. Eventually they resolved the disagreements 
among themselves, but continued to be antagonistic to Boyer*s strong 
hand.
Boyer was replaced by Brigadier General Harold R. Duffie, who 
also left the directorship under a cloud on June 30, 1957» Although 
Duffle's resignation was for "pressing personal reasons," a high-ranking 
member of the Army section of the association told newspaper reporters 
that a thorough cleanout of the top members of the staff was in order 
because it was felt that paid employees had been taking "too personal 
interest" in the campaign of individuals for the national presidency of 
the association. He also said there was friction among the Washington 
staff. Duffie served only one year as the executive director.
After the 1957 convention, at Santa Barbara, California, the 
executive committee appointed Colonel John T. Carlton to be the new ex­
ecutive director. Carlton was a former Washington, D. C., newsman, ad­
ministrative assistant to Senators George Smathers, of Florida, and 
Walter F. George, of Georgia, and investigator for the Senate foreign 
relations committee.
The association was fortunate in having three skilled lobbyists 
on its staff after World War II. The most prominent was Major General 
Melvin Maas, who before and during World War II served in Congress from 
Minnesota for a total of sixteen years. He served two years in the Uni­
ted States Marine Corps in the Pacific area during World War II, and in 
1946 was an advisor to the naval affairs committees. The politically 
wise Maas was a popular figure after the war in military Reserve circles.
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and was a particularly adept spokesman for the association. He was on 
the staff as a legislative consultant.
From June, 1954, till June, 1955, the association had as its 
national president the famous presidential candidate of the states’ 
rights party. Senator Strom Thurmond, of South Carolina. At the same 
time, the association had on its paid staff Colonel Justice M. Chambers 
as assistant executive director. Chambers was a World War II Congres­
sional Medal of Honor winner and former staff advisor to the Senate 
armed services committee. Because of this experience he was very valu­
able to the association.
The major area of action for the Reserve Officers Association 
is, of course, in Congress. The professional staff stays in constant 
contact with the armed services committees and has developed considerable 
influence within these committees,^ Largely because of this influence, 
there has been a steady increase in the amount of Reserve interests that 
have been written into law. At the organization’s insistence. Congress 
has given statutory status to many administrative details.
On the question of the proper amount of administrative details 
to be written into law, the association has been in direct controversy 
with the Army. In 1951 Brigadier General E. A. Evans said:
If we were to state what we believe to be the principal dif­
ferences between the thinking of the ROA and the Pentagon in 
connection with H. R. 4860, it would be that we wished to see a 
maximum written into law; while the Pentagon apparently wishes 
to have a minimum, therefore leaving a large portion of our prob­
lems to be settled administratively. We have gone through many 
hectic years since World War II on such a basis, and we feel very
Îbid.
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strongly that the solution to the Reserve problems is in having 
a maximum covered by law, 40
Perhaps the association's greatest victory, so far as the denial 
of administrative discretion is concerned, was the Reserve Officers Per­
sonnel Act of 1954* Starting early in the 1950*s, the association urged 
Congress to write a promotion schedule into law. Reserve officers were 
extremely dissatisfied with the administrative regulations governing 
promotions, which were unstable and discriminated between regulars and 
reservists. Members of the Reserve recognized no reason why reservists 
should not be promoted alongside regulars who had the same time in grade. 
The first major success came in the House version of the Armed 
Forces Reserve bill of 1951* At the insistence of association lobbyists, 
the House armed services committee added a provision to the bill re­
quiring the Secretary of Defense to submit new promotion legislation by 
February 1, 1952. This requirement was discarded from the final draft 
of the act which passed in 1952. A substitute provision required the 
various services to promulgate equitable promotion regulations. The 
Army did this in sufficiently good form that later its regulations were 
largely written into the statutes. Mostly because the Air Force con­
tinued to administratively discriminate against reservists, the House 
began hearings on a new bill in 1953*
Throughout the struggle, it was a vigorous battle between the 
Pentagon and the Reserve Officers Association. The importance of the 
promotion law to reservists was stated by Executive Director Charles M,
^%* 8. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Armed 
Services, Hearings, Reserve Components. 82d Cong,, 1st Sess,, 1951, p. 
442,
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"Count" Boyer before the Senate armed services committee in 1954î "In 
no other area of Reserve affairs has there been more dissatisfaction 
with existing policies and procedures than in this delicate area of 
promotions. . . " H  It was very important to the Department of the 
Army, too, that the Reserve Officers Association be prevented from 
foisting upon the service a law which discriminated against regulars.
As previously described, the bill did not go into effect until 
three years after its introduction. The House passed the bill in 1953» 
and the Senate passed it in 1954 to be effective on July 1, 1955» Be­
fore it could go into effect on schedule, the defense department asked 
for several amendments. The law finally went into effect in an amended 
form on schedule— with much Reserve Association jubilation.
The association's efforts to control the organization and pro­
cedures within the Army Reserve hierarchy has been felt in two specific 
areas. The first effort, made by Brigadier General E. A. Evans while he 
was executive director of the association, was toward the decentraliza­
tion of operational activities. In 1951» he told a House committee in­
vestigating the Reserve program;
Much of the trouble which has arisen in connection with the 
Reserve program of all the services has been the attempt on the 
part of large staffs located in the Pentagon to operate and admin­
ister directly the Reserve programs. . . .  We feel that the large 
Pentagon staffs should be for the purpose of creating policy and 
over-all plans and that the operation of Reserve programs can most 
effectively be performed if you take their operating staffs away 
from Washington and put them out where they can think and act.1%
S. Congress, Senate, Armed Services Committee, Hearings, Re­
serve Officer Personnel Act of 1954, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., 1954, p. 28.
I2u. S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Ser­
vices, Hearings, Reserve Components. 82d Cong., 1st Sess., 1951» p. 21.
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Evans lauded the decentralized operations of the Naval Air Re­
serve training program, which is administered outside the Pentagon. He 
said;
The Anry today could effectively create such a system by 
giving to General Mark Clark, the commanding general of the 
Army Field Forces, full responsibility for the administration, 
organization, control, training and all other things that might 
be necessary in order to create an effective Army Reserve. But 
there shouldn’t be any strings on his mission. He should be given 
complete responsibility. If this were done, you would find a 
marked change in the Army Reserve effectiveness.^^
Soon afterward, the Army adopted this idea, not only for the Re­
serve Forces but for all Army operations within the continental limits 
of the United States. The move, perhaps, stemmed from Reserve pressure.
The second major effort of the association to control Reserve 
organization and procedures was the drive for higher rank and higher 
status for the Reserve chief in the Pentagon. As described earlier, the 
effort has been mildly successful. As of 1957, the association con­
tinues to work for the promotion of the Reserve chief to deputy chief of 
staff level. Starting with the national convention of 1949, the associ­
ation passed resolutions asking for the appointment of a deputy chief.^
Another important interest of the Reserve Officers Association 
has been the 23 per cent of its membership which were, in July, 1957, on 
active duty in the Armed Forces. This group had the status of a separate 
section within the association. A separate active duty committee, com­
posed of eight members— a chairman, a vice chairman and an alternate vice
^3lbid.. p. 21.
"Reserve Officer. 33 (Jan., 1957), 15.
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chairman from each of the three services, and a secretary— looked after 
the interests of the members in extended active service. Actually, this 
was only a coordinating group. Three subcommittees performed the basic 
function of maintaining surveillance over the three services. The full 
committee reviewed the actions of the subcommittees and sent recommenda­
tions to the executive director for action.
Until about 1955» the interests of active duty personnel held a 
secondary position in the association's program. In 1957, the active 
duty committee estimated that only ten per cent of the Reserve officers 
on active duty were members of the association.A recruiting effort 
was begun to enlist these officers. With the improved facilities for 
handling active duty interests, as exemplified by the formation of the 
committee, it appears that the organization will gain influence in the 
active duty area. At some later date, it might even compete favorably 
in power with Regular Army interests, which are without a formal organi­
zation but which nevertheless now rule over aH.active duty matters.
A major victory was won for the active duty members in the pass­
age of the Reserve Officer Personnel Act. Previously, Reserve officers 
going on active duty carried with them into service no credit for their 
Reserve service toward promotion. The association fought hard for a new 
provision giving equal seniority for Reserve and active duty service.
This point, one of great contention between the regulars and reservists, 
was settled by the arbitration of the armed services committees. When 
the law was finally enacted, it carried a compromise whereby reserve time
^^Reserve Officer, 33 (Aug., 1957), 7.
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would be credited toward promotion, providing the reservist had been 
sufficiently active in Reserve work— if he had attended drill sessions 
or finished correspondence courses. Considering the vehemence with 
which the Regular Army fought this provision, the compromise was a major 
success for the Reserve Officers Association,
The older officers constitute an element within the association 
which has contributed greatly to the size and power of the organization. 
Since World War II, there have been many officers in this category.
Vast numbers were promoted to be majors and lieutenant colonels and many 
became colonels. Being in this position of high rank, they desired even 
more than other Reserve officers, to receive additional promotions, to 
win credit toward retirement, and to get high and influential assign­
ments within the Reserve combat units.
Army planners have been worried by the demands of these older 
officers, partially because they know of the unfortunate condition of 
the Reserve when war broke out in 1940. At that time there were thou­
sands of officers on the Reserve rolls who were too old for combat. Many 
were not suitable for desk jobs. Efforts to clean out the deteriorated 
ranks released a torrent of dissatisfaction.
To prevent the Army Reserve from falling into a similar predica­
ment after World War II, the Pentagon sought strict enforcement of age- 
in-grade limitations. For all types of units, the age ceiling was set 
at 55 years for lieutenant colonels, and 58 years for colonels. These 
rules kept older officers out of pay status in combat units and even pre­
vented their enrollment in Army Reserve schools.
All such regulations were promulgated with sincere intentions to
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keep the Reserve vigorous and ready for combat. Each new restriction, 
nevertheless, brought forth additional clamor which was especially re­
sented by the Pentagon. Army planners believed such pressures were in 
obvious violation of the best interests of the nation. Lieutenant Gen­
eral Robert 0. Richardson, Jr., has given his view of the matter:
The training of officers of the civilian components is one of 
the most delicate and difficult problems that confront the Army 
because both the Reserves and the National Guard are political, 
as well as military organizations, especially the National Guard.
When the Army tries conscientiously to eliminate those who are 
inefficient, it is subjected to all sorts of pressures to prevent 
action which is known to be in the interests of the nation, and 
it is often unjustly accused of prejudice.^
Because of such views as this, the older officers have been unable to
win much ground in their battle.
The Reserve Officers Association has cooperated with a variety 
of other interest groups in the building of a large Reserve. These in­
clude the United States Chamber of Commerce which has generally favored 
increasing the size of the Reserve, probably in order to avoid the taxa­
tion necessary to maintain a large standing army. Other organizations 
favorably disposed toward the Reserve include the American Legion, Mili­
tary Order of World Wars, American Veterans of World War II, Disabled 
American Veterans, Jewish War Veterans, Marine Reserve Officers Associa­
tion, Veterans of Foreign Wars, American Veterans Auxiliary and the Na­
tional Security Committee.
During consideration of the Reserve Forces Act of 1955, these 
patriotic organizations joined together to urge passage of the bill.
^̂ Lt. Gen. Robert C. Richardson, Jr. (Ret.), "No Safety in Numbers," 
Atlantic, 181 (June, 1948), 30.
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They organized themselves into a loose confederation called the National 
Security Committee and wrote to President Eisenhower that they would 
"vigorously direct efforts" to secure passage of the bill, which they 
did.̂ ^
The American Legion has been particularly cooperative with the 
Reserve Officers Association. During consideration of the 1952 Reserve 
bill, Granville S. Ridley, chairman of the Legion’s National Security 
Training Committee, told the Senate armed services committee that: "The
American Legion has never set itself up as being top expert in the Re­
serve problems. We have sought to leave that detail to the National
16Guard and Organized Reserve." He asked for favorable consideration 
of the bill on behalf of the American Legion’s national convention which, 
at Miami, Florida, had approved the bill. Ridley said, "We are dissatis­
fied with the manner in which Reserve activities have been conducted in 
the past." He asked that more Reserve matters be "spelled out in the 
law, leaving a minimum to administrative control." The words are surely 
the same as the Reserve Officer Association might utter.
The association has constantly sought for itself a more secure 
foothold on Reserve policy-making. It has looked longingly at the Na­
tional Guard Association’s penetration of the National Guard Bureau and 
yearned for a similar bureau of its own in the Department of the Army.
The association has looked particularly for methods whereby it
^^Interview with Bryce Harlow, Administrative Assistant to the 
President, Sept. 18, 1957.
S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Armed Forces 
Reserve Act of 1952, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 1952, p. 3»
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can dominate the General Staff Committee on Army Reserve Policy. This 
committee was originally established as an after-thought to the General 
Staff Committee on National Guard policy which, according to congres­
sional intentions at the time of its creation, gave to the National 
Guard a spokesman in the higher reaches of the Army staff. The Reserve 
Officers Association has never quite been able to duplicate the Guard̂  s 
success. It has never been able to dominate the Reserve counterpart of 
the National Guard coimittee.
In fact, the Army Reserve policy committee is, on occasion, 
dubbed a rubber stamp for the Army staff. Although this is not alto­
gether true, so long as the Department of the Army keeps its current 
control over committee appointments, the committee is likely to remain 
outside of Reserve Officers Association control. The members of the 
National Guard committee must be nominated, according to law, by the 
governors, and by custom they must also receive a recommendation from 
the chief of the National Guard Bureau. Because the governors and the 
National Guard Bureau are easily within its influence, the National 
Guard Association is able to exercise great control over the National 
Guard committee. The Reserve Officers Association has no such legal re­
quirement or custom.
The association has attempted to gain control of the committee 
through legislation requiring committee members to be nominated by the 
association and to be confirmed by the United States Senate. A resolu­
tion to this effect was passed at the association’s national convention
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in 1950, and in 1951 the organization's journal̂ ? announced partial suc­
cess in that the Department of the Army was beginning to consult the 
association before appointments were made among the Reserve members of 
the committee. The resolution, however, has received no serious con- 
sidération by either the Department of the Army or Congress,
Although the Reserve Officers Association has not developed its 
political powers to the same extent as the National Guard, it is never­
theless powerful. Its representatives before Congress have been skilled 
in the lobbying arts. So often it is recalled among reservists that, 
at parties given by Brigadier General Evans, practically all the members 
of Congress who were influential in military affairs could be found. 
Other executive directors, although without General Evans* long lobbying 
experience, were also well known among congressmen.
According to Colonel Clarence E. Barnes, former president of 
the association,21 the organization's lobbyists have not been extremists 
for the Reserve cause. They have acknowledged the need for a balanced 
military program, including National Guard as well as Regular troops.
In fact, on occasion the unified Reserve Officers Association, in order 
to function as an organization of Army, Navy and Air Force men, have 
been forced to show more perspective than the three semi-separate active 
military services which constantly tend to be provincial. If this were
19lTCR Henry G. Doyle, "The Bulletin Board," Reserve Officer. 2? 
(Dec., 1951), 4.
20Interview with T. Edward Braswell, Staff, Senate Appropriations 
Committee, Sept. I6, 1957*
24lnterview, Nov. 20, 1957»
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not true, the association would have disintegrated from dissension many 
years ago.
This sober and sincere interest in the national security has 
brought the Reserve lobby respect and prestige among congressmen.
Colonel Barnes says. It explains, to some extent, the effectiveness 
of the lobby although there is little grass roots political power with­
in the organization.
It must, of course, be understood that the problem of national 
security is broad, and there remains plenty of room for the association 
to recommend only improvements from which its members will benefit. It 
is indeed noticeable that the association has not, with any vigor, 
pointed out the lack of combat readiness on the part of its members.
It has not demanded the ouster of Reserve officers from a pay status 
who, because of their critical civilian employment, would not be able 
to go off to war. It has not encouraged the enforcement of strict age- 
in-grade requirements or fostered frequent physical examinations of its 
members who might be called to active duty.
Also, it must be noted that the association has not unanimously 
indulged in generosity and compromise. General Westover, a long term 
association enthusiast and office holder, had disagreements with Pentagon 
brass which bordered, at times, on feuds. Colonel William H. Neblett, 
national president in 1947-48, became widely known for his anti-Regular 
Army views, vdiich contributed to the refusal of the regulars to cooperate. 
Colonel H. N. Willoughby, former president of the Indiana department, 
mustered considerable antagonism among national guardsmen for his plan
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to merge the Army Reserve and National Guard into a single federal force, 
Nevertheless, these incidents have not been frequent, and the Reserve 
Officers Association is usually considered one of the more responsible 
and stable lobby organizations in Washington.
The association has prevailed in its controversies which have 
reached congressional attention. Except for the refusal of Congress to 
force the Department of Defense to create a deputy chief of staff to 
handle Reserve affairs, the association has not lost a single major is­
sue before Congress. In this one exception. Congress feared to demand 
any specific administrative arrangement and compromised by telling the 
Army secretary to "designate a general . . . officer to be directly re­
sponsible for Reserve affairs to the Chief of Staff.
Obviously,. this settlement does not suggest any impotence on the 
part of the association. The legal provision that was adopted was as 
close to the association’s demands as Congress could give without hope­
lessly hamstringing administrative flexibility.
The reasons for the association’s success, as previously con­
sidered, did not grow from any tight political network such as that 
possessed by the National Guard Association. The Reserve Association 
has to depend largely on the good sense of its arguments and the favor­
able disposition of the Congress for the Reserve as opposed to an expen­
sive active army.
The Reserve Officers Association has shown its impotence, how­
ever, in the administrative area. It has budged the administrators of
22U. S. Code, Title 10, sec. 264.
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the over-all Army a little— but very little. The cause of this failure 
lies in the fact that the administrators, generally respected by con­
gressmen as subject-matter experts, have substantial power to delay 
congressional action. Usually the administrators have the power to de­
lay, sometimes indefinitely, any or all legislation as complicated as 
that involving Reserve matters. This has been true, even in the post- 
1952 period with its Democratic Congress and Republican president.
There are several examples of delay sponsored by the bureaucracy. The 
arrival of the 1952 Reserve bill in the congressional hopper occurred 
only after pleas from the association caused Representative Vinson to 
send a deadline to Assistant Secretary Rosenberg, The armory bill was 
in the administrative mill from 1947 until 1949 and was not implemented 
until long after the Korean War because the Army and Defense Departments 
and the Bureau of the Budget could not or did not establish final build­
ing specifications. Construction finally began after the association 
persuaded Congress to harass the administration. Similarly, the promo­
tion law was prepared by congressional ultimatum, stemming almost en­
tirely from the association.
Thus, the Reserve Officers Association has prospered but only 
so far as it has been able to drive the problems out into the congres­
sional arena.
CHAPTER VII 
THE NATIONAL GUARD ASSOCIATION
’’Civilian in peace, soldier in war. For three centuries 
I have heen the custodian of security and honor. I am the 
Guard.”
With this slogan, together with ’’There will always be a Guard,” the Na­
tional Guard Association has marched in wedge formation to an extremely 
strong position in the making of Reserve policy. The association— an 
unincorporated, non-profit organization— began in 1878. A group of 
Civil War officers, who according to Guard claims were from both the 
North and the South, met at Richmond, Virginia.They had one goal, to 
put strength into that constitutional clause calling for joint partici­
pation between the state and nation in the maintenance of a militia.
They wanted the national government to supply money and instructors suf­
ficient to revitalize the state militias.^ They hoped to end the long 
history of uncertainty within the militia system.
Out of the Richmond meeting, grew an ’’Association of Officers.” 
They met again in New York City, in 1879, and again the same year in 
St. Louis, Missouri, where the organization evolved into the National
^Army Times (Reserve Edition), Sept. 21, 1957, p. 17.
^Samuel P. Huntington, ’’Civilian Control and the Constitution,” 
American Political Science Review. 50 (Sept., 1956), 684.
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Guard Association. The association grew slowly, but today it is un­
doubtedly the most powerful pressure group within the Reserve area.
In October, 1944, the association began a post-war awakening.
It opened its first permanent headquarters— two rooms and a bath— in a 
former apartment hotel, the Stoneleigh Court Building, in Washington,
D. C. Assets were extremely meager,3 but from that point on, the growth 
of the association was rapid.
In 1948, only 42 per cent of Guard officers belonged to the 
association.^ The leaders of the lobby insisted that the various state 
adjutant generals require every National Guard officer to become a mem­
ber of the association. As the Guard units were being reorganized from 
the shambles of World War II demobilization, almost all applicants for 
Guard commissions were "offered the opportunity" to fill out a member­
ship application blank prior to the time they appeared before the offi­
cial examining board. This coercion was sufficient to build a National 
Guard Association which, by 1953, included 99 per cent of all Guard of­
ficers.
Since October, 1947, the association has been publishing its 
monthly National Guardsman, which is the official voice of the associa­
tion. As of 1957, it has a circulation of about 85,000 copies.
The president and other officers are elected at an annual con­
ference of the association in which each state is entitled to one vote
^Interview with Maj. Gen. Ellard A. Walsh, Sept. 21, 1957.
^Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State (Cambridge; 
Harvard University Press, 1957), p. 174»
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for the adjutant general or commanding general and one additional vote 
for every five hundred men comprising its Army and Air National Guard, 
From 1943 to 1957, the association became almost another name for Major 
General Ellard A. Walsh, who served as its national president through­
out this period, in addition to another term between 1928 and 1929. 
During this fifteen years* service to the organization, he moulded the 
association largely to his own liking. In 1957, Walsh decided to re­
linquish the top post, and at the organization’s 79th general conference 
in Louisville, Kentucky, Major General William H. Harrison, Jr., Massa­
chusetts adjutant general, was selected as his successor.
The first president of the association was General George W. 
Wingate of New York. At other times the presidency has been occupied 
by a long list of politically potent National Guard officers including 
Major General Charles Dick, of Ohio, Mayor General Edward Martin, of 
Pennsylvania, and Colonel Bennett C. Clark, of Missouri— all members of 
the Congress.
The association has held a convention in some prominent American 
city every year since 1896, and perhaps even earlier. Records have been 
lost on all except six conventions between 1879 and 1896.
By 1955, the association had fulfilled plans made at the 1946 
convention in Buffalo, New York, to have an eighteen-man staff. Nine 
persons were assigned to headquarters duties and nine others managed the 
association’s monthly journal.
The top officers of the association, the president, vice presi­
dent, secretary, treasurer and chaplain are elected by the annual con­
vention. An executive committee is also chosen by the convention to
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make interim decisions. Ordinarily, two three-day sessions of the ex­
ecutive committee are held each year. The committee is composed of all 
elected officers and two other officers from each field army area and 
field air force area, each with three-year terms.
In addition, the convention has a number of specialized commit­
tees which function throughout the year, including committees on legis­
lation, finance, membership, publications, public relations, air affairs, 
constitution and by-laws, and others. The executive committee creates, 
as it sees fit, several special committees to meet specific problems.
Alongside the National Guard Association there exists the Adjut­
ant Generals* Association, composed of all the adjutant generals of the 
various state Guard units. The men who make up the Adjutant Generals* 
Association, generally speaking, control both organizations. The same 
interests, as a comparison of the rosters of officers will show, are at 
the helm in both organizations.
The National Guard Association has reached a status, in 1957, of 
great power. It occupies an ambiguous position on the borderline between 
a private association and a public agency.5 Actually it is nothing more 
than another Washington lobby, but it considers itself the official 
spokesman for a government organization, namely the National Guard of the 
United States, The Guard officials of the various states, seeing the 
association*s handiwork, are glad to view it in the same light, and 
Congress has frequently accorded the association a semi-official status. 
For instance, in 1951, the House armed services committee took action to
5lbid.. p. 174.
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permit the association to sit in on secret testimony by defense offi­
cials. It would have done so, except for the complaints of the Depart­
ment of Defense.6
Although the National Guard Association has usually had fewer 
members and less money than the Reserve Officers Association, it has 
constantly won more of the rewards for good lobbying. Its successes, 
which will be obvious later in this essay, have been tremendous. The 
victories won by the Guard Association have come almost entirely from 
its influence with the Congress.
By virtue of the dual status clause in the Constitution. Con­
gress has control of the training and discipline of National Guard 
troops, and because Congress furnishes almost all the money required by 
the Guard, it can coerce the Guard in almost any other area. At any time, 
the Congress could federalize the Guard under the same powers through 
which it controls the Regular Army. It is therefore completely logical 
for the National Guard Association to show its greatest attention to 
congressmen. This has been done, and Congress has rewarded them well. 
"Congress," in the words of President Walsh, "has ever been our refuge
7and our strength."'
A number of guardsmen and congressmen have commented upon their 
close relationship. Major General James F. Cantwell, chief of staff of 
the New York National Guard has said:
Û. S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Armed 
Services, Hearings, Reserve Components. 81st Cong., 1st Sess., 1951, p. 
679.
"̂ Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1949), p. 175.
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Because the National Guard Association represents the fifty- 
one states and territories and is able through its membership to 
bring considerable pressure to bear on Congress, it has consis­
tently enjoyed a high respect from Congress. The leadership of 
the Association has been of such caliber, too, that the Associa­
tion has been able to influence Congress. The strength ties 
both in the state representation and in the fact that thg poten­
tial vote represented by the $00,000 and their families.
A few congressmen, fully as cacdid, have spoken about the situa­
tion in critical tones. Representative Charles A. Plumley, Republican 
of Vermont, has said;
The gentleman [General WalshJ is correct in that he ^n his 
political action] contacts the Governor; the Governor contacts 
the adjutant general, and the adjutant general contacts every 
member of the National Guard. Then they write you and me and 
the pressure is brought to bear that should not be brought to
bear.9
Representative Sterling Cole, Republican of New York, was even more 
caustic. During testimony by General Walsh on the Armed Forces Reserve 
Act of 1952, he said;
I have, during those five years, acquired the impression—  
and I don’t speak personally critical of you two gentlemen at 
all, but the fact is you two gentlemen have been the ones that 
have appeared during those five years. I have acquired the im­
pression, which is the National Guard Association and the Adjut­
ant Generals Association are somewhat difficult to satisfy. I 
will put it mildly, and I wonder what the reason for it is. Is 
it because of this hybrid nature of the Guard, of being both fed­
eral and state, and neither federal nor state; is that true; is 
it because of the fine spirit that has been developed through the 
existence of the National Guard over a long period of our national 
history; is it because of the zeal of its representatives who have 
appeared before us for the last five years, or is there any ex­
planation for it?
General Walsh; Yes, sir.
Representative Cole; But at any rate, I do have the impres­
sion, that the Guard Association is pretty cantankerous.
General Walsh: I think it is quite the reverse. If you will
^Letter from Maj. Gen. James F. Cantwell, July 23, 1957.
%. S. Congressional Record. 81st Cong., 2d Sess., 1950, p. 6740.
212
go back to my testimony, I said the National Guard is pretty 
well satisfied with existing laws and policy. Well, if we are 
satisfied with existing laws and policy, then wherein do you 
find us difficult to satisfy.
Representative Cole: Well, only that whenever a personal
problem comes up it never meets satisfaction of the National 
Guard Association initially. Eventually, it usually does, but 
that is only because the ©ommittee and the Congress acquiesces 
in the criticisms that are advanced by the Association.^^
The statements by these two congressmen portray, in an elemen­
tary way, the functions and character of the National Guard Association, 
The association has two themes, states* rights and the minute-man tra­
dition, which tend to stir many Americans, although both are widely con­
sidered these days as historical shibboleths. The success of the two 
themes show the sentimental feeling for the Guard which exists through­
out America. Any tampering with the Guard brings a quick reaction.
High placed guardsmen do not always leave political maneuvering 
to the National Guard Association. In military circles. Guard officers 
have an undeniable reputation as "politicians." This can be verified 
by listening to various division commanders of the Guard talk about run­
ning for governor. However, more reliable proof of the Guard*s reputa­
tion comes from a study in 1942 idiich surveyed the opinions of privates 
in National Guard and Regular Army divisions.^ In the Guard divisions,
52 per cent of the privates who were national guardsmen said that promo­
tions were made through "bootlicking or politics," as compared to 26 per 
cent who said promotions were won through ability. The percentages were
S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Armed 
Services, Reserve Components. 82d Cong., 1st Sess., 1950, p. 496.
^^Samuel A. Stouffer et al.. The American Soldier : Adjustment during 
Army Life (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1949), p. 269.
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almost exactly reversed in the replies of Regular Army privates in two 
Regular Army divisions.
Further verification comes from Hanson Baldwin of the New York 
Times, vdio pointed to four general officers currently commanding Guard 
divisions in the northeastern United States in 1947 as political ap­
pointees. He stated his alarm that they all lacked combat experience.
In 1957, two prominent Pennsylvania politicians, a former lieutenant 
governor and the incumbent United States senator, held National Guard 
commissions as major generals. None of these appointments are illegal. 
Under an opinion of the United States Attorney General, the political 
activities of guardsmen are exempt from laws limiting the political 
activity of national employees or state employees whose salaries come 
from national funds.
As previously described. Guard political activities bear fruit 
in the big Guard appropriations. Frequently Congress appropriates more 
for the National Guard than is requested by the administrative officials. 
In 1948, the Republican 80th Congress raised such appropriations almost 
one hundred million dollars, although the administration was controlled 
by the Democrats.
As with other pressure groups, the association has not been con­
tent with control over legislation. It seeks also to control the day 
to day regulations coming from the administrative hierarchy. With the
^%ew York Times. March 30, 1947, p. 33*
^̂ u. S. Department of Justice, Opinions of the Attorney General, 
vol. 40, no. 19 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1940).
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help of Congress, it has made great inroads toward the domination of 
the administrative machinery. Its greatest conquest, so far, has been 
its domination of the National Guard Bureau of the Department of the 
Army,
The association has achieved legislation requiring the chief of 
the bureau to have ten years’ Guard experience and have a recommehdation 
from his governor,This requirement effectively limits the leadership 
of the bureau to members of the lobby itself. Aside from the fact that 
the association’s national headquarters by skillful use of publicity 
holds a virtual veto over any unfavorable appointment, this legal limita­
tion tends to expand the veto power to the state adjutants general. It 
is unlikely that any governor would sign such a recommendation without 
the approval of his military staff office, the adjutant general.
From the standpoint of long-term benefits derived, the capture 
of the War Department’s administrative structure for making Guard policy 
has been the association’s most glorious conquest. The fact that the 
Army’s chain of command has been adversely affected has not seemed to 
worry the Guard leaders. In 1944, General Walsh said;
There can be no question either but throughout the years 
many of our difficulties with the War Department are due to the 
shibboleth of the "chain of command." Entirely too much stress 
has been placed on the fact that the Chief, National Guard Bur­
eau is in the chain of command with the result that in our 
opinion he has been hampered in dealing openly and frankly with 
the States.15
^U, S, Code. Title 10, sec, 3015 (1956).
^^National Guard Association, Official Proceedings of the 66th 
Annual Convention (Baltimore, Md., 1944), p. 64.
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The first organization for handling National Guard policy was 
established in 1908 in the form of the National Militia Board. It was 
composed of five active militia officers appointed by the Secretary of 
War and convened only upon summons by that officer. Evidently the sys­
tem was not satisfactory to the association. A resolution was passed 
at the 1909 convention of the association in Los Angeles asking for a 
change,which came in 1916. A militia bureau under a Regular Army 
officer replaced the militia board. The President was also authorized 
under the same Act to assign to duty in the bureau one colonel and one 
lieutenant colonel of the National Guard.
The militia bureau, in harmony with Regular Army interests, was 
far from satisfactory to the National Guard Association, and efforts 
for amendment were successful in 1920. In that year, the National De­
fense Act required that the chief of the bureau be a National Guard of­
ficer and prescribed the system of appointment. This had been the asso­
ciation's goal, and it has been the most far-reaching change accomplished 
thus far toward enhancing the association's grip on Guard policy. Gen­
eral Walsh has said, concerning the action, the following:
The establishment of the Militia Bureau of the War Depart­
ment . . . with a National Guard Officer as Chief thereof as 
provided in Section 81 . . . was the culmination of years of 
effort on the part of the National Guard to establish its own 
bureau with a National Guard Officer as its Chief. Its efforts 
to establish such a bureau naturally met with considérable oppo­
sition and the then Regular Army Officer in charge of the Mili­
tia Division of the War Department was to characterize the efforts 
of the National Guard in this connection as "pernicious med- ling."17
l^Ibid., p. 60. 
l?Ibid., p. 61.
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The system of appointing bureau chiefs came under brief recon­
sideration in the House armed services committee in 1951. Representa­
tive L. Gary Clemente, Democrat of New York, showed some concern that 
gubernatorial nomination of the chief might put some inexperienced man 
into the chief»s position. Walsh said the fear was groundless and went 
on to describe in detail the system:
. . . before the vacancy occurs the Secretary of the Army 
advises the Governors of the States of the prospective vacancy 
and requests them to submit nominations in conformity with the 
provisions contained in existing law. Each Governor may submit 
as many names of qualified people as he desires, or may not sub­
mit any name. When the lists come back to the Department of the 
Army, the procedure has been to convene a board of six general 
officers who screen that list and submit recommendations . . .  
usually three to the Secretary of the Army. From there, they go 
to the Secretary of the Army and then they go to the President 
vdio makes the final selection. Then he sends the nomination to 
the Senate and if confirmed, of course, the chief is duly ap­
pointed and sworn in.l®
The fact that the Congress has specifically provided by law for 
this special staff officer, the bureau chief, is itself unique. But it 
has gone further. In other areas, the law has left Army officials re­
latively free to reorganize the various Army staff sections as desired. 
Such freedom is limited in the case of the National Guard Bureau. The 
chief may be removed only for cause, and he may succeed himself although 
other members of the Arngr staff may stay at Army headquarters for no 
longer than four years except by "a special finding that the extension 
is necessary in the public interests"^9 by the Secretary of the Army.
S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Armed 
Services, Hearings, Reserve Components. 82d Cong., 1st Sess., 1951, p. 
1035.
19u, S. Co^, Title 10, sec. 3031 (1956).
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In 1957, the National Guard Association sought to write into 
law a detailed plan for the organization of the bureau. The purpose 
was to make the bureau less vulnerable to professional army control.
Such a measure has long been a goal of the guard association. Speaking 
of such legislation in 1951, General Walsh said:
. . . there was a bad situation over there . . . with the 
advent of General Flemming as the chief, there has, as I say, 
been a vast improvement. . . .  But the whole trouble over there 
will never be resolved until Congress defines the duties and 
the functions of the National Guard Bureau and the Chief thereof 
by law. For the past 28 years they have been defined by regu­
lation, and regulations, of course, are subject to change and to 
whim and caprice.
The 1951 bill^l was introduced by Representative Overton Brooks. 
It would have made the bureau the only channel of communications with 
the states on National Guard matters, prescribed the various branches 
in each of the two divisions of the bureau, made the chief responsible 
for the "administration and promulgation of policies pertaining to the 
National Guard," as well as for the preparation of budget estimates and 
for new National Guard legislation. It would have allowed the chief to 
report to the Secretary of the Army directly through the Army chief of 
staff, without consultation with deputy or assistant chiefs.
The association has also fought to retain, for the state adjut­
ants general, the authority to decide the types and functions of the 
Guard units. The founding fathers did not make it altogether clear, but 
they probably intended the national government to be able to pattern and
S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Ser­
vices, Hearings, Reserve Components. 82d Cong., 1st Sess., 1951, p. 100.
R. 6297, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., 1957.
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mold the various state militias together into a well constructed whole,
according to the best military doctrine of the times. It is doubtful
if they would have approved of current legislation:
No unit of the Army National Guard of the United States or 
the Air National Guard of the United States may be relocated or 
redrawn under this chapter until the Governor or the State or 
territory, or Puerto Rico, or the Commanding General of the 
National Guard of the District of Columbia, as the case may be,
has been consulted. 2̂
Consultation with the governor, of course, gives the association time 
to muster its forces to prevent change.
Another limitation that has been attached to the Army’s control 
over the Guard is the requirement that Guard appropriations be appor­
tioned among the states "in direct ratio to the respective actual
strengths in enlisted members of the active National Guard."̂ 3
The domination of the National Guard Bureau by the association 
was a major success, but there was still no law which required the Army 
to make use of the bureau in policy-making for the National Guard. There 
was no legal provision which would prevent the Army from relying upon 
some other staff agency for Guard policy. This vulnerability motivated 
the National Guard Association to attempt to write into the National De­
fense Act of 1916 requirements that such policy be made by special com­
mittees of Regular Army and National Guard personnel. The I916 attempt 
failed, but success came in the National Defense Act of 1920. That act 
said:
22u. S. Code. Title 10, sec. 2238 (1956).
23u. S. Code. Title 32, sec. 10? (1956).
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All policy and regulations affecting . . . the National Guard 
. , , shall be prepared by committees of the appropriate branches 
or divisions of the War Department General Staff to which shall 
be added an equal number of officers from the National Guard of 
the United States, whose names are borne on lists of officers 
suitable for such duties submitted by the governors of their re­
spective States, Territories and for the District of Columbia by 
the Commanding General of the District of Columbia National
Guard.24
The provision went on to require at least five National Guard officers 
to be on duty with the Army staff at all times. It was mandatory that 
the chief of staff send all policies and regulations prepared by the 
committee to the Secretary of the Army, and to advise him thereon.
It is this organization, currently in operation in 1957, as the 
General Staff Committee on National Guard Policy, which has helped to 
keep Guard policy within the grasp of the National Guard Association.
There is still no method whereby the association can force the committee*s 
program into Army regulations, but at least the committee has a direct 
channel to the Secretary of the Army. In addition, the committee enables 
the association to secure all the information available to the Army staff 
on Guard affairs.
Initially, the committee functioned as the association desired, 
and it appears that both the Army and the National Guard profited from 
its deliberations. Gradually, however, from about 1929 the National 
Guard Association sensed a change. It complained that their representa­
tives no longer functioned as true members of a joint Guard-Regular Army 
committee. Although the Guard representatives were assigned to specific 
sections of the general staff as contemplated by law, the Guard Associa-
2441 Stat. 764.
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tion continued to complain:
In being so assigned there was a tendency to segregate them 
and seldom was there the intercourse between the members which 
permitted a free exchange of views as had been the custom and 
which was contemplated by law. More and more matters pertaining 
to the civilian components and particularly the National Guard 
were ticketed as "secret" and instead of dealing openly and freely 
with the National Guard Bureau and the National Guard, dealings 
tended to become surreptitious— if at all. The practice of 
labeling such matters "secret" where the components are con­
cerned is not only indefensible but a practice which has always 
and is now working to their great disadvantage. ^
The association continued to complain, especially after the pro­
mulgation of a policy which the association claims the National Guard 
committee was not consulted about, limiting the initial assignment of 
guardsmen on the Army staff to six-months» duration. An additional six- 
months» duty could be given upon approval of the general staff section 
chief, who was a Regular Army officer.The National Guard Association 
protested vigorously against the six-months» limit which was obviously 
a discrimination against the Guard since Regular Army staff officers 
held four-year terms. The association felt that:
Such a policy was promulgated for the sole purpose of in­
suring that no National Guard officer would become thoroughly 
familiar with General Staff procedures or with any matter of 
import or have a real voice in determining matters of policy 
affecting the National Guard. 7̂
The War Department blandly replied that it was trying to train as many 
National Guard officers as possible in general staff procedures. Even­
tually, however, the association won its point, and the term of office
Z^National Guard Association, Official Proceedings of the 66th 




was established as three years, with possible one year extensions for 
not to exceed two years. Through the years, also, the association has 
won for its representatives on the general staff the right to contact 
and coordinate freely with the National Guard Bureau. This was a privi­
lege which, according to the association, the Regular Army frequently 
sought to impair.
In addition to its efforts to keep the chief of the bureau with­
in its grasp, the National Guard Association has also sought to maintain 
the support of as many officers within the bureau as possible. When 
the bureau was founded in 1920, it was administered almost entirely by 
Regular Army officers. An act of September 22, 1922, permitted the
assignment of four National Guard officers to the bureau. Then in 1949
28the association secured introduction of a bill in the 81st Congress, 
asking that fifty per cent of the bureau’s officers be guardsmen. Gen­
eral Walsh gave two reasons for his request;
. . .  to overcome the existing shortage of officers of the 
Regular Establishment, and the other to insure that there would 
always be a substantial number of National Guard officers on duty 
in the National Guard Bureau so that the National Guard point of 
view would at all times be evident. 9̂
Defense Secretary Louis Johnson said there was no objection to
a fifty per cent figure, but Department of the Army officials requested
that only forty per cent be permitted.3^ The association was agreeable
2&S. 1197, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., 1949»
9̂u. S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Armed 
Services, Hearings, Amendments to Section 81, National Defense Act. 81st 
Cong., 2d Sess., 1950, p. 5068.
3Qlbid.. p. 5068.
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to a forty per cent figure which would have allowed assignment of some 
44 National Guard officers to the bureau at that time. Their assign­
ment was, of course, not mandatory upon the Army,
Earlier, the law permitted only four Guard officers in the bur­
eau, but various war powers given the President during World War II were 
used as the basis for assignment of several more to the Bureau,
The bill went into law^^ with little discussion. The scanty 
House and Senate hearings were spent largely in discussing whether the 
Air National Guard was included in the language of the bill,^^
As of 1957, there are no specified spaces in the bureau to be 
filled with Guard officers while other positions belong to the Regular 
Army,33 The chief of the bureau says assignments depend more on "pro­
fessional qualifications and job requirements,"3̂
Since the reestablishment of the National Guard after World War 
II, the National Guard Bureau has included an information office within 
its structure. This office is staffed by an Army officer, an Air Force 
officer and six civilians, 3̂ all of whom have had training and experience 
in the field of advertising or public relations. They are assisted by 
a professional advertising agency, selected after valid bids. This part
31p, L, 458, 81st Cong,, 2d Sess,, 1950,
3 2 i b i d ,
33hetter from Maj, Gen, Edgar C, Erickson, Chief, National Guard 
Bureau, Oct, 11, 1957, to the author,
3 4 i b i d ,
33u. S, Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Appropria­
tions, Hearings, Department of Army Appropriations for 1957, 85th Cong,, 
1st Sess,, 1957, p. 1285,
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of the bureau produces publicity of all types— news releases, television 
film clips, radio spot announcements, posters, bill boards, pamphlets, 
and other advertising. It was established for recruiting purposes but 
has the secondary function of issuing propaganda for the National Guard 
in general. This propaganda capability will be of considerable value 
in preserving respect for the minute-man tradition and for states* 
rights, the hard rock foundation upon which the Guard has built its suc­
cess.
Much of the guard association's power is based on the ability to 
produce and disseminate propaganda. The organization has both an effec­
tive propaganda theme, the minute-man tradition and states* rights, and 
the tools of dissemination. Every Pentagon action not in accordance 
with National Guard views is seen as an attempt to end the traditional 
dual status of the National Guard. The tools of dissemination are the 
Guard organizations in each of the states, usually led by the state ad­
jutant general, who is a major general on the staff of the governor. He 
usually has the ear of the governor, and frequently he can exercise 
great political pressure through the office of the governor.
The ability of the state adjutants general to pass information, 
propaganda, and indoctrination down to the troops is important. They 
have, at least as much, and probably more, influence over the votes of 
their subordinates, the guardsmen, than any other top administrators.
In addition, the adjutants general are important elements of the vast 
provincial interests in this country. By personality, they are politi­
cians, and they stay attuned to local interests which, almost by defini­
tion, want the National Guard to be within the control of state govern-
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ments.
Local interests, up to and including the governors, appreciate 
the Guard immensely. Usually state officials, including the governor, 
lack sufficient legal power to perform many of the functions prescribed 
by the state constitutions and expected of state officials by the people. 
In cases of necessity, the state officials can rely upon the National 
Guard. It is only natural that they would appreciate this fact and work 
hard to protect it from national encroachment.
The contention of these state officials who fight so hard for 
the National Guard— that a state force is needed— is usually accepted, 
even by those who normally stress the handicaps of dual status.
But the National Guard Association goes much farther. It uses 
these favorable inclinations in the people to get a great deal more than 
was probably intended by the founding fathers. It wants the national 
government to pay the Guard’s salaries, furnish all equipment including 
that used by the Guard in the fulfillment of its state mission, and pay 
more and more of the cost of armories.
The controversy over the dual status of the National Guard has 
been, more than usual, at boiling point since 1940. Three particular 
incidents are interesting, not only as proof of the guard association’s 
power but also to demonstrate the Guard’s successful use of the dual­
status arguments. These are the quick death administered by the Guard 
Association to the 1948 report of the Committee on Civilian Components, 
the furor of a similar vein in the first years of the Eisenhower admin­
istration, and the six-months’ controversy of 1957.
Because of the elusiveness of ready solutions to the over-all
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Reserve problem in 1947, Secretary of Defense Forrestal appointed Assis­
tant Secretary of the ArnQr Gordon Gray to head a six-man inter-service 
board to make a thorough study of the situation. An assistant secretary 
and a high ranking line officer from each of the services, who constitu­
ted the membership, concluded that the National Guard ought to be merged 
with the Army Reserve to form a single, nationally-controlled Reserve.3̂  
It produced, as might be expected, a tremendous outburst from the Guard. 
Letters besieged the Department of Defense, the President, and Congress. 
In the week after the issuance of the report. Major General Walsh pub­
licly threatened a fight in Congress and said, as he had many times 
earlier, that state control of the Guard "is practically the last bastion 
in the fortress of states’ rights."37 Secretary Forrestal, almost simul­
taneously, pointed out to reporters that the report was not "a pattern 
for legislative action . . .  and does not at this stage, constitute 
military establishment policy."
A letter in the files of the Departmental Records Branch of the 
Army reveals President Truman’s view of the furor. He said, in a note 
to Forrestal:
It is a most interesting document and one that deserves a lot 
of study but, at this time, it is filled with political dynamite, 
and during a presidential campaign can defeat its own purpose. 
Sometime or other I’d like to have a good long session with you 
and the Secretaries of the Army, Air Force and the Navy, I have 
some very strong ideas on Reserve Forces and also have some 
suggestions to make in connection with the report referred to.3°
36committee on Civilian Components, Reserve Forces for National 
Security (Government Printing Office, 194871
37Time Magazine. 52 (Aug. 23, 1948), 19.
3^Letter from President Harry S. Truman to Secretary of Defense 
James Forrestal, Aug. 12, 1948, Departmental Records Branch, Department 
of the Army.
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Soon thereafter, a resolution against the Gray board report was 
passed by the executive committee of the conference of governors meeting 
in Chicago. It said that the report was "un-American, unconstitutional 
and contrary to the basic philosophy of our American form of govern­
ment. "^9 Attacks such as this, together with the other National Guard 
Association agitation, were sufficient to kill the report.
In 1953» Assistant Secretary of Defense John A. Hanna brought a 
similar storm of protest by suggesting that the Guard be used, in the 
case of atomic attack, for civil defense purposes. Pentagon plans, it 
was rumored,wanted the Guard, since it could not be made into a na­
tional force, to take on the functions of a home guard. Nothing enrages 
the Guard's high ranking officers so much as this threat to diminish 
their role in the event of hostilities. They fought back hard. Speaking 
to the state convention of the Massachusetts National Guard Association 
at Boston, General Walsh used words which recalled the history of nearby 
Lexington: "If they want war, let it begin here," he told fifteen hundred
cheering Guard officers. Without explanation, the Department of Defense 
abandoned any further action on the plan.
Another clash of much greater import occurred from January to 
March, 1957. On January 14, the Army ordered, under the authority of the 
Reserve Forces Act of 1955 that all new enlistees in the Army Reserve and 
National Guard be required to take six months' active duty training,
S. Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Hearings, Armed 
Forces Reserve Act of 1952. 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 1952, p. 310.
40Time Magazine. 63 (March 1, 1954), IS.
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after which they would be returned to their homes for weekly participa­
tion in army drill sessions. The requirement grew out of an awareness 
of the fact that, with only raw recruits going into the Reserve units, 
the armory drill training seldom got beyond elementary basic training. 
Not only would six months’ active duty put the training program on a 
more stable basis, but it would also meet legal requirements that all 
soldiers have four months’ training before being sent overseas.
Almost in mass, the National Guard rose up to fight this train­
ing requirement. It was felt the new rule would cause a tremendous re­
duction in Guard enlistments which would eventually diminish the Guard’s 
importance. Early in February, the Brooks Subcommittee of the House 
armed services committee began hearings on the controversy which lasted 
until February 2 1 s t . T h e  chief of the National Guard Bureau said pub­
licly that he opposed the Pentagon plan,^2 and Alabama Governor James
E. Folsom appeared to ask the subcommittee members to support the Guard 
"against the clique of brass and bureaucrats seeking complete control of 
all military forces of our country. "̂ 3 Both Army and National Guard 
Association officials appeared with long technical arguments. The Guard 
Association claimed the six months’ requirement would produce a better 
trained National Guard private than the average Army second lieutenant; 
therefore such a long program was not necessary. They wanted the length
S. House of Representatives, Subcommittee No. 1, Committee on 
Armed Services, Review of the Reserve Program, Committee Publication No. 
22, Feb. 4-21, 1957, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., 1957.
^%ew York Times. Feb. 8, 1947, p. 8.
^^New York Times, Feb. 9, 1947, p. 8.
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of the training reduced and the commencement of such training to be 
postponed. Backed by ten uniformed National Guard generals, Walsh added 
that the new program was another attempt to federalize the Guard.^
A compromise favorable to National Guard interests was arranged 
in late February between the antagonists, with Representative Overton 
Brooks serving as mediator. Later, Brooks told a New York Times re­
porter that he had arranged the compromise by holding "a series of con­
ferences vri-th spokesmen for each side, gently prodding first one and 
then the other to give a little ground.""̂5 When the smoke cleared, the 
Guard had won an eleven weeks’ training period which was to be available 
to enlistees until October 15, 1957, at which time it would increase to 
six months. In addition, the Army promised to maintain the total 
strength of the Guard at a minimum of 400,000 men.
The clamor over the situation motivated Hanson Baldwin to write:
The National Guard has unlimbered its biggest guns in Wash­
ington to retain its preferred position in the nation’s defense 
structure. . . . The Guard, because of its dual state and federal 
status has always occupied a privileged position in the U. S. de­
fense structure. Two masters— the states and Washington— have 
helped the Guard to retain its independence. But this dualism 
has complicated our military problem, hampered combat efficiency 
and interfered with the direct exercise of command. It has also 
subjected the Anry Department to great political pressures, ex­
ercised indirectly through state capitols and directly through 
the National Guard Association . . .  In a military sense the 
arguments for doing this (ending the dual status) are all on the 
Regular Army side.
The dual status of the Guard has also been the basis of consid­
erable antagonism between the Army Reserve and the Guard. Because of
^̂'New York Times, Feb. 9, 1947, P» 8. 
^^New York Times, Feb. 27, 1957, p. 14.
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fear that a strong Reserve would eventually discredit the National 
Guard, the National Guard Association has opposed any advance in the 
Army Reserve program. Just after the war, the association sought to 
prevent the founding of Army Reserve combat divisions. Previously, only 
the National Guard had active divisional organizations in operation, and 
therefore almost all the high rank within the Reserve Forces was to be 
found in Guard units. If the Army Reserve were authorized to organize 
active line units, it would for the first time constitute direct com­
petition for the Guard.
The controversy came to a head in the meetings of the Byrnes 
committee, in 1949, which had the responsibility of planning the postwar 
structure of the two forces. Major General Ellard A. Walsh, a member 
of the committee, fought hard to prevent any recognition of equality 
between the two Reserve components. His pressure came to bear not only 
upon Congress but also upon the Regular Army.
Generally, the Regular Army has felt that, if a Reserve Force 
were mandatory, it would be better to have a wholly national force. For 
years the professional soldiers had winced at the Guardis use of their 
profession as a hobby. They had heard rumors of political commissions 
in the Guard and of the Guardis alleged avoidance of its responsibilities 
by hiding behind the skirts of states* rights. If there had to be a 
civilian component program, the regulars preferred the Army Reserve.
The Regular Army view, however, had little chance of survival when 
the great winds of the National Guard began to blow. To avoid an open 
battle over the troop basis decision. Secretary of the Army Kenneth Royal 
convened the Byrnes board. The subtleties of this particular situation
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will probably never be understood. The chairman was James F. Byrnes, 
a Southern states’ righter who had been elbowed out of his position as 
President Truman’s Secretary of State. The reasons of the Byrnes ap­
pointment remain mysterious. It might have been anticipated that the 
committee’s recommendations would be in favor of the National Guard, 
only to be overruled by Byrnes’ new antagonist. President Truman; this 
is largely vhat happened. The Regular Army staff allowed the Byrnes 
committee report to become ostensible public policy. The Army Reserve 
was to be shunted off on a mission of providing support troops. In act­
uality, the Byrnes report was never fully implemented. In later years, 
the troop basis was revised many times. The Army Reserve won authority 
to organize combat divisions along side the National Guard. The Byrnes 
episode reveals well the struggle for power and status between the Army 
Reserve and the National Guard.
The dual status of the Guard is, thus, the crux of the power of 
the National Guard Association, and in addition the ramifications of the 
dual status permeates the entire Reserve program. It is the key factor 
which must be reckoned with whenever any long range plans for the Re­
serve components are under consideration.
Since the dual status of the Guard is a problem in federalism of 
fundamental importance, it was surprising that the 1955 report of the 
Commission on Intergovernmental Relations did not study— indeed, did not 
mention— this arm of our national defense. Meyer Kestnbaum, the commis­
sion’s chairman, has said;
The dominant interest of the National Government in the field of 
defense is the main reason why the Commission did not make the
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intensive study viiich would have been necessary and only upon 
which a firm recommendation or recommendations could be based.
To a certain extent, this view that the National Guard is already 
or will sooner or later move entirely into the national domain is widely 
held. Already the national government, by controlling purse strings, 
controls many Guard policies; state authority is frequently a ceremonial 
carry-over from older times.
If there should come an end to dual status— either by an outright 
switch to the Army clause of the Constitution or by a gradual infiltra­
tion of national authority— the National Guard Association would lose 
tremendous power. Some observers see this trend already in action. 
William H. Riker says, "Administratively as well, the National Guard is 
today much weaker than it was in 1916 or, for that matter, in 1948."^^ 
Such a conclusion is not easily proved. It is true that the National 
Guard lost in some of its endeavors in the Armed Forces Reserve Act of 
1952, and several administrative rulings have gone against the Guard.
But it is much too sarly to bury the National Guard as a state force, or 
to ignore its lobby, the National Guard Association.
It must be admitted, however, that all logic points to the even­
tual decline of the Guard as a state force. The disadvantages of dual 
status to military efficiency are apparent. The Guard is not even com­
pletely satisfactory as a state police force anymore. Its weapons are 
now too big and destructive to be suitable for handling mobs. The ex-
^^Letter from Meyer Kestnbaum, August 14, 1957, to the author.
^^William H. Riker, The Soldiers of the States (Washington: Public 
Affairs Press, 1957), p. 100.
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pense of the Guard is great even for states, although the national gov­
ernment pays most of the expenses.
In addition, the Guard has evoked the ill will of the Regular 
Army, and to a lesser extent, the Reserve Officers Association. Both 
these interests can be expected to quietly urge the nationalization of 
the Guard. It must be understood, however, that the efforts of these 
two interests to subdue the Guard will be somewhat clandestine. Hereto­
fore, the hostility of the regulars for the National Guard is a matter 
of record, but they must be cautious in proposing nationalization. Such 
proposals inevitably get their civilian superiors into political trouble. 
Likewise, the members of the Reserve Officers Association have consider­
able dislike for the National Guard, but the organization avoids any 
open breaks with the Guard Association. It is felt that the two organi­
zations should, if possible, present a common front. With this objec­
tive, the Reserve Officers Association has passed resolutions opposing 
the Gray board’s recommendations to nationalize the Guard. Such resolu­
tions are not as significant, however, as the profound feeling against 
the Guard which exists among many Army reservists. Whenever there is a 
chance of success, the Reserve Officers Association can be expected to 
favor the nationalization of the Guard. In the meantime, in unofficial 
ways, the association will quietly foster nationalization.
The state officers who fight for continuance of the dual status, 
together with all others who want to preserve the Guard as a state force, 
will probably be unable to maintain the present favorable position of the 
National Guard. Certainly, if the next few years showed the Guard to be 
inadequate for modern warfare, nationalization would undoubtedly come.
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Perhaps, in the long run, the most significant factor in the 
Guardis future, other than dual status and its ability in modern war­
fare, is the possible decline of the Guard in prestige. Lately, the 
National Guard Association’s activities have been seen by the public 
to be obviously in behalf of the National Guard. Efforts to get its 
men draft exempt have hurt the reputation of the National Guard as a 
patriotic organization. Secretary of Defense Charles E, Wilson, in 
1957, called guardsmen ’’draft-dodgers,” which constituted a tremendous 
blow. The Guard’s resistance to a civil defense role has focused some 
public attention on its unwillingness to help in a vital area of national 
defense.
These factors will probably encourage nationalization. At the 
present time, however, the National Guard interests continue in a strong 
position, and there seems to be no immediate nationalization in sight.
CHAPTER VIII 
THE RESERVE FORCES POLICY BOARD
In June, 1948, Secretary of Defense James V. Forrestal created 
an interdepartmental board to write a prescription for the sickly Re­
serve program. The following recommendation of this board, the Gray 
Board, became the basis of the Reserve Forces Policy Board:
For the purpose of considering, recommending, and reporting 
to the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force on Reserve 
Force policy matters provision should be made in each service 
for a policy committee at least half the members of which shall 
be officers of the Reserve Forces. From the membership of these 
three service committees, there should be established a joint 
interservice committee to consider, recommend and report to the 
Secretary of Defense on Reserve Force policy and procedures of 
joint or common interest to the Reserve Forces of all the ser­
vices.^
Under the Naval Reserve Act of 1938 and Section V of the National Defense 
Act of 1920, the departmental committees already existed. About one 
year later, after Secretary Forrestal had left office, the new secretary, 
Louis Johnson, began implementation of the recommendation for a joint 
inter-service committee. He established the Civilian Components Policy 
Board in June, 1949, 'vdiich was later renamed the Reserve Forces Policy 
Board.
Û. S. Department of Defense, Committee on Civilian Components, 
Reserve Forces for National Security (Washington: Government Printing 
Office, 1948), p. 22.
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At the time, the new Department of Defense was establishing its 
program of uniformity and coordination over the three subordinate ser­
vices. The Civilian Components Policy Board was given the objective of 
bringing uniformity to the Reserve components of all the services. In 
his semi-annual report of December 31» 1949» the Secretary of Defense 
said:
The Board will initiate and coordinate plans which, when 
approved, will be made operative by the Secretaries of the 
three departments. It will see that all policies, plans and 
programs of the civilian components as promulgated by the 
Secretary of Defense will concur with strategic plans, roles, 
and missions agreed upon by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and 
that all plans represent a joint enterprise of the civilian 
components and the regular military establishment, working 
together in a composite policy group.
On matters of major policy the board was directed to make recom­
mendations to the Secretary of Defense, and on other policy matters it 
was empowered to exercise full delegated authority within its field. A 
charter embodying this authority was approved June 14, 1949, and amended 
August 19, 1949, to include the additional authority granted to the Sec­
retary of Defense by the amendments to the National Security Act in 1949. 
On all matters which are determined by the chairman to involve major 
policy, the board had only authority to make recommendations to the sec­
retary.^
The board's membership included a civilian chairman, the assistant
%. S. Department of Defense, Semi-Annual Report of the Secretary 
o f Defense, July 1. 1949 to December 31. 1949 (Washington; Gcyernment 
Printing Office, 1950), p. 36.
^William T. Faricy, "The Civilian Components Policy Board," Re- 
serve Officer. 27 (Dec., 1949), 4.
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secretary vAio had responsibility for Reserve affairs in each of the 
military departments, one active officer from each of the departments, 
as well as two Reserve officers each from the Army Reserve, Naval Re­
serve, Marine Corps Reserve, Air Force Reserve, National Guard, and Air 
National Guard. In addition, a non-voting Reserve officer of general or 
flag officer rank served as full-time executive officer for the board.
The Coast Guard Reserve was represented by a Reserve officer without a 
vote, although in peacetime, the Coast Guard is an integral unit in the 
Treasury Department.
The board held its first meeting October 4-6, 1949. In the 
years thereafter, it met about every eight weeks for one, two, or three 
day sessions. During the first year the meetings were held monthly, 
but the number lessened as administrative procedures became stabilized. 
For example, from February 16, 1953» until December 9» 1955» the board 
met seventeen times.^ The board also developed a small secretariat 
ranging from four to eight military officers paid by their respective 
services and frcan four to seven civil service women. The head of the 
board*s staff is the full-time military executive officer. During the 
first seven years of the board’s existence, it has had only two such 
executives. The first. Brigadier General Luke W, Finlay, was borrowed 
for a few months from his position as an attorney for the Standard Oil 
Company of New Jersey. A 1928 graduate of the military academy, Finlay
Û. S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Government 
Operations, Replies from the Executive Departments and Field Agencies to 
Inquiry Regarding the Use of Industry Advisory Committees. January 1,
1953 to January 1. 1956. Part IV, Department of Defense, November 1, 1956, 
84th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 1278.
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had resigned from the service, reentering during World War II. He served 
the board in the rank of colonel. After nine months he returned to his 
civilian post and was replaced by Rear Admiral Irving M. McQuiston. 
McQuiston was a reservist who had been recalled to active duty in 1932 
to set up and administer a long range Naval Air Reserve training program. 
He had remained in the active service thereafter, and had been appointed 
to be the Regular Navy^s representative on the board when it was first 
set up in September, 1949.
The board’s beginnings were not impressive. The announcement 
of its creation came on May 20, 1949, with little prior planning or co­
ordination with the three subordinate departments. Neither the direc­
tive which established the board nor the membership had been cleared 
with the departmental secretaries. When the directive became available, 
the three services considered the board’s powers and responsibilities to 
be much too broad.5 The board would have power not only to establish 
the general Reserve policies but also could interfere with the opera­
tional details which were considered by the services to be properly with­
in the prerogatives of each of the services. The regulars felt they 
were held responsible by law for the military proficiency of the civil­
ian components, but this responsibility might be subverted at any time 
by interference from the board. The regular services disliked, also, 
being outnumbered, two to one, on the board by reservists. Thus, the 
reservists controlled the policy, but the regulars were held responsible 
for the success of the policy.
^New York Times. June 12, 1949, p. 19.
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By the time the Secretary of Defense had issued his next semi­
annual report, the operational authority of the Civilian Components 
Policy Board had been curtailed. He said in the report.
The Civilian Component Policy Board is founded on the concept 
that it should function as a staff agency only, establish overall 
policies for the civilian components of the three military de­
partments and coordinating the separate plans, policies, and pro­
grams of the departments whenever such coordination is indicated.
The Board has been rigid in a strict and constant adherence to 
this concept. Responsibility for the operations of the indivi­
dual programs remains in the hands of the secretaries of the 
three military departments, a responsibility which they and their 
subordinates are discharging with effective results.
Another point of discussion was the role of the chairman, who is 
required by law to be a civilian because of the fundamental policy of 
civil supremacy over the military establishment,? As part of this con­
cept, the chairman has the deciding vote in case of a tie. It is assumed 
the civilian chairman will not be influenced by strong prejudices toward 
any of the services; this, however, is not always true, since any civil­
ian sufficiently well informed to be a good chairman will usually have 
served with one of the armed forces and will probably have developed 
strong affiliations.
Nevertheless, Lieutenant General Milton G. Baker, former civilian 
chairman of the board and superintendent of Valley Forge Military Academy, 
has recommended that the use of civilians as chairmen be continued,^
Û, S, Department of Defense, Semi-Annual Report of the Secretary 
of Defense, December 1. 1950— June 30. 1950 (Washington; Government 
Printing Office, 1950), p, 22,
?Letter from It, Gen, Milton G, Baker, Nov, 5, 1957, to the author, 
Sibid,
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On September 12, 1949, the chairman was authorized to act be­
tween meetings on all matters other than those of major policy in order 
that official action need not wait for the calling of an emergency meet­
ing. On October 14, 1949, this interim authority was transferred to an 
executive committee composed of the four civilian members of the board 
as voting members and the military executive as a non voting member.
The chairman continued to act alone between meetings on matters vrtiich 
did not require consideration by the executive committee,9
The first chairman was William T. Faricy, president of the Assoc­
iation of American Railroads. He was succeeded by another railroad man, 
Edwin H. Burgess (Baltimore and Ohio) on May 4, 1950, and was in turn 
replaced by Charles H. Buford. When Buford resigned in early 1953, he 
won approval for Dr. Arthur S. Adams, president of the American Council 
on Education as his replacement. Other chairmen have been Milton G.
Baker and John Slezak, former Assistant Secretary of the Army.
Most matters considered by the board at its regular meetings 
have been prepared by the board*s own secretariat, by some staff section 
of the Department of Defense, or by one of three subordinate departments. 
Officially, the agenda has been prepared by the chairman with the help 
of the military executive and his staff. This was with the understand­
ing, as Chairman Edwin H. Burgess told the House armed services subcom­
mittee in 1951» "Any interested party can present a matter to the Board." 
Actually, board members have had little to do with the matters to be dis-
9u. S. Department of Defense, Semi-Annual Report of the Secretary 
of Defense. July 1. 1949— December 31. 1949 (Washington; Government 
Printing Office, 1950), p. 38.
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cussed in the meetings— except by interjection on the spur of the moment 
during meetings. Although representatives of the pressure groups fre­
quently testify before the board, they are responsible for bringing up 
little new material.
In January, 1952, a heated controversy arose concerning parti­
cipants in board meetings. The secretarial members— the assistant or 
undersecretaries of the departments— lacking time to attend the meetings, 
usually sent substitutes. During the previous year, the substitutes had 
generally been the top civilian assistants to the assistant secretaries 
and included such men as Elvis J. Stahr, Jr., former dean of the Uni­
versity of Kentucky Law School and, at that time. Special Assistant to 
the Secretary of the Army. The dispute was born out of an attempt by 
Under Secretary Francis P. Whitehair to establish Captain E. B. Taylor, 
of the Regular Navy, as his alternate. Whitehair had queried Mr. Charles 
A. Coolidge, an assistant to the Secretary of Defense, by telephone as 
to the legality of the appointment. Coolidge said the appointment seemed 
satisfactory except that the alternate should be a reservist. The board 
directive anticipated that a majority of the membership would be reser­
vists, and if Under Secretary Whitehair appointed a regular officer, the 
directive would be violated. Nevertheless, Captain Taylor appeared at 
the next meeting of the board, and there was "apparently a heated discus­
sion on the matter at the meeting. The controversy was later resolved 
by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower and Personnel, Anna
^^his was a handwritten note on a staff paper concerning the mat­
ter, contained in File OASD (M&P) 334 RFPB (1952), Departmental Records 
Branch, Department of the Army.
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Rosenberg, who agreed with a recommendation by Chairman Charles H. Bu­
ford that
Approving, as an alternate for the Undersecretary of the Navy, 
a regular naval officer would not only upset the contemplated 
balance but establish a precedent that could lead to full mili­
tary representation,
I recommend that the Navy be requested to nominate a civil­
ian alternate for the Undersecretary vrtiose status would elimin­
ate the question of legality and propriety in accordance with 
the attached proposed reply,
Whitehair later appointed a civilian as his alternate.
Assistant Secretary Anna Rosenberg did not ever feel favorable 
toward the use of alternates. She asked on November 10, 1951, in a mem­
orandum to the military executive of the board for an attendance chart 
of the assistant secretaries at the board meetings. At the meeting on 
the 7th, 8th, and 9th of November, 1951, every assistant secretary was 
absent, except Assistant Secretary of the Army Earl D, Johnson attended 
for two hours, while his alternate was also in attendance. In January, 
1952, Mrs, Rosenberg, in a mimeographed request to the various secretaries, 
ordered their attendance at the board meetings. After a short time, how­
ever, the appointment of alternates continued, and it was not long until 
the assistant secretaries revived the previous practice of sending alter­
nates.
The formulation of the Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1952 was the 
most valuable and far-reaching contribution of the Reserve Forces Policy 
Board, Starting in 1949, the Reserve lobby had applied pressure to the
^Memorandum from Charles H, Buford to the Assistant Secretary of 
Defense (M&P), January 16, 1952, File OASD (M&P) 334 RFPB (1952), Depart­
mental Records Branch, Department of the Army,
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Department of Defense to produce recommendations which would improve 
the Reserve, The board constituted a ready-made, active, and expert 
administrative body to prepare the recommendations. Early in 1951» the 
Reserve Forces Policy Board developed a set of basic principles on be­
half of the Secretary of Defense which were offered as the basis of a 
new and effective Reserve program. They included (l) the assumption 
that all citizens should share the responsibilities and burdens of na­
tional security, (2) that the members of the Reserve and Regular Services 
are entitled to equal treatment under equal circumstances and, to this 
end, all true disparities between regulars and reservists should be elim­
inated, (3) that reservists should be recruited, promoted and eliminated 
according to a system designed to produce competent and vigorous forces, 
(4) a concentration upon realism in training, (5) that the Reserve Forces 
must be provided with a continuous flow of pre-trained personnel, if
they are to perform the missions which the national security requires
12of them. These policies became the basis of a bill presented to the 
House in 1951 which later was enacted as the Armed Forces Reserve Act of 
1952,
The continuous pressure of the Reserve Officer Association from 
1949 to 1952 to write the Reserve Forces Policy Board into statutes 
brought forth the greatest discussion thus far of the over-all organiza­
tion and functions of the board. The idea of statutory status was very 
much opposed by the National Guard Association. Major General Ellard A,
^%ear Adm, I, M. McQuiston, ’*History of the Reserves Since the 
Second World War," Military Affairs, XVII (Spring, 1953)» 25.
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Walsh' complained that statutory status for the board might cause the 
general staff committees to "be virtually eliminated or superseded in 
time,"̂ 3 With one of these general staff committees practically con­
trolled by the association, the National Guard would certainly not want 
to trade.it for a board on which the Guard was outvoted, four to fifteen, 
as it was on the Reserve Forces Policy Board,
Brigadier General Evans of the Reserve Officers Association, 
appearing before congressional committees, discussed the possibility of 
including general staff committee members among the members of the new 
statutory Reserve Forces Policy Board, but hesitated to approve the out- 
ri^t abandonment of the general staff committees at that time.
Representative Sterling Cole of New York of the House Armed Ser­
vices committee was most interested of all congressional committee mem­
bers in abolishing the Reserve boards and creating one Reserve Forces 
Policy Board, He said:
I am inherently opposed to creating more and more boards and 
more secretaries and more people in the government to stumble over 
each other, and if a job can be done effectively without it, I 
think we ought to try to see that that is done , , , Now I am won­
dering if it isn’t possible to unit these three existing boards,
, , , and constitute them as a watchdog board to see that the prin­
ciples of whatever law passes with respect to Reserve affairs is 
carried out by the various departments, whether by a secretary as­
signed especially for that job or by somebody else, , , , 14
General Walsh, of course, would not stand for the elimination of the gen­
eral staff committees, and the idea of combining the various boards was 
abandoned,
13u. S, Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Ser­
vices, Hearings, Reserve Components. 82d Cong,, 1st Sess,, 1951, p, 481.
^Ibid.. p, 467.
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However, it appeared that General Walsh could not keep the 
board from being given a statutory basis; therefore, he suggested an 
amendment which would appeal greatly to the line departments. The amend­
ment which would appeal greatly to the line departments. The amendment 
provided that the board "shall not engage in the administration or op­
eration of any policies, procedures, or programs." He presented the 
amendment, "to protect the Defense and military departments from in­
vasion. Representative Cole immediately announced his opposition to 
the amendment, but asked the opinions of various services represented 
at the hearing. Mr. John Adams, legal counsel for the Department of 
Defense said,
. . .  it is doing a great deal of that now and . . .  I
think (the amendment) would seriously restrict . . . and would
hamper considerably the effective implementation of the Reserve 
programs which the subcommittee seems to desire to place by 
statute as responsibilities of the Secretary of Defense.^®
The Departments of the Army and Air Force favored the Walsh amendment,
but Mr. Clayton L. Burwell, speaking for the Navy, opposed the amendment.
He said, "I think the Secretary of Defense has to have some latitude or
the whole system may tend to disintegrate."1? The respected Melvin Maas
commented that the whole Department of Defense was for policy-making—
not operations— therefore he had no great opposition to the amendment
but thought it was useless. As discussion proceeded, it appeared that
no member of the subcommittee was sufficiently interested in the amend-
15%bid.. p. 955. 
l^Ibid., p. 955. 
17lbid.. p. 957.
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ment to move its acceptance, so Representative Cole moved that the 
amendment be not accepted. Thus, the subcommittee, rejected Walsh*s 
idea.
Because a statutory status for the board would abolish consider­
able administrative discretion, the Department of Defense strongly op­
posed any move in that direction. Knowing this opposition, the House 
armed services committee was curious about opinions on the subject by 
board members. Chairman Edwin H. Burgess, testifying before the subcom­
mittee,^® said the board had originally approved a new statutory status, 
and further questioning by the subcommittee members revealed that the 
Office of the Secretary of Defense had overruled this part of the board*s 
recommendations. Burgess said he, personally, had favored the provision 
and recommended that the board be written into law without any changes 
in the current organization. He declared, "I think the board is admir­
ably set up for the purpose that it is designed to perform."^?
Later, testimony by Admiral McQuiston that the board wanted it­
self continued but not put in a statutory status was inconsistent with 
the earlier testimony by Chairman Burgess, and the subcommittee was con­
fused. But the matter was soon forgotten. The subcommittee members, 
however, especially Representative Cole, continued to question the ad­
miral about occasions in which the Office of the Secretary of Defense 
had overruled the board in its recommendations to Congress.




mendations on the material to be contained in the Armed Forces Reserve 
bill of 1952, a feeling persisted among some congressmen and board mem­
bers that board recommendations were disapproved by the secretary with­
out the proper referral back to the board or to Congress. Because of 
congressional allegation to this effect, including that of Representa­
tive Clyde Doyle, Democrat of California, the Assistant Secretary of De­
fense asked the military executive of the Reserve Forces Policy Board to 
make a study of the occasions when board recommendations had met such 
disapproval. In his reply of December 18, 1952, Rear Admiral I. M. 
McQuiston mentioned three such instances. 0̂
The Reserve Forces Policy Board became a statutory agency on 
the first of January, 1953» by virtue of the Aimed Forces Reserve Act of 
1952. On January 19» 1953» and October 9» 1953» the Department of De­
fense issued new charters for the organization, the last of which is 
still in effect in 1957. The membership and organization of the board 
continued as before, and the board, acting through the Assistant Secre­
tary of Defense (M&P) was designated as the principal policy advisor on 
Reserve affairs to the Secretary of Defense. The charter also carried 
a provision, as required by law, assuring that no changes were intended 
in the general staff committees. The Reserve members of the board were 
given three year terms and the civilian and regular military service 
members continued to serve for indefinite terms, depending upon their
^^Investigation revealed that these disapprovals occurred through 
actions of Major General E. B. Lynch, in the absence of Assistant Secre­
tary Rosenberg. When General Lynch was asked about his actions, his 




The duties of the board continued to be entirely advisory in
nature. The chairman was empowered to appoint, with the approval of
the Secretary of Defense, the military executive of the board. All mem­
bers of the board*s staff were made responsible to the chairman. Yet, 
the chairman was continued in a part-time status.
After the passage of the 1952 act, the board dedicated itself 
to the abolition of several discriminations between regulars and reser­
vists of the services and in improving the Reserve Forces, in general.
An episode of some practical importance was caused by the direc­
tive of October 9, 1953» Reserve officers on the board were required to 
be in an active status and to continue in an active status throughout 
their terms of office. At the time, two members of the board. Major 
General Melvin Maas and Commodore J. B. Lynch were retired personnel of 
the Army and Navy, respectively. The Reserve Officers Association lead­
ership was outraged by the possibility that their legislative consultant. 
General Maas, would be ousted from the board. The association’s magazine 
reminded the Pentagon that Congress, itself, had rejected such proposals 
earlier, and it threatened; ”Watch for a legislative inquiry viien Con-
ppgress assembles in January.” An open clash on the subject was avoided 
by a memorandum, dated November 27, 1953, from Assistant Secretary of 
Defense John Hannah which suspended until January 1, 1955, the active
S. Department of Defense, Directive No, 5120,2, Oct, 9, 1953. 
^%eserve Officer. 29 (Nov,, 1953), 3*
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duty provisions of the new directive. 3̂
As time passed, most of the issues and controversies suitable 
for board action rapidly declined. The great majority of Reserve de­
cisions could be more appropriately handled by the ordinary administra­
tive hierarchy of the three services, with the board considering only 
those questions which required greater deliberation and coordination.
By 1954, when the new Eisenhower administration was working on a revi­
sion of the 1952 act, the Reserve Forces Policy Board was already begin­
ning to be sidetracked. Timothy W. Stanley, a former student in the 
Harvard Defense Studies Program and at the time an assistant to the Sec­
retary of Defense, has described the role of the board in the foimula- 
tion of the Reserve Forces Act of 1955î
When the Reserve Forces Act of 1955 was being prepared in 
the Department of Defense, the major responsibility fell to ad 
hoc task forces working directly under the Assistant Secretary 
of Defense (M,P&R). The Reserve Forces Policy Board was opposed 
to certain aspects of the plan as drafted by the task forces, and 
its role was less significant than its title might indicate.^
Because of the secrecy policies of the Department of Defense 
during the tenures of Charles E. Wilson and Dwight D. Eisenhower, little 
is known about the role of the board in the formulation of Reserve pol­
icy. The information which has leaked to newspaper reporters in recent 
years shows the board considering the routine policy questions. It was
^^File OASD (M&P) 334 RFPB (1953), Departmental Records Branch, 
Department of the Army.
^%'imothy ¥. Stanley, American Defense and National Security (Wash­
ington: Public Affairs Press, 1956), p. 124« This observation arises 
from Stanley’s and R. G. Stevens’ "The Formulation of the National Re­
serve Plan within the Department of Defense," an unpublished, classified 
(Confidential) staff study. Office of the Secretary of Defense, 1955.
249
reported that, at the meeting during the week of September 14, 1957, 
the board considered such items as (l) a renewed effort to obtain con­
scription legislation whereby youths could be drafted directly from 
civilian life into the Reserve components, (2) a study of the impact on 
the Navy and Air Force of the Army^s six-months» training program, (3) 
proposals to cut back the simmer camp training of non-unit Army reser­
vists, and (4) a discussion of the financial cutbacks in the Reserve 
program which began in 1957.
The Reserve Forces Policy Board has certainly not performed as 
an independent, watchdog committee for the public and for Congress, as 
contemplated by several legislators. Representative James E. Van Zandt, 
Republican of Pennsylvania, had said, when a statutory status for the 
board was being considered by the armed services committees, that he 
would like to see the board composed of members »»vrfio are permitted to 
take a definite position, probably in conflict with the position of the
Secretary of Defense or Secretary of the Army, Navy and Air Force, and
still retain his position on the Board.^25 Later, he told the Senate 
armed services committee that the board should be required;
. . .  to report direct to Congress if, in their opinion,
the will of Congress is being ignored. Therefore, Congress as 
the representative of the American people, retains its control 
over Reser'/e affairs.2°
By no means has the board been an agent of Congress. The Department of
25u. S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Ser­
vices, Hearings, Reserve Components, 82d Cong., 1st Sess., 1951, p. 922.
26u. S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Hearings, 
Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1952, 82d Gong., 2d Sess., 1952, p. 162.
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Defense maintains a jealous guard over the loyalties of the board.
There is an even occasional insistence that the board, and especially 
its secretariat, show complete loyalty to the Office of the Assistant 
Secretary of Defense (M,P&RF) rather than directly to the Secretary of 
Defense, as stated in law. An incident of this type occured in July 
and August, 1953, when Chairman Charles H, Buford submitted a final re­
port of his tour of duty to the assistant secretary. It was customary 
not to release such documents to the press until the Secretary of Defense 
had personally seen them, but in this instance. Admiral McQuiston asked 
permission for immediate release. A lieutenant colonel was assigned 
the duty of examining the report for public relations reasons prior to 
release. He reported there was nothing objectionable in the report ex­
cept paragraphs No. 10 and 11, which dealt with the loyalty of the 
board to the Secretary of Defense and ultimately to Congress, as re­
quired by law. His memorandum on the subject read:
Someone on the Board or the staff appears to believe that 
the Board is responsible to the Secretary of Defense and ulti­
mately to Congress . . .  I suggest that Dr. Hannah (the Assis­
tant Secretary) contact Dr. Adams (Mr. Buford*s replacement as 
Chairman of the Board) with a view of determining who on the 
RFPB staff is forcing this issue on the responsibility of the 
Board direct to the Secretary and to the Congress. If somebody 
in his office does not want to play ball. Dr. Hannah may wish to 
take steps to get rid of him.27
Even the semi-annual report of the Reserve Forces Policy Board, 
which is printed as a part of the semi-annual report of the Secretary of 
Defense, is carefully censored by Defense officials. For example, the
27Memorandum from the Assistant to the Military Deputy to the Assis­
tant Secretary of Defense, Aug. 3, 1953, File OASD (M&P) 334 RFPB (1953) 
Departmental Records Branch, Department of the Army.
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board’s report for the period ending December 31» 1954» was stopped by 
a brigadier general who complained:
It is noted that in the proposed report the RFPB has ex­
pressed Board opinion on a matter upon which final DOD (Department 
of Defense) position has not been established. This is consid­
ered to be outside the purview of the report and could prove to 
be embarrassing to the OSD (Office of the Secretary of Defense) 
since such material will become a chapter in the Sec/Def report 
required by the National Security Act of 1947* It is felt that 
the RFPB report should be objective and not serve as a vehicle 
to announce their feelings to Congress. Such feelings in way of 
advice should be properly submitted to Sec/Def via ASD (M&P) in 
accordance with the Board’s mission.^
The fact that the loyalties of the board were misunderstood from 
the beginning was a tremendous handicap. Most congressmen, when they 
voted for a statutory status for the board, were under the impression 
they were furnishing the Reserve interests with a spokesman within the 
Department of Defense. It was for this reason that they wrote into law 
the membership of the board which was to be dominated by reservists.
Yet there is no evidence that the appointees to the board have shown any 
great degree of independence. Little change in this respect appears 
likely for the future. Reservists appointed to the board must be active 
in the Reserve Forces, according to administrative fiat, and by public 
pressure must hold high rank in the Reserve. They profit by not rocking 
the Defense boat, and except for Major General Melvin Maas, who was in a 
retired status while serving on the board, there has been no exceptions. 
Thus, while the Department of Defense has the benefit of the views of 
some long experienced reservists, it has denied itself the uncoerced,
2%emorandum from Brig. Gen. John H. Ives, USAF, Director of Mili­
tary Personnel Policy Division, OSD, to Admiral Womble, Feb. 10, 1954» 
File OASD (M&P) 334 RFPB (1954) Departmental Records Branch, Department 
of the Army.
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independent, fresh approach to the Reserve questions. The concept of
the board as a focal point where conflicts among the various services
can be resolved has not developed. Lieutenant General Milton G, Baker
has said, "Actual clashes between the departments on Reserve matters are 
29very rare," ' As natural to all administrative hierarchies, the person­
nel handling the day-to-day problems prefer to resolve differences among 
themselves. It is a rare instance when such personnel will be willing 
to refer a question for arbitration to a board of outsiders. It is even 
more unlikely that the administrative hierarchy composed of regulars 
will be willing to turn over any touchy problem to a board of reservists 
of the several services. It is much more likely that controversies will 
be resolved by ad hoc committees and by use of other administrative rem­
edies.
In the case of controversies which are referred to the board, 
Lieutenant General Milton G, Baker has described how they are handled:
Upon questions of major policy, as determined by the Chairman, 
an affirmative vote of ten members is required. On all other 
questions, the affirmative vote of a majority of the Board is 
required to carry the question,3̂
It appears that much of the board*s troubles derives from the 
lack of a clear role, despite the fact that it has acted efficiently in 
areas where any board could have performed well. It has provided a 
forum wherein interest groups could espouse their views within the De­
partment of Defense and thereby keep the administrators informed. It 
has provided a board of experts to study Reserve plans for criticism at




a minimum of expense to the government. It has also made available an 
arena for the settlement of interdepartmental disagreements. Yet, none 
of these functions have been sufficient to keep the board's status as 
the principal policy advisor to the Secretary of Defense in Reserve af­
fairs, as provided by statutes. It is likely that the board's importance 
will continue to dwindle as the administrative framework of the Depart­
ment of Defense becomes more institutionalized.
CHAPTER IX 
CONCLUSIONS
The Reserve situation must be seen in the context of over-all 
manpower policy. Unfortunately, as in World War II, the manpower prob­
lem continues to be an enigma in our defense policy. In order to solve 
our Reserve problems, it is imperative that some basic decisions be made 
on several key manpower questions— on the manpower needs of the civilian 
economy in wartime, on whether military or domestic leaders will make 
the manpower allocations if and when war comes, on the use of involun­
tary recruitment in these years of semi-peace, and on several other fund­
amental issues.
The United States has never fully applied its resources in peace­
time to the solution of manpower problems, and the current troubles with 
Russia might not be sufficient to inaugurate advance planning now. Yet, 
the great need remains. This dissertation discusses a very small area 
where planning is necessary. It inquires into the pressures involved in 
making policy for the Army Reserve Forces, where manpower problems loom 
large. By use of examples from our experience of the last ten years, it 
considers the influences of the National Guard Association, the Reserve 
Officers Association, and the Regular Army interests.
It is, of course, important to note that there are other deter-
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minants of Reserve policy. These are the far-reaching functional issues 
which surround the Reserves. The most significant of these have con­
cerned the over-all benefits to be derived from a vigorous Reserve pro­
gram in light of the specialization seemingly required in modern armies. 
Almost as important has been the role of federalism, which has been used 
effectively by the National Guard Association to win special privileges. 
Troubles in manpower recruitment, especially those stemming from the 
antagonism of many veterans for almost everything of a military nature, 
have been of fundamental importance. Other technical matters that have 
influenced policy include civil defense, unit versus individual training, 
armory construction, inter-service coordination, and conflicts between 
the civilian mobilization responsibilities of reservists as opposed to 
their military mobilization duties. These pages are intentionally de­
void of a general discussion of these technical issues.
In the final analysis, it has been the interaction of the three 
prominent pressure groups making use of the various technical arguments 
that have shaped the policies of the Army Reserve Forces.
The National Guard Association's power is due to a combination 
of factors. First, the National Guard lies in the marrow of practically 
every American community. Its members and its friends have votes of 
which every congressman is acutely aware. The leaders of the Guard are 
frequently influential men in the community who have contact with members 
of Congress. From this grass-roots situation, springs the power of the 
National Guard Association.
Secondly, the guard association's power arises out of the backing 
provided by state officials who feel strongly the need for a state force
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such as the National Guard. The governors and other state officials are 
alert to prevent any estrangement of the National Guard and the state 
governments. The concern of these officials stems from their high re­
gard for the usefulness of their own guard units, from their emotional 
and intellectual attachment to the cause of states* rights and from the 
desire of their constituents to maintain the minute-man tradition and 
states’ rights.
It is important to recognize, then, that the crux of National 
Guard power is the dual status clause of the United States Constitution. 
However, this constitutional provision is only one of two alternatives 
which is available to the nation as a foundation for any Reserve organi­
zation. Those constitutional powers possessed by Congress to raise and 
support armies remain available at any time. Whenever they desire, the 
people can make the Guard into a national force. This is the great 
vulnerability of National Guard power.
The handicaps to the efficiency of the National Guard as a fight­
ing force which arise from the dual status, are not well known to the 
American public. Consequently, the National Guard Association has not 
greatly feared the abolition of dual control. Furthermore, it will be 
difficult for the people, who are traditionally uninterested in military 
matters, to get adequate information on the subject. The association 
attacks with vehemence any mention that a dual status prevents the field­
ing of an efficient army. Yet, there is considerable evidence that the 
National Guard lacks the leadership, as a state force, necessary to pro­
duce a first class army. As the people decide the answer to this funda­
mental question, they will be deciding the ultimate fate of the National
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Guard Association and its interests.
The Regular Army is, perhaps, fully as influential as the Na­
tional Guard Association, but it works in a much different fashion. Its 
leverage is exercised deep in the bureaucracy. In fact, it is the double 
personality of the Regular Army, as an interest group and as the bureau­
cracy, from which its power arises.
Its influence has been handicapped by its inability to throw 
charges— either reckless or responsible charges— into the headlines as 
its opponents frequently do. The complaints concerning Regular Army 
discrimination against the Reserve Forces during World War II are good 
examples. There was a particularly deep-seated disagreement over who 
was to get the promotions, but the bureaucracy was never able to make 
use of propaganda during the furor to the same extent as Reserve Forces 
lobbyists.
The Regular Army as an interest group has sought a large stand­
ing Army, As a part of this goal, it has wanted universal military 
training, and the strong Reserve usually considered concomitant to uni­
versal military training has not been pushed by the regulars. Frequently, 
it has been thought, by congressmen in particular, that the Regular Army 
actually opposed large Reserve Forces. The actions of the regulars tend, 
without actual proof, to verify this. At least, they have not been en­
thusiastic for the Reserve program.
Further verification of interest group activity on the part of 
the Regular Army is seen in the hassle over the level at which Reserve 
policy will be made in the Pentagon. Only after ten years of feuding 
over the matter did the regular establishment consent to the creation of
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an office •which would raise the Reserve Forces’ position in the bureau­
cracy. This occurred five years after Congress expressed, by statute, 
a desire that the Reserve be given a more prominent voice. It occurred 
only after the regulars had assured retention of their relative position 
on the Army staff. Matters formerly handled by assistant chiefs of 
staff were moved to a new, higher level of officers called deputy chiefs 
of staff. Then and only then did the Reserve Forces get their own assis­
tant chief of staff.
Most of the evidence bearing upon the Regular Army’s treatment 
of the Reserve problem fails to prove conclusively any determined, in­
tentional effort to halt the progress of the Reserves. It reveals, how­
ever, fairly strong indications that a guild feeling exists which works 
to the detriment of the Reserve Forces. Undoubtedly much of this feel­
ing arises from well substantiated, professional doubt among regulars 
that the ’’summer soldiers” of the Reserve can ever be made into an ade­
quately trained Army.
Much of the feeling also stems from an inherent uneasiness that 
a greatly expanded Reserve program would curtail the interests of the 
Regular Army guild. There is already evidence that, given the opportun­
ity, Congress will rely, for reasons of financial economy, on the Re­
serve Forces rather than on a professional Army. Regulars feel further 
insecurity from the numerous campaign speeches and propaganda which claim 
that citizen soldiers singlehandedly won World War II. In addition, the 
regulars have a vivid impression, which might be mistaken, that Congress 
and the people consider them to be an undemocratic, indoctrinated caste. 
They sense a widespread favoritism for the Reserves based on the concept
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that the Reserves will keep the Army democratic— that the Reserves will 
heighten popular control over the military. All these factors inten­
sify the guild feelings and make the Regular Army fear its displacement 
by reservists.
The Reserve Officers Association is the least powerful of the 
three important pressure groups. It lacks the powerful support of state 
officials which the National Guard Association possesses, and it is 
without the strategic position in the bureaucracy which the Regular Army 
has.
In addition, the Reserve Officers Association has never had the 
strong, stable leadership found in either of the other two interest 
groups. The presidents of the association do not move their homes to 
Washington as Major General Walsh did as president of the National Guard 
Association. The head of the Washington office of the Reserve Officers 
Association has been a professional lobbyist. There has been a high 
turnover in the office.
However, the association has been influential with Congress. It 
was especially effective in getting changes in recall procedures after 
the Korean War and in getting a more equitable promotion system in 1954*
Generally speaking, congressmen have been favorably disposed 
toward the Army Reserve. They deem a large, trained Reserve to be a 
necessary supplement to the Regular Army. Many believe the Reserve 
proved its effectiveness in World War II and in the Korean War. In add­
ition, numerous congressmen are now, or have been, members of the Reserve. 
They are familiar with the program and are, therefore, inclined to sup­
port it. Another important reason for congressional support arises from
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the attitudes and voting power of thousands of reservists and forme./ 
reservists, not organized into pressure groups, who passively favor a 
larger Reserve, Their favorable attitudes seem to influence congres­
sional decisions.
The Reserve Officers Association can, thus, present its propo­
sals in a fairly fertile atmosphere. This is of considerable importance 
since the association's political power— its vote getting power— is not 
great. The successes of the association can be attributed largely to 
the favorable climate in which it works. It has had to depend on what­
ever logic and intelligence it could muster in its arguments, together 
with the favorable disposition of congressmen.
Because the association has been only mildly successful in in­
fluencing the administrators of the Reserve program, the congressional 
tendency to leave many decisions to the discretion of the executive 
branch has been a serious handicap to the association. Consequently, 
the association has constantly sought to have more and more Reserve pol­
icies written into law— well beyond administrative tampering.
The Role of Congress 
In addition to reasons already mentioned. Congress supports the 
Reserve Forces for the sake of political expediency. This situation grows 
out of the fact that the United States is spending around $38 billion 
annually on defense— a figure widely considered to be a maximum which 
the people can stand. Still, there is evidence that the United States 
is losing the armament race. Cost statistics reveal to a fairly precise 
degree, that economies will accrue from dependence on Reserves rather than
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on an expensive professional force. The Reserves, thus, make possible 
a strong defense without additional taxation. It is an inviting offer 
which few legislators, for political reasons, can ignore.
To accomplish a more effective Reserve, Congress has constantly 
urged the executive branch to build the program. The legislative branch 
does not seem to have the technical ability or the inclination to write, 
for itself, the detailed policies which would improve the program. 
Nevertheless, the leadership provided by Congress, through its badgering 
and harassment of the Army, has been a significant reason for the pro­
gress of the Reserve Forces,
Not many years ago, this would have been considered the least 
that Congress might do in the making of policy. Today, such activities 
are usually called "congressional leadership," Although since the days 
of John Stuart Mill, legislative bodies have been occasionally declared 
to be incapable of initiating policy, it is only recently that we have 
become resigned to the doctrine that Congress can do little more than 
review policy made by the executive branch,^
Congress demanded in the early 1950*s that departmental experts 
prepare, for its consideration, legislative proposals to build the Re­
serves, By such action. Congress admitted that its role was that of a 
reviewing agency— that it was incapable of initiating policy,
4his view of Congress is not accepted by Lawrence Chamberlain in 
his The President, Congress and Legislation (New York: Columbia Univer­
sity Press, 1946), Chamberlain studied ninety pieces of legislation, 
including several in the field of national defense, and concluded that 
Congress was playing a lively role in the initiation of government pol­
icy, The view of Congress contained in this dissertation is not at odds 
with Chamberlain, Although Congress has not initiated Reserve policy, 
it has by methods described herein, played a preponderant role in the 
development of the Reserves,
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However, during consideration of the same departmentally-pre- 
pared measures, several new ideas and proposals were put forth by con­
gressional leaders. On at least two occasions, congressional committees 
made major revisions in legislation sent over from the Department of De­
fense— on the Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1952 and the National Reserve 
Plan which became the Reserve Forces Act of 1955.
One congressional innovation, added to the Eisenhower adminis­
tration's National Reserve Plan, would have desegregated southern National 
Guard units. Although stricken from the final version of the bill. Con­
gress deliberated on this specific policy. No such thing can be said 
for the Department of Defense. The consideration given the problem by 
Congress shows more willingness to meet this thorny problem than was 
shown by the Department of Defense in ignoring the situation.
These activities, including the constant pressure on the executive 
branch to improve the program, constitute congressional leadership. 
Although Congress has not had the ability to write Reserve policy itself, 
it is the agency most responsible for the policies which built the Re­
serve Forces to their present level. Congress continues, by generous 
appropriations and other methods, to be the programme most important 
safeguard against administrative cutbacks.
The Reserve program is somevdiat unique in that it has not been 
the subject of close congressional surveillance. The appropriating power 
has not been used to superintend the program; appropriations have been 
much too generous to constitute controls. So far as other surveillance 
methods are concerned, there has been suggestions of special committees 
to oversee the Reserves, such as the watchdog committee recommended by
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Senator Margaret Chase Smith, but such committees were never meant to 
harass or restrict the Reserves. They were generally meant to protect 
the Reserve Forces from the Regular Army, or to furnish impetus which 
seemed to be lacking.
It is interesting to note, also, the complete absence of poli­
tical partisanship in congressional handling of Reserve affairs. There 
has been no outright disagreements along party lines since World War II. 
In addition, the chairmen and minority leaders of the House armed ser­
vices committee have been especially congenial. The chairman allows the 
minority leader, by custom, to make assignments of minority members to 
the subcommittees. And on one occasion the minority leader served as a 
subcommittee chairman.
Whether Congress has acted wisely in sponsoring a vigorous Re­
serve program is, at present, very much undecided. In its enthusiasm 
for the Reserves, the Congress has acted largely on short range motiva­
tions— to pacify interest groups or for reasons of financial economy. 
Like the bureaucracy. Congress has made no fundamental, profound deci­
sions based on the over-all proved merit of the Reserve Forces.
It is likewise apparent that neither Congress nor the Department 
of Defense have made much progress in allocating equitably the burdens 
of national defense among the various individuals of the country. The 
inequity of recalling World War II veterans to fight in the Korean War 
became obvious in 1950 with tremendous impact. Since the Korean War, 
the matter has lain dormant, potentially explosive in case it should 
again come to grip public attention. The equity of the various types of 
active and Reserve duty has not interested the major pressure groups to
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the extent that a solution has become mandatory.
The Interaction of the Interest Groups 
The National Guard and the Regular Army interests constitute the 
two main forces which dominate Reserve Forces policy. It is significant 
that these two interests frequently neutralize each other— tending to 
pull policy down a middle course. There have been occasions when the 
conflict has prevented the determination of any firm policy, or more 
often, the conflict has forced a compromise. The compromises have been 
obvious in legislation. They have also been am important factor in pol­
icy-making at administrative levels. For instance, the 1957 decision 
requiring six months’ training for all National Guard enlistees was 
clearly the result of compromise between these diametrically opposed in­
terests. Even President Eisenhower indirectly acknowledged the near 
equality of the two groups by speaking nicely of the Guard while simul­
taneously agreeing with the regulars by saying the National Guard was 
"never going to be the kind of force we need until we get these recruits " 
having at least six months of good hard basic training."
It must be recognized that the near equal power of these groups 
does not always result in precisely equal compromise. Each compromise 
depends, of course, on the problem under discussion. In explaining, for 
instance, the rapid death suffered by the Gray board report at the hands 
of the National Guard Association, it is evident the radical qualities 
of the report put the Regular Army in a position for total defeat. As 
expected, the Guard Association was completely successful.
To some extent, the mutual neutralization of the two powers has
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enhanced the position of the Reserve Officers Association, and has been 
indirectly the reason for the moderate development of the Army Reserve 
during the last decade. Actually neither the Regular Army nor the Na­
tional Guard Association has desired to build the Army Reserve. Alone, 
the Reserve Officers Association had little chance of accomplishing this 
build up. The progress which has occurred has had its origin in the 
acquiescence of the Regular Army. The regulars understood that, because 
of National Guard power, there would always be some type of citizen 
force. If so, they preferred a nationally-controlled Army Reserve over 
a state-controlled National Guard. This preference was the basis of 
acquiescence by Regular Army interests in the drive of the Reserve Offi­
cers Association toward an increase in the size of the Army Reserve.
The Reserve Officer Personnel Act of 1954 is an example of the 
benefits derived by the Reserve Officer Association from the acquies­
cence of one of the more powerful groups. It came about through a com­
bination of Army Reserve and National Guard interests, although the Reg­
ular Army vehemently opposed the law. The Reserve Officers Association 
wanted the law, and the National Guard Association gave its tacit appro­
val.
The Armed Forces Act of 1952 grew out of a combination of Na­
tional Guard opposition. Reserve Officer Association approval and Regular 
Army acquiescence with its civilian superiors in the Pentagon who felt 
public pressure for the act. In the final analysis, it was the great 
public agitation, aside from pressure group agitation, which brought 
passage of the bill. The vehemence with which so many Americans viewed 
the Korean recall system was the dominating factor.
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The Reserve Forces Act of 1955, which brought out the most am­
bitious plans for the Reserve yet announced, had a nebulous source.
There were no diametrically opposed forces. The National Guard Associa­
tion would probably have opposed the bill if there were any mention of 
the Guard in the bill. Major General Walsh made it clear to the con­
gressional committees that the National Guard did not want to be covered 
by the legislation. Since it was not covered, the National Guard Assoc­
iation made little effort to influence the disposition of the bill. On 
the other hand, the Reserve Officers Association supported the bill en­
thusiastically. Final passage was largely the result of strong admin­
istration backing, however. The bill would have failed without the 
strong support of the Department of Defense.
It seems, from a study of the past ten years, that the Reserve 
Officer Association is likely to be successful in lobbying Congress 
whenever the National Guard or the Regular Army will acquiesce in the 
Reserve viewpoint. If the matter under consideration is strongly opposed 
by one of these big interests, that one interest can usually secure a 
veto of the matter in Congress. The cancellation of an anti-segretation 
clause in the Reserve Forces Act of 1955 by National Guard interests is 
an example of this power.
Certainly a combination of the two major interest groups can veto 
an Army Reserve proposal. This is seen in the long effort of the Amy 
Reserve to get a high-ranking Reserve coordinator into the Pentagon hier­
archy. Both the Regular Amy and the National Guard opposed the move, 
but despite great enthusiasm by the Reserve Officers Association, the 
idea has not fully materialized.
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The three important pressure groups involved in Reserve Forces 
policy-making have much in common, and it would be a mistake to assume 
they are in total, constant competition. It might be noted, among other 
things, that all three groups are composed of officers, except that the 
Regular Army might, on occasion, be considered as including enlisted in­
terests. Generally speaking, enlisted men have no ability to apply, in 
an organized way, any pressure on policy-making. Thus, the three groups 
safeguard officer interests almost exclusively.
All three groups are of the nature of guilds. The guild feelings 
are based on the same military skills, but the groups are significantly, 
although artificially, different. The distant future will probably 
bring some realignment of the groups so that the basic differentiation 
will be between active duty and non-active duty personnel. For the time 
being, the groups are different largely by legal definition. They, nev­
ertheless, compete for preferred positions in national defense, higher 
rank, and greater status. The fundamental issues, such as the state of 
combat readiness, military techniques, and similar technical matters, 
have not been the areas of great debate. The controversies stem from 
the areas where guild interest is prevalent.
A typical example is the competition between the National Guard 
and Army Reserve for authority to organize combat units of the Reserve 
Forces. It is in the combat units, rather than in support units, where 
high rank is found. To capture this high rank, and to have a higher 
standing among the defense forces, the two components have comp-3ted vig­
orously.
Another example is the resistance shown by the National Guard to
268
accept a civil defense mission. This is a suitable objective for a 
state force, according to Regular Army views, especially since there 
will probably be great agitation to retain the Guard units at home in 
case of atomic attack on civilian communities. The Guard declares the 
move is only an attempt to relegate state forces to a secondary position 
in national defense. As of 1957, the controversy has not come to a 
head, and considering the political power of the National Guard, a de­
cision is likely to be long delayed.
The Administrative Hierarchy 
An already confusing Reserve policy-making mechanism was further 
complicated in 1947 by the creation of the Department of Defense. Along 
with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Personnel, Manpower, and Re­
serves, there was created the Reserve Forces olicy Board to coordinate 
the Reserve policies of all the military departments. At first, the 
board seemed to serve efficiently as a body of experts representating 
the various departments to write Reserve policy. As the administrative 
hierarchy of the Department of Defense has developed, the board seems 
to have declined in usefulness.
The new unified defense department served to relay pressure from 
the other departments toward a revitalization of the Army Reserve pro­
gram. The Navy, in particular, according to popular opinion, had a bet­
ter program, and this was the basis of considerable agitation to improve 
the Army system.
As might be expected, the three prominent interest groups have 
sought to control the day-to-day regulations which flow from the defense
269
establishment. The Regular Army, of course, has a tremendous advantage 
over the other two interests in this effort because the administrative 
hierarchy is but another name for the Regular Army. Obviously, the 
struggle is an effort by the National Guard Association and Reserve Of­
ficers Association to entice the hierarchy away from its Army managers.
The National Guard bureau has, since about 1920, been the prime 
example of National Guard Association success in the struggle. Through 
legal requirements that the chief of the bureau have ten years’ exper­
ience as a guardsman and be recommended by the governor of his home state, 
the National Guard interests have been able to influence greatly the oc­
cupant of the office. In addition, the guard association has accomplished 
legislation allowing forty per cent of the employees of the bureau to be 
guardsmen who have been called to active duty specifically for service 
in the bureau. This has been an Important reason for the domination of
the entire bureau by the association.
The Reserve Officers Association, as yet, has not enjoyed sim­
ilar success, although it is influential. Already, it is the habit of
the Army to recall a prominent reservist to serve as chief of Army Re­
serve and ROTO affairs. So far these men have not been vociferous spokes­
men for Reserve interests, except Brigadier General Wendell Westover, 
vriio made a frontal assault on Regular Army interests opposed to the Re­
serve. He was definitely more loyal to Reserve interests than to the 
dictates of his superiors in the Pentagon. There have been other less 
dramatic evidences of Reserve Officer Association influence.
It is not the major objective of this thesis to recommend admin­
istrative techniques which will provide these agencies in the Pentagon
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with adequate armor to withstand the interest groups. Nevertheless, it 
is evident that administrative reorganization of the Reserve Forces 
staff within the Army is in order. In fact, it is essential if further 
encroachment is to be avoided.
Policy is currently made in scattered offices which are not 
always cooperative. The National Guard Bureau has been, on occasion, 
openly hostile to its ostensible superior, the Office of the Assistant 
Chief of Staff for Reserve Components, The Office of the Chief, Army 
Reserve and ROTC Affairs has been naturally jealous of the same agency 
which has become the top Reserve office in the Army,
If policy is to be made in a responsible manner, free from the 
irresponsible pressures from interest groups, there must be a consolida­
tion of these agencies into a common front. It is important that the 
National Guard Bureau, the Office of the Chief, Army Reserve and ROTC 
Affairs, the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Reserve Compon­
ents, and the secretariat of the General Staff Committees on National 
Guard and Army Reserve Policy be joined into a single staff agency which 
can be held responsible for what happens or fails to happen in the field 
of Reserve policy.
There should, perhaps, be four divisions in the new staff sec­
tion; National Guard Affairs, Army Reserve Affairs, ROTC Affairs, and 
the secretariat of the general staff committees. The latter would be 
responsible for the presentation of information at meetings of the com­
mittees, the preparations of the committee’s reports, and for general 
administration of the committee’s responsibilities.
The objective is to move these agencies into a position so they
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can be held responsible for carrying out the goals of the Secretary of 
the Army and his superiors. Currently, the National Guard bureau acts 
independently to the extent that it is protected by the National Guard 
Association, It is essential that the unique system of appointment for 
the chief of the bureau be ended. He must not be required to have been 
for ten years a member of the National Guard, There must be no shackles 
on the Chief of Staff in choosing his Guard advisor— at least no more 
than govern the appointment of other members of the Army staff. Then 
the Chief of Staff can be held responsible, by the Secretary of the Army, 
for National Guard policy.
It is also essential that the Army adopt procedures to assure 
that the Reserve staff is adequately informed on Reserve matters. Here­
tofore, there have been miscellaneous colonels, lieutenant colonels and 
majors come and go on the Reserve staff. They are at that point in their 
Army career where a tour of staff duty is in order. Because of a record 
of excellent prior service or because they have friends already in the 
Pentagon, they are assigned at Department of Army level. Without ever 
having heard of the particular office before, they are given a position 
on the Reserve staff. They begin, in a most sincere way, to learn some­
thing about the Reserve Forces, Except for a few, they have no long 
range interest in the Reserve. Usually, before they have been able to 
master the intricacies of Reserve policy, they are transferred to field 
duty or some other job.
Therefore, it seems to be necessary to develop a corps of spe­
cialists, dedicated to an effective Reserve, if the Army staff is to 
show enough mental superiority to withstand the interest-group onslaught.
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The day must end when the lobbyists know more about the Reserve situa­
tion than do members of the staff.
Already the Army has administrative techniques for the selection 
of officers qualified for various types of duty with the civilian com­
munity, These personnel classification procedures must go further. A 
career field in Reserve management might be established whereby Army 
personnel would stay in Reserve work for a major portion of their careers 
and thereby develop a high degree of proficiency.
It seems worthwhile for the general staff policy committees to 
be retained as legitimate forums for the discussion of policy with the 
interest groups. No major changes are necessary. They are already 
strictly advisory in nature and constitute no interference with adminis­
trative responsibility.
From the standpoint of administrative efficiency, it would be 
better if the committee*s members were more efficient as advisors, more 
alert as liaison with the field, and more accurate as voices of the var­
ious interest groups. At the present time, the committee seem to be 
absorbed in Arngr politics— too anxious not to make anyone angry. It 
would be better if there were free and frank recognition that the Amgr 
Reserve members. National Guard members, and Regular Army members were 
outright spokesmen for their own interests. Presently, this is the role 
of the National Guard members, but the others are much less candid. Too 
many Reserve members are, as Senator Margaret Chase Smith calls some 
reservists, "too regular-minded." They tread lightly so as to retain 
the little influence they have in getting friends promoted and the like. 
They tend to be too pliant, and therefore all aspects of many problems
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do not get an adequate hearing. Consequently, the value of the committees 
is less than it should be.
The Control of Regular Army Interests 
The foregoing suggestions constitute the traditional remedies 
to illegitimate interference by pressure groups in the making of public 
policy. They will probably be sufficient to restrict the National Guard 
Association and the Reserve Officers Association, They cannot possibly 
be adequate to protect policy-makers from Regular Amy pressures. This 
is true because the Regular Army ̂  the Army staff which makes policy 
for the Reserves,
The only possible solution lies in the strict maintenance of 
civil supremacy. It is mandatory that civilian authorities in the Penta­
gon be able to keep all policy in accordance with the desires of Con­
gress and the people. To perform in this manner, they must be alert to 
the nature, goals, and political tactics of the Regular Army,
Civil supremacy has in the past been altogether inadequate.
This is partially shown by the ability of the Army to partially ignore 
the Army Reserve despite the fact that Congress, and probably the people, 
have wanted a big, effective Reserve,
In areas where the Regular Army puts its own interests ahead of 
policies announced by Congress, as seemingly occurred in the case of the 
Reserves, we must establish civil authorities in sufficiently strong 
positions to correct the situation. So far, civil supremacy has been 
largely a matter of a professional military organization outweighing non­
expert civilians. The high turnover keeps civilian secretaries in a
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johnny-come-lately status, and they are appallingly dependent on the 
Army staff.
The problem could probably be resolved in the next few decades 
by the establishment of a corps of civilian specialists who were in a 
position to dominate the Department of Defense, A nucleus of such a, 
corps already exists in the Pentagon. An example is seen in Mr. Gordon 
Gray who, beginning in the 1940^s served as Assistant and Under Secre­
tary of the Army, Assistant Secretary of Defense and Director of Defense 
Mobilization. Such personnel should be free of military discipline and 
military folkways. Whether or not they could be kept free of emotional 
involvement with the military "institution" and its interests is, of 
course, the fundamental question so far as the corps* effectiveness is 
concerned.
Whatever solutions are proposed, they must not involve the ruin­
ation of the military institution itself. There must be no dimunition 
of the esprit de corps of the Army or the other services. Its discipline, 
traditions, rank structure, and the like must be preserved until shown 
to be of no value in military operations. At the present time, there is 
no reason to believe that these factors are not important factors in the 
effectiveness of a field army. In establishing effective civil supre­
macy, there must be no hampering of the qualities which contribute to 
military effectiveness.
However, it might be advantageous to institutionalize, as a 
group, the managers of the Reserve program within the Regular Amy— to 
give them a semi-separate hierarchy. They might even be given some of 
the trappings of independence, but no actual autonomy. This would be for
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the purpose of dividing the Regular Army in order that it can be kept 
conquered. If a segment of the Regular Army were "civilian minded" by 
virtue of its long association with the civilian components and other 
civilian activities, there might be a better opportunity for containment 
of its interests.
Postscript
The decisions on the Reserve program that are pending, in 1957» 
are momentous, indeed. The most vital current question concerns our de­
pendence on Reserves rather than upon an active, professional Army. A 
number of similar decisions are long overdue. It is imperative that we 
decide what to do with the Reserve Forces. Generally speaking, we must 
either build a large Reserve machine constantly ready for battle, or 
quit deluding ourselves about the ability of any amateur army to win 
modern wars.
When the decisions are made, the pressure groups which have been 
considered here will have a strong voice in their formulation. If the 
goals and methods of these groups are widely understood at the time we 
will probably be able to prevent any undue influence which would hurt 
the nation. The danger comes from the current lack of public awareness.
The dangers are particularly great in that the power of these 
groups is possibly currently preventing the formulation of important pol­
icies. If not already in existence, a deadlock among these groups is 
conceivable. At least, there seems to be no current progress toward far- 
reaching decisions on the role of the Reserves. It is possible that we 
are moving steadily toward war while our three main interest groups battle 
among themselves for status, prestige and power.
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